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From a late night conversation between two taxi 
drivers waiting for customers in central Uppsala, 
2007: 
 
Driver 1: “It’s annoying when customers cannot 
separate left from right.” 
 
Driver 2: “Yeah, but I think most Swedes have a 
problem with that. Everyone who rides with me 
dislikes the moderates1, but still they won the elec-
tion”. 
 
(quoted in Rasti, Claesson, Fjellborg, and Jonason 
(2007:8), translation mine)  
 
 
 
                                                   
1 Moderates = The Swedish conservative party, Moderata samlingspartiet. 
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Voters’ Perceptions of Party 
Politics 
- A multilevel approach 
Introduction  
Modern representative democracies are most properly described as gov-
ernment by the consent of the governed rather than government by the 
people (Manin 1997; Schattschneider 1960). Elections are central to the 
democratic process and several scholars of modern democratic theory have 
struggled to determine the circumstances under which meaningful and ef-
fective representation can exist. One of the more prominent models used 
for theorizing on these matters is the responsible party model (RPM), 
which outlines a number of conditions that must be met in order for public 
policies to reflect mass opinion. In the RPM parties are assumed to present 
prospective policy programs during the election campaigns and so provide 
the basis for the choices voters will make. The voters are assumed to vote 
for the party whose policy program is closest to their own policy prefer-
ences. The elections are in this context reckoned as a process of mandate 
giving and when in government, parties will strive to fulfill the mandate by 
implementing their policy programs. Elections should thus function as a 
mechanism for generating agreement in the opinions of the voters and their 
elected representatives (Adams 2001; APSA 1950; Esaiasson and Holmberg 
1996; Pennings 1998; Thomassen 1999).  
Voters’ perceptions of parties’ policy positions are essential since democ-
ratic representation, conceived here as the correspondence between public 
policies and attitudes among voters, is unlikely to result from elections in 
which voters do not know where the parties stand or strongly disagree 
among themselves about the positions of parties. Under such a circum-
stance, the mandate apparently given would not necessarily reflect policies 
desired by a majority of the voters (Berelson 1952; Downs 1957; Schmitt 
and Thomassen 1999; Stokes 1963; van der Brug 1997).  
Several studies have demonstrated that voters often are relatively unin-
formed about political matters (Bartels 1996; Campbell, Converse, Miller, 
and Stokes 1960; Carpini and Keeter 1996; Converse 1964; Page and 
Shapiro 1992; Petersson 1998 et al.), and that voters often disagree in their 
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perceptions of the positions held by parties or candidates (Berelson 1952; 
Granberg and Holmberg 1988; van der Eijk, Franklin, et al. 1996). For 
example, in the American presidential election of 1948, Berelson found that 
only about 16 percent of the voters perceived the two candidates correctly 
(Berelson 1952). There are, however, just a few studies that have uncovered 
occasions where large collective misperceptions among voters have oc-
curred (Converse 1975; Granberg 1985). More commonly, the aggregated 
mean or median perception among voters when placing parties or candi-
dates on various scales tends to be a reasonably accurate representation of 
reality (Granberg 1993; Marcus 1982; Page 1978; van der Brug and van 
der Eijk 1999b; van der Brug 1997; 1998). 
The overarching research task in this book, however, is not to identify 
instances of large disagreement among voters or between voters and ‘their’ 
representatives. Instead, this study will focus on perceptual agreement (PA) 
among voters and the circumstances which (would) promote it. The term 
perceptual agreement refers here to the extent that voters' views of a 
party's policies coincide. The fact that voters collectively tend to perceive 
the positions of parties or candidates correctly is of course encouraging for 
the representative democracy. Nevertheless, even if the mean and median 
voter perception tends to be accurate, it does not necessarily tell us that 
much about the relevance of the perceptions for the vast majority of the 
voters. From this perspective, a high PA among voters is of particular im-
portance for a properly functioning representative democracy. If there is no 
agreement among voters about what parties stand for, then the individual 
choices apparently guided by policy preferences will turn out to be indistin-
guishable from random noise. Agreement about parties’ policies allows the 
collective outcome of such choices to be intelligible and, as such, it affects 
the extent to which voters are meaningfully represented in a political sys-
tem. By allowing voters to make informed electoral choices, perceptual 
agreement is an important determinant of the outcomes of electoral proc-
esses (Granberg and Holmberg 1988; van der Brug and van der Eijk 
1999b). It is therefore important to assess the factors that affect the extent 
to which voters share common perceptions of parties’ policy positions. 
Most research on political perceptions among voters has however, fo-
cused mostly on the impact of individual-level characteristics or cognition. 
Factors such as political knowledge (van der Brug 1997), left-right self 
placement and sympathy for a party, have proven to be influential on the 
accuracy and agreement in voters’ perceptions (Granberg 1993; Popkin 
1991). Other studies have shown that contextually related features such as 
differences in the political system (Granberg and Holmberg 1988) or the 
salience of an issue (Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; Oscarsson 1998; van 
der Brug 1997) can influence voters’ perceptions of party positions. Despite 
this work, not much is known about various contextual influences on vot-
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ers’ perceptions, i.e. whether the perceptual process is determined mainly 
by external stimulus or internal features. This is a relevant question that 
remains unanswered. 
The aim of this book is to deepen our understanding of which factors 
that affect PA, i.e. the extent to which voters share common perceptions of 
parties, by introducing some questions that more or less have been absent 
in prior research on the subject. More specifically, the aim is to study how 
voters’ perceptions of parties’ policy positions are affected by and interact 
with different political-institutional contexts. The project expands existing 
research on policy representation in general and voters’ perceptions in par-
ticular and contributes to the existing literature by addressing three sets of 
research questions.  
Firstly, the project draws the electoral and institutional context into the 
research on perceptions and perceptual agreement. Just as Madison as-
serted two centuries ago, it is today widely believed that architectural crea-
tion of political institutions is one of the cornerstones of a well-functioning 
representative democratic system (cited from Ferejohn and Kuklinski 
1990). Or as Key (1966) once noted, a political system gets the citizens it 
deserves. A common notion within the literature on electoral institutions is 
that the adoption of different electoral formulas creates different incentive 
structures for both individual voters and rational vote-seeking politicians, 
which affect their behavior (Farrell 1997; Norris 2004). For similar rea-
sons, the institutional settings also might bring different incentives that will 
motivate and assist voters when they acquire information about the parties’ 
policy positions. Institutional settings thus may have consequences for vot-
ers’ PA. 
Secondly the project brings the political parties into the PA equation. 
The RPM emphasizes the importance of responsible and cohesive parties 
that hold stable and divergent policy positions. Political parties serve as 
carriers of continuity, values and ideologies and are viewed as an important 
ingredient in representative democracy (Hoffman 2005; Katz and Mair 
1995). In spite of the organizational transformations that are claimed to 
have occurred today, political parties rather than single candidates remain 
the main actors in most modern representative systems (Dalton 1985; Dal-
ton and Wattenberg 2000; Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996). Earlier studies 
have shown that both voting behavior and the amount of political informa-
tion among voters is affected by various features of political parties, such as 
political labels (Snyder 2002), the electoral size (Cox 1997; van der Eijk, 
Franklin, and van der Brug 1999) or their ideological positions (Mac-
donald, Listhaug, and Rabinowitz 1991; Macdonald and Rabinowitz 1993; 
Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). Many political parties in modern times 
are facing problems with declining numbers of party members (Holmberg 
2007; Mair and van Biezen 2001) but they still (may) play crucial and im-
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portant roles as orientational instruments in the process of informing voters 
about political issues. 
Thirdly, the study investigates how individual voters interact with fac-
tors related to the political parties and the institutional context, thereby 
affecting the voters’ PA. Consequently, three sets of variables related to 
three different levels (systems, parties and individual voters) are modeled 
simultaneously in order to asses which factors or combination of factors 
has the greatest impact on PA of the voters. The study also examines to 
what extent differences in context might exaggerate or mitigate the ten-
dency by individual voters to yield to ‘wishful thinking’ when identifying 
party positions (i.e. a tendency among individuals to place parties or candi-
dates that they like close to themselves while those that are disliked will be 
pushed away when placing parties or candidates on various scales). It has, 
for example, been asserted that wishful thinking is a direct consequence of 
ambiguity and indistinctness in the political alternatives confronting voters 
(Granberg and Holmberg 1988; Holmberg 1999b). It has also been claimed 
that proportional electoral systems tend to promote more centralized party 
organizations that are more programmatically and ideologically oriented 
compared to parties in more disproportional or majoritarian systems 
(Holmberg 2006; Norris 2004). If this is true, we could reasonably also 
expect lower degrees of assimilation and contrast effects among voters in 
more proportional electoral system, which in turn should promote PA. 
The general theme through the book is thus a normative concern with 
political representation and the circumstances under which effective politi-
cal representation can exist. The book also provides an evaluation of the 
popular responsible party model. The study is based on three independent 
empirical studies which cover different but overlapping research fields such 
as voting behavior, political parties and electoral systems but have political 
representation in general and political perceptions among voters in particu-
lar as the common denominators. The analysis of the study is carried out 
by combining cross sectional time series data on individual voters with ob-
servations on party characteristics and electoral systems by using the results 
of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project (CSES) and the 
European Voter project.  
The present study shows that institutions matter and that factors related 
to the institutional structure exert significant direct effects on voters’ PA 
but that the political parties also mediate a series of important indirect ef-
fects on the voters. Differences related mainly to political parties followed 
by those of individual voters (such as behavior and characteristics) are, 
however, of greatest importance for shaping and affecting voters’ PA. 
A discussion of some of the basic requirements in the RPM for effective 
representation and the importance of left-right ideology as an information 
cue for voters follows this introduction. Next comes a discussion of the 
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dependent variable perceptual agreement and then a section on empirical 
and methodological considerations. The chapter closes with a presentation 
and summary of the results.  
A model of political representation 
Regular, competitive and free elections are the main instrument for political 
representation in contemporary representative democratic systems (Lau and 
Redlawsk 2006). Elections provide citizens with an opportunity to influ-
ence the direction of public policy directly through their ballots. The par-
ticipation in the policy making process is necessarily indirect since most 
democratic systems are very large scale. It is therefore important that on 
the election day, citizens are able to make informed and reasoned choices. 
An essential condition of representative democracy is the ability for parties 
and voters to communicate effectively so that voters are able to distinguish 
between different policy alternatives. Poor communication in this regard 
may seriously degenerate the quality of government. If voters’ perception of 
a party or a candidate’s position is blurred this may in the worst-case lead 
to serious distortions in the relationship between citizens and government 
with the 'wrong' policies getting enacted (Granberg and Holmberg 1988; 
van der Brug 1997).  
In simplified models of democracy, elections constitute the link between 
citizens and their representatives and the latter are often viewed as dele-
gates of the former, acting on their behalf and according to their will 
(Holmberg 1997; Monroe 1998; Page and Shapiro 1983; Schmitt 2000; 
Stimson 1995).2 Political parties are central in this context, serving as me-
diators between public preferences and policy outcomes as they translate 
problems into programs and - when in government - translate programs 
into action. These steps are an intrinsic part of indirect democracies and are 
the heart of the mandate and sanction theory, also known as the responsi-
 
 
                                                   
2 In reality, the relationship is more complex than this as parties not only present policy pro-
grams for the voters’ to decide upon, but also try to convince the voters that their policies are 
the most reasonable. In the literature on models of representation, there is usually a distinc-
tion between elite-driven and mass-driven processes. Simple dichotomies may be helpful but 
they seldom capture the whole concept; therefore, many scholars use the concept of dynamic 
representation where the process is more or less elite- or mass-driven (Esaiasson and Holm-
berg 1996; Holmberg 1997). 
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ble party model.3 The RPM has been the normative foundation in several 
studies concerning the functions of representative democratic systems, 
where it has been used to theorize about the necessary conditions for citi-
zens to select parties or candidates that represent their policy preferences 
(Granberg and Holmberg 1988; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Pedersen 
1983; Pennings 1998).4  
The RPM has often been criticized from a normative point of view for 
being a populist theory missing essential democratic values such as division 
of powers i.e. checks and balances. From an empirical perspective the 
model is often said to be unrealistic. The merit of the model however, is 
that it is useful when studying the actors and the processes of political rep-
resentation in a systematic manner. The founding assumptions of the model 
can then be used as benchmarks to evaluate the effectiveness of different 
aspects of systems of political representation, i.e. the ‘chain’ of representa-
tive democracy (Thomassen 1999).  
The RPM presumes that during an election campaign parties will present 
policy programs from which voters will make their choices and which will 
serve as a prospective mandate. Typical criteria assessed by the model are 
that parties should present divergent and stable policy programs so that 
voters are given meaningful electoral choices. With respect to the voters’, 
the RPM assumes that in some manner voters base their decisions on a 
comparative evaluation of the competing policy programs and then vote for 
the party or candidate whose policy-program best matches with their own 
preferences (APSA 1950; Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; Klingemann, Hof-
ferbert, and Budge 1994; Thomassen and Schmitt 1997).5  
 
 
                                                   
3 However, just as the voters’ preferences are expected to influence how they are evaluate the 
policy programs of the parties’ in the mandate model, the preferences of the voters are also 
central in the accountability model of voting. The main difference between the two models is 
that while the mandate model is prospective the accountability model is retrospective in the 
sense that voters are assumed to evaluate the parties on their past record rather than their 
programs for the future (Holmberg 2006). Nevertheless, the focus in this thesis is on elections 
viewed as a vehicle of preference aggregation through a process of mandate giving, just as in 
the RPM, rather than the elections as a process of sanctions and accountability. 
4 It should be noticed that the mandate theory does not necessarily imply that a representa-
tive democratic system has to rely on parties as the main actors in the shaping, the creation 
or the translation of the public opinion. In reality however, political parties have come to 
play an important roll in almost every modern democratic system (Dalton 1984; Katz and 
Mair 1995) even though their influence varies between countries due to factors such as the 
type of electoral system (Holmberg 2006).  
5 From a spatial perspective the model assumes that all issues, parties, candidates and voters 
can be located in an n-dimensional space, where smallest spatial distance is decisive for how 
voters choose to cast their ballots (Downs 1957). 
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The model can be summarized as: 
 
1. There must be at least two parties that are competing with dif-
ferent programs. 
2. The political parties should present stable and divergent policy 
positions so that the voters are given meaningful electoral alter-
natives.  
3. The parties need to be internally cohesive with sufficient party 
discipline to enable them to implement their policy programs. 
4. Voters are expected to vote rationally which implies voting for 
the party whose program are closest to their own preferences. 
a) Voters need to have policy preferences. 
b) They are aware of the main differences between the policy 
positions represented by different parties. 
Evaluating the responsible party model 
The responsible party model has also been labeled ‘the not so responsible 
party model’ (Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996). It has been discussed if the 
model asks too much of both parties and voters. The RPM demands that 
voters are well-informed on the policies of the parties and that they have 
preferences and it prescribes that political parties behave responsibly and 
formulate stable and divergent policy propositions. Despite the fact that 
normative models in general do not need to be realistic, it is interesting to 
ask whether there is any empirical validity to the model or if it just reflects 
a normative ideal of party-based representation that is somewhat beyond 
the reach of reality? 
Turning to the first element in the model as outlined above, it is clear 
that two or more parties are represented in the party system in most par-
liamentary democracies through out the world and especially in a European 
context. Furthermore, it is the political parties rather than the individual 
candidates that are the main actors in the parliaments (Dalton 1985; Gran-
berg 1985; Granberg and Holmberg 1988; Katz and Mair 1995).6 From 
 
 
                                                   
6 Unless noted otherwise, the analyses in this book will focus on the perceptions of party 
positions rather than those of individual candidates. The knowledge about party positions is, 
of course, only one type of political information on which voters can base their decisions. 
However, the theoretical implications of this study are equally applicable to candidates.  
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this perspective, the first criterion of the RPM seems to be well met.  
Concerning whether parties in general present stable and divergent pol-
icy positions or not, the second element of the RPM, several scholars have 
demonstrated a decline in ideological polarization between the major po-
litical parties in several West European party systems during the 1980’s and 
the 1990’s (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Oscarsson 1998; van der Brug 
1997). Researchers on party behavior have come to a slightly different con-
clusion however, namely that over a longer time perspective the decline in 
ideological polarization is not a linear phenomenon and that parties in gen-
eral are behaving as stipulated by the RPM. In contrast to the debate about 
the end of ideologies and the transformation of parties into ‘catch-all’ enti-
ties with vague election manifestos, the authors of the Comparative Mani-
festo Project (CMP) conclude that party ideologies are as vital as ever and 
that their ideological positions are both as stable and as diverse as required 
by the RPM (Adams 2001; Budge 1994; Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, 
Bara, and Tanenbaum 2001; Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 1987; Gunther 
and Diamond 2003; Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994). The cur-
rent study assumes with some justification that the second element of the 
RPM is adequately fulfilled. 
 An investigation by Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge (1994) of the 
relationship between the electoral policy programs of parties and the poli-
cies they enact when in power provides empirical support for the third ele-
ment of the RPM. Based on ten western countries over a 40 year period, 
the results show a clear relationship between what politicians say and what 
they ultimately do. The authors conclude that election manifestos indeed 
predict party actions and that parties are the central actors in representative 
political systems (Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994). Research on 
parties’ specific election promises provides further support, in that parties 
are found to act on most of their promises in most systems investigated 
(Mansergh and Thomson 2007; Naurin (forthcoming 2009); Royed 1996). 
The fourth and final element(s) of the RPM relate to individual voters 
and voting behavior. As set out by the RPM, political representation is only 
obtained if citizens vote according to their policy preferences. For several 
decades of research on voters and elections it was believed widely that the 
decisions made when voting were a result mainly of long term factors such 
as social alignment and partisanship (Farrell 1996). Less attention was 
spent on the effect of various contextual or short term factors on voting 
behavior. The received wisdom about voting behavior was reconsidered 
several times since voters from the mid-1970s onwards in both Western 
Europe and North America became more disposed to vote according to 
their policy preferences rather than to different group or party loyalties 
(Finkel 1993; Holmberg 2004; Lane, Martikainen, Svensson, Vogt, and 
Valen 1993; Narud and Aalberg 1999; Oscarsson 1998; Smith 2001). To-
Introduction – Voters’ Perceptions of Party Politics 
 23  
day, the left-right ideology is held as the single most important predictor 
behind party choice in Western countries (Holmberg and Oscarsson 2004; 
van der Eijk, Franklin, and van der Brug 1999; van der Eijk, Schmitt, and 
Binder 2005). It would appear then, that in the last few decades the first 
part of the fourth element of the RPM has been met satisfactorily as well. 
The final underlying criterion in the RPM (4b) asserts that voters should 
be informed and knowledgeable of the main differences between the par-
ties’ policy positions. In this respect the amount of political knowledge 
among voters is an important determinant of the quality of the outcomes of 
electoral processes, as it is more likely that well informed rather than ill-
informed voters make electoral decisions that properly reflect their atti-
tudes toward public policies. Of concern are several empirical studies that 
demonstrate that the average level of political knowledge among the citi-
zens in many countries is modest at best (Bartels 1996; Berelson, Lazars-
feld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; 
Carpini and Keeter 1991; Carpini and Keeter 1996; Converse 1970; Peters-
son 1998 et al.). If the process of representation is to be acceptable norma-
tively, a necessary condition that must be fulfilled is that voters have ex-
plicit preferences and that they are informed about different policy alterna-
tives (Adams 2001; Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; Klingemann, Hoffer-
bert, and Budge 1994; Naurin 2003; Pennings and Lane 1998; Thomassen 
1999; van der Brug 1999a). If voters are not capable of an enlightened and 
educated understanding (see Dahl 1989), the idea of representative democ-
racy is beyond reach (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). 
One can conclude that at the least from a West European perspective, 
most aspects of the RPM are met to a large extent. Nevertheless, as stipu-
lated by the RPM, no matter how often all the criteria above are met, if the 
requirement of informed and knowledgeable voters is not met then democ-
ratic representation is unattainable. Perceptual agreement is essential here 
as an expression of effective and successful communication within a sys-
tem. PA is, hence, an indication of collective rationality and successful 
communication within a political system. 
Next follows a discussion of how vote decisions based on agreement 
among voters about parties’ ideological left-right positions can work as a 
guarantor of effective policy representation. 
Informed votes and reasoned choices – a foundation of repre-
sentative democracy 
For more than a half century, voters’ knowledge on matters of political or 
societal character has been the subject of several studies. Many of these 
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studies came to the conclusion that the amount of detailed information 
among voters was poor in general and that the normative requirement of 
reasoned choice was beyond the capability of the vast majority of the citi-
zenry (Lupia and McCubbins 1998; see for example Campbell, Converse, 
Miller, and Stokes 1960). According to Lupia and McCubbins the diver-
gence between the necessity of delegation and citizens' incapability of rea-
soned choices constitutes a democratic dilemma as it threatens to reduce 
the idea of representative democracy to an illusion (Lupia and McCubbins 
1998). Many scholars and political commentators consider that the di-
lemma is real and that voters generally are ignorant of the details in the 
decisions they face (Bartels 1996; Berelson 1952; Campbell, Converse, 
Miller, and Stokes 1960; Carpini and Keeter 1996; Converse 1964; Dean 
and Moran 1977; Holmberg and Oscarsson 2004; Key 1966; Kinder and 
Sears 1985; Kuklinski 2002; Luskin 1987; Page and Shapiro 1992; Peters-
son 1998 et al.; Schumpeter 1950; Zaller 1992).7  
There is however, no consensus among researchers when it comes to 
questions about the levels of political information among citizens. Some 
scholars argue that voters are not as uninformed about political matters as 
some studies have reported (Holmberg 2000; Holmberg and Oscarsson 
2004; Key 1966; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1979; Oscarsson 1998; Page and 
Shapiro 1992). It has also been suggested that the political skills of voters 
have improved during the second half of the last century due to the growth 
of the mass-media, the development of the welfare state, rising levels of 
formal education and an increasing social and geographical mobility 
among citizens (Thomassen 2005). Those who hold that voters tend to be 
relatively uniformed about political matters can be divided into two sub 
camps: those who hold a positive view of voters’ potential abilities; and 
those who are negatively disposed.  
Among the latter group we find of those who are negatively disposed 
towards the individual voters’ abilities and believe that a true democratic 
society in many ways is an illusion and those who yet still believe that a 
good democratic society is possible. This idea originates with Condorcet 
(see Page and Shapiro 1992) and relies on statistical theory indicating that 
individual shortcomings will equal out on average and the collective opin-
ion will therefore be rational (Ferejohn and Kuklinski 1990; Oscarsson 
1998; Page and Shapiro 1992).  
 
 
 
                                                   
7 A valid explanation for the often low amount of information among voters is that among 
most citizens the interest in politics is often moderate (Zaller 1992). 
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Figure 1. A classification of different theoretical strands about information 
and voting behavior 
 
 
 
An alternative position to be found in this debate (but also constituting a 
bridge of sorts between the first two overarching positions) emanates from 
the positive tradition and argues that voters in fact are capable of mak-
ing complex decisions and doing so, what is more, on the basis of very little 
information (Adams 2001; Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich 1984; Holm-
berg and Oscarsson 2004; Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; 
Oscarsson 1998; 2006; van der Brug 1997). The key point here is the 
fact that voters use heuristics in their decision making, and this is claimed 
to be a sufficient basis for reasoned choices (Feldman and Conover 1983; 
Fiske and Linville 1980; Kinder 1993; Popkin 1991; Slothuus 2008; Tomz 
and Sniderman 2004; Zaller 1992). Anthony Downs furthermore, argued 
in defense of the uniformed votes that it was irrational for a voter to be 
fully informed about the policies of the parties or candidates on a range of 
different issues. This because the costs personally are too high in relation to 
the collective gain from voting as one's vote drowns in the sea of other 
votes (Downs 1957).8 Voters therefore sensibly use information shortcuts 
 
 
                                                   
8 According to Downs' model, governments formulate policy to satisfy as many voters as 
possible; but no voter will be pleased by a policy if s/he does not prefer it over the alterna-
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when considering how to vote.9  
The importance of heuristics for political representation 
An electorate with clear and shared perceptions of the party space has re-
peatedly been identified as one important prerequisite for successful politi-
cal representation (Schmitt and Thomassen 1999; van der Brug 1997). A 
range of studies in the field of political representation focus on citizens’ 
abilities to perceive political messages from elites, i.e. how well policy al-
ternatives and issue positions are being communicated to citizens. In order 
to achieve a meaningful communication, citizens need to gain clear, shared 
and correct views of the main alternatives and be able to identify the most 
important differences between them (Berelson 1952). To manage all of this 
in an efficient way, rational voters use heuristics – i.e. ideologies, cognitive 
schemas or belief systems – as cost-reducing devices or cognitive shortcuts 
(Downs 1957; Popkin 1991; Zaller 1992). 
The idea that voters can make reasoned choices on the basis of limited 
information is today a rather established concept within the field of voting 
studies. In the 1950s, for example, Berelson, Lazarfeld, and McPhee (1954) 
and Downs (1957) argued that voters rely on opinion leaders, political par-
ties and ideologies to overcome their information shortfalls. Anthony 
Downs in particular, delivered the insight in An Economic Theory of De-
mocracy that parties’ ideological positions serve as one of the more promi-
nent cognitive cues or information short cuts for voters (see also Oscarsson 
1998; Popkin 1991; van der Brug 1997). Ideologies are thus working as 
                                                                                                                       
tives. In order to prefer one policy over the other, a voter needs to be informed about the 
alternatives. In this situation, information enables voters to have specific preferences, which 
in turn influence government policies that affect them. By voting, a citizen then has the op-
portunity to influence the government policies for the next mandate period; and by voting on 
the grounds of expected performance, a voter tries to maximize his/her utility. If the utility is 
too low and the information cost is too high, a voter may abstain. Downs' theory assumes 
that peoples’ perceptions of parties and policies are guided by a common underly-
ing spatial structure. In a two-party system, parties and voters are normally seen as distrib-
uted along a single ideological dimension, most commonly the left-right dimension. In order 
to maximize their vote-share parties make adjustments to their position in either direction 
along the conflict dimensions in an attempt to attract as many voters as possible (Downs 
1957). In a multi-party system the situation is a bit more complex since the electoral competi-
tion is often fought on the basis of multiple dimensions and the relative importance of the 
different dimensions is likely to be weighted different by each actor (Robertson 1976; 
Sjöblom 1968; Stokes 1963). 
9 The theory draws heavily from rational choice theory where voters are assumed to be cogni-
tive misers but by using various types of information short cuts they will still be able to act 
rationally when deciding which candidate or party to vote for (Zaller 1992).  
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cognitive schemas which voters use in order to process real-world informa-
tion or, to some extent, compensate for a lack thereof.10 Downs built his 
theory partially on the empirical findings of the Columbia studies (see 
Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960), suggesting that voters 
mostly lack knowledge about governments and politics (Popkin 1991). 
Downs point was that voters’ lack the incentives to collect information 
about political matters for the sole purpose of improving their voting 
choices. Note that by relying on cognitive cues and schemas voters are not 
sacrificing their issue orientation; instead, they are dealing with it in a more 
economical way (Downs 1957).11  
Nevertheless, reasoned choices based on cognitive schemas do require 
some knowledge and voters have two options to gain this knowledge. 
Firstly, they can obtain knowledge from personal experience. Secondly, 
they can obtain knowledge from other voters (Lupia 1994; Lupia and 
McCubbins 1998). In many political situations, only the second option is 
available because politics can encompass problems that are unfamiliar to 
the voters' own experience (Lane 1995). A person who wants to make a 
reasoned choice consequently must have the opportunity to learn from ex-
ternal sources (Lupia and McCubbins 1998).  
Scholars have delivered several explanations for different sources of 
 
 
                                                   
10 Party ideologies are generally reckoned as being concretized through the party program 
and advertised in the election manifestos, which in the U.S are often referred to as election 
platforms (Budge 1994). In agreement with most discussion, the concept of ideology is here 
understood as a value or belief system that is accepted as fact or truth by some group, com-
posed of sets of attitudes towards the various institutions and processes of society. It provides 
the believer with a picture of the world both as it is and as it should be, and in so doing, it 
organizes the tremendous complexity of the world into something fairly simple and under-
standable; ideologies thus provide a cognitive structure through which to interpret and un-
derstand events (see Demker 1993; Kilander 1991; Page and Shapiro 1992 for a similar in-
terpretation). 
11 The problem with an uninformed electorate may also be of less importance when consider-
ing the fact that factual knowledge of the kind often measured in election surveys is not al-
ways decisive for reasoned choices (Churchland 1995). Or as Page and Shapiro put it: “Does 
it really matter whether people can name political figures, so long as they can find or recog-
nize their names when needed and know something about the main candidates on the ballot? 
How important was it to be able to identify SALT or NATO or other acronyms, so long as 
people knew the United States belonged to an anti-Soviet military alliance and had talked 
about arms control with the USSR? Is it really necessary to know the length of terms of of-
fice? Elections come when they come, regardless” (Page and Shapiro 1992:12). According to 
these authors, many of the questions about political Information in surveys are founded on 
more lexical matters and details, which is the main reason why voters in general are often 
seen as being uninformed. Page and Shapiro’s point is that questions like that do not neces-
sarily capture the essence of a reasoned choice (see also Holmberg and Oscarsson 2004). 
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learning e.g. potential cognitive cues and schemas. Some scholars argue 
that people rely on factors such as ideology, i.e. left-right position (Bobbio 
1996; Budge et al. 2001; Oscarsson 1998; van der Brug and van der Eijk 
1999b) social class (Oskarson 1994) and party identification (Berelson, 
Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 
1960). How voters make choices is inherent in the varying value and usage 
of party cues. Party identification has traditionally been identified as a well-
known and widely used voter cue (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 
1960; Enelow and Hinich 1984; Fiorina 1981; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 
1979; Popkin 1991; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). It is, however, 
not an equally valuable cue for all voters or in all situations. Party identifi-
cation is a useful cue only if it conveys information about knowledge and 
trust. If voters are going to be affected by partisan appeals, they must be 
able to recognize speakers who share their party identification. They also 
must have some basis for trusting these speakers, and this may be obtained 
from the perception of common interests with the speakers or from their 
own party or from the presence of some external factor that bestows trust-
worthiness on the speakers (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). Other types of 
cues are economic or sociotropical evaluations (Holmberg and Oscarsson 
2004; Kumlin 2004; Pattie 2001). Certain issues are more important than 
others for most voters, which may imply known issue biases (Calvert 
1985). According to spokesmen of the accountability model, many voters 
base their decisions on a retrospective evaluation of a party or a candidate, 
where certain histories of observed behaviors may be a guiding principle 
(Downs 1957; Holmberg 1999a). Alternative channels to information on 
political matters may emerge from a search for parties or candidates with 
shared policy interests or elite status (Zaller 1992). Some scholars ar-
gue that people learn from the aggregate actions of others, as represented 
by histories (Fiorina 1981; Key 1966), or opinion polls (McKelvey and 
Ordeshook 1985). Clearly, there are several types of cognitive cues accessi-
ble to voters.  
It is of course an individual question as to what kind of cues a voter will 
make use of but it also depends on what cues are available. Election cam-
paigns are central with regard to improving or making cues available for 
voters (Popkin 1991). During election campaigns, numerous speakers from 
political parties, interest groups, media organisations, friends and family 
offer advice to voters about how they should cast their ballots. Since cam-
paigns have a framing effect they will also be important for unifying the 
electorate around a given set of issues, as some dimensions or cleavages will 
be highlighted during a campaign, and this will assist voters to make their 
choices (Budge et al. 2001; Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 1987; Klinge-
mann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994; Popkin 1991).  
In spite of this large body of literature, we do not know much about the 
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quality of the cues or how well they function. In fact, can more detailed 
information be substituted by cues and schemas? Lupia and McCubbins 
tried to answer this question by testing theories on connectionism, in ex-
perimental studies.12 Their study confirms that voters do not necessarily 
need detailed political information to make a reasoned choice as the use of 
different cognitive cues can sufficiently inform them (Lupia 1998; 1994). In 
conclusion, Downs (1957) asserted that it is rational for a voter to be igno-
rant on political information from a cost-benefit perspective and Lupia and 
McCubbins showed that by using cognitive cues voters can obtain suffi-
cient information for making reasoned choices (Lupia and McCubbins 
1998 see also; Tomz and Sniderman 2004 for a similar study).  
However, the debate between heuristics versus factual knowledge has 
become more nuanced in recent years, since different studies confronting 
theories about short-cuts with empirical data, have ended up with diverse 
and many times discouraging results (Luskin 2002). Bartels and Oscarsson 
for example, empirically demonstrated that 'knowledge effects' do exist in 
the aggregated votes of the American and Swedish electorate. The authors 
conclude that an extensive use of cognitive heuristics cannot fully compen-
sate for a voter’s lack of factual political knowledge (Bartels 1996; Oscars-
son 2007). Other studies showed that almost all voters utilize cognitive 
heuristics, especially in situations where the decisions are complex and this 
use increases the probability of correct voting among more knowledgeable 
voters, but has the opposite effect among novices (Lau and Redlawsk 2006; 
Lau and Redlawsk 2001). Recently, Blaies et. al. presented evidence of an 
information effect in three out of six Canadian elections. The analysis also 
showed that when the positions of all parties were clearly visible for the 
voters, there was no information effect and the shortcuts employed by the 
less informed voters seemed to work efficiently. One drawback however, 
was that the less informed voters often did not consider the full set of 
available options (Blais, Gidengil, Fournier, and Nevitte 2009). It has also 
 
 
                                                   
12 Connectionism is a concept taken from the cognitive science and can best be explained as 
the process where people systematically connect current observations of their physical world 
to physical or emotional responses derived from experience. Connectionist models show how 
people systematically attribute meaning to new or relevant objects by connecting them with 
already familiar objects, procedures, or people. Connectionist activity underlies the capacity 
of recognizing features or patterns given only partial information and, by focusing attention 
on different features of one's sensory input, the ability in an instant to see complex analogies 
by recalling relevant information, (Lupia 1998). Reasoned choice would require encyclopae-
dic information without a process like connectionism, with such a process, reasoned choice 
requires less information (Popkin 1991). 
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been shown that different ideological schemes affect attitudes towards the 
third sector (i.e. voluntary, non-profit organizations) among voters in Swe-
den (Kumlin 2001). Yet another Swedish study, based on a self-recruited 
convenience sample, points towards the fact that knowledge about parties’ 
ideological position can be used as an information rationale/cue for parties’ 
positions on a row of underlying factual issues, even for the group of least 
informed voters (Dahlberg 2009).  
An explanation for the variation in the results of the studies presented 
above, aside of differences in terms of operationalizations and research de-
sign, could be that the theories about ideological short-cuts were developed 
mainly in an American context. Previous studies show that there are sub-
stantial differences between the political contexts of America and Europe, 
with differences in the impact of ideology on voting behavior providing one 
of the greatest contrasts (Granberg and Holmberg 1988). It has also been 
suggested that different sources of information are not equally valuable in 
retrospective or prospective elections (Oscarsson 2007). This implies that 
even if theories of ideological short-cuts tend to be falsified in certain con-
texts, this does not necessarily mean that they lack validity in other con-
texts. 
Prior research forms the basis of a conclusion that short-cuts cannot 
fully substitute for an absence of factual political knowledge but under cer-
tain circumstances and to some extent, they can be used as an information 
substitute that will improve individuals’ behavior more than would chance 
alone. More research is needed before we can say anything more certain 
about the use and the qualities of different short-cuts and schemas. Proba-
bly it is not as simple as an either/or question but rather a matter of differ-
ent ways of processing political information. 
Based on prior research, I argue that if voters can make adequate elec-
toral choices by using cognitive cues in a context of limited information, 
then one of the more prominent and valid information shortcuts available 
to them will be the parties’ ideological left-right positions. The strength of 
the left-right dimension is that it summarizes positions on a large number 
of underlying issues and ultimately, does not only structure voters’ prefer-
ences but may also be used as an information rationale. By being knowl-
edgeable about the left-right dimension, information regarding the parties’ 
left-right positions can be used as information short cuts to the parties’ 
standpoints on several concrete issues (Downs 1957; Fuchs and Klinge-
mann 1990; Holmberg and Oscarsson 2004; Oscarsson 1998; van der Brug 
1997; 1999a). Perceptual agreement among voters on parties’ ideological 
left-right positions can thus work as a guarantor for successful political 
representation.  
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Ideology as a cognitive cue 
History provides endless examples of the extensive use of spatial metaphors 
for organizing abstract social, political and religious beliefs and thought 
systems (Laponce 1981). In West European countries, the left-right dimen-
sion has had a major impact on voting behavior for a long time. Political 
actors and issues are often discussed in media or by political commentators 
with metaphorical reference to points on a left-right continuum (Budge et 
al. 2001; Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 1987; Dahlberg and Oscarsson 
2006; Oscarsson 1995; Thomassen 1999; van der Brug and van der Eijk 
1999b; van der Eijk, Franklin, and al. 1996; van der Eijk, Franklin, and 
van der Brug 1999).13 Since its origin in the late 18th century, the bipolar 
left-right construction has shown a remarkable resilience, reproducing itself 
in new polities and in new historical and social contexts. The absorptive 
power of the left-right semantics is impressive; for instance in Europe, reli-
gious, liberal economic and materialist values all contribute to a rightist 
identification of citizens while secular, anti-capitalistic and post-materialist 
values contribute to leftist identification (Knutsen 1995a; Knutsen 1999; 
Mair 1997). Although the substantive meaning and interpretation of the 
left-right distinction has not remained the same for two hundred years – 
excepting for the key element of ‘equality’ (Bobbio 1996) – the distinction 
has played a crucial role as an information cost reducing device for political 
actors. Leaders have made extensive use of the left-right grammar for sen-
ding political messages that otherwise probably would have been incom-
prehensible for many voters. The left-right distinction thus has an impor-
tant orientational function for individual citizens, as well as communicative 
function for political systems (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Inglehart and 
Klingemann 1976).  
Of course, the left-right dimension is not the only conflict dimension 
represented in most political systems.14 One objection might be that the 
ideological left-right division is only valid for well-established idea-based 
parties, with their origins in the ideologies of the 19:th century, and does 
 
 
                                                   
13 This spatial metaphor is as old as modern representative democracy itself and has obvi-
ously survived through the centuries. The left-right dichotomy derives from the days of the 
French revolution where the national assembly was organised with the radicals sitting to the 
left and the conservatives to the right (Oscarsson 1998; Holmberg 2004) 
14 For example, the result from a study made by Paul Warwick shows that among 16 West 
European countries three common dimensions can be identified, where the left-right dimen-
sion is the most prominent one followed by social control and post-materialism (Warwick 
2002).  
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not necessarily encompass interest parties or more recently emerged parties 
with other values, such as environmental movements etc.15 However, Swed-
ish election studies have shown that the left-right dimension tends to re-
produce itself so that it lasts over time and embraces parties that initially 
do not fit in the ideological left-right dimension (Oscarsson 1998). This is 
also something that happened with D’66, a democratic party founded in 
Holland in 1966 with the aim to break up traditional cleavages and ideolo-
gies. Notwithstanding this ambition, the party soon developed into a leftist 
liberal party with few explicit ambitions to ‘shatter’ the existing party sys-
tem (van der Eijk and Niemöller 1983). This implies that newcomers that 
survive the first critical years tend to absorb into the party system and the 
dominating conflict dimensions in politics such as the left-right dimension.  
We cannot say for certain what the spatial left-right distinction itself has 
meant for the formation and functioning of Western representative demo-
cracies. It is not very controversial however, to conclude that the left-right 
metaphor provides a powerful base for communication and that the pro-
cess of political representation is more efficient if citizens and elites share 
the same perceptions of the ideological landscape, utilizing a common po-
litical language. 
Potential (dis-)advantages when studying voters’ perceptions of 
the left-right positions of political parties  
Even though the left-right dimension was and still is one of the most 
prominent conflict dimensions in many countries there are signs that it has 
decreased in importance in recent years (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). 
This may be true to the extent that the distances between parties have been 
decreasing during the last decade, as in the case of Sweden (Holmberg 
2000; Oscarsson 1998) and in the Netherlands. However, the results from 
a comparative longitudinal analysis of eight West European countries also 
indicate that there is a pronounced tendency for the bulk of the public to 
place themselves in the centre of the left-right scale (Knutsen 1998).  
Nevertheless, we know from extensive previous research that a moder-
ate-to-strong left-right dimension occurs in all countries within the Euro-
 
 
                                                   
15 Most parties do, however, have some kind of ideological foundation. Even if a party is 
founded upon traditional ideological belief systems or is meant to represent the interest of a 
certain group of people or organized around other values, there is often a common set of 
ideas or values that constitutes the core of the party (Bäck and Möller 2003). 
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pean Union (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann and Fuchs 1995; Knutsen 
1988; Knutsen 1989; Knutsen 1995a; van der Eijk, Schmitt, and Binder 
2005; Warwick 2002).16 Recent studies have underscored the importance of 
left-right in European politics. Studies of perceptual accuracy – which re-
quire comparisons of elites’ and citizens’ positioning – have shown that 
European voters have fairly accurate perceptions of parties’ left-right po-
sitions. Moreover, European voters are generally more accurate about left-
right positions than they are for any other comparable issue dimension (van 
der Brug and van der Eijk 1999b). Results from a recent comparative study 
made by Dahlberg and Oscarsson also show that European parties are scat-
tered across most of the left-right ideological spectrum and that the left-
right dimension represents a strong, and even the strongest, structuring 
force on citizens’ political preferences (Dahlberg and Oscarsson 2006). 
Voters’ perceptions of party positions along the left-right dimension is still 
very informative with regard to the main forces that shape government 
formation, party competition and voting behavior in a vast majority of EU 
countries. At least within a European context, it therefore seems as the left-
right dimension still remains a relevant factor for structuring voters’ party 
preferences. But even if political orientation is one of the strongest predic-
tors of voting preferences, these policies will not reflect a voter’s attitudes if 
s/he does not correctly perceive the parties’ policy positions.  
Voters’ perceptions of party positions are influenced by the salience of 
an issue. Compared with other kinds of issue dimensions, the strength of 
the left-right dimension could be that it is not as sensitive to salience as are 
other position issues such as nuclear power, abortion etc. that tend to go 
through some kind of life-cycle (Gilljam 1988; Oscarsson 1998; van der 
Brug 1997).  
Most political systems are, of course, best depicted as multidimensional 
political landscapes. However, for two important reasons this study will be 
limited to the left-right dimension. Firstly, the left-right dimension repre-
sents the single common denominator of most national party systems. It is 
more or less salient in all countries covered in this study. The second argu-
ment is of a more practical nature and concerns the fact that the left-right 
dimension is the only available and comparable dimension in most election 
studies through out the world. Furthermore, the left-right dimension is not 
too vulnerable to a frequent problem with comparative designs concerning 
variations in the questioning between different national election surveys. 
 
 
                                                   
16 Ireland being the interesting exception where religion outscores left-right ideology (see 
Klingemann and Fuchs 1995). 
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The left-right question is fairly invariable and usually takes the form: 
“Where would you place party x on a left-right scale stretching from y to 
z?”. The advantage of survey questions like this is that we do not have to 
consider what the left-right dimension actually means or what it contains in 
every single country, even if to some extent left-right issues will differ be-
tween countries depending on history, traditions, culture, etc.17  
Perceptual agreement - the dependent variable  
An underlying implication of the responsible party model is, as mentioned, 
that voters and their elected representatives share relatively similar percep-
tions and that those perceptions held by the voters’ are in correspondence 
with the positions of the parties’ or the candidates in different issue dimen-
sions (APSA 1950). Votes based on perceptual agreement in left-right terms 
will yield meaningful mandates for the policies that parties propose to the 
extent that left-right perceptions of the voters accurately reflect policy posi-
 
 
                                                   
17 Political perceptions or the ability of putting parties in their place on a left-right scale de-
mands some kind of knowledge or sophistication. In democratic theory there is a long tradi-
tion that prescribes an informed citizenry as a crucial element to democratic politics (see Dahl 
1989). But what exactly is political knowledge or sophistication? According to Converse 
(1964), political sophistication is a cognitive property such as a belief system used when con-
sidering different alternatives or thinking abstractly about politics, for example, on how dif-
ferent issues fit together in a coherent framework. Also Luskin (1987) defines political so-
phistication or knowledge as a set of beliefs and attitudes which constitutes a cognitive com-
plexity about politics. Given a common definition of the concept of political knowl-
edge/sophistication, a second question is how political information or sophistication can be 
measured empirically? Most scholars typically rely on two different measures of political 
knowledge. The first and probably most simple approach often uses an individual item, 
mostly a NES item asking for the interviewer’s subjective assessment of the respondent’s level 
of knowledge about politics (Bartels 1996). The second most common strategy is to use series 
of factual questions from NES and construct some kind of index used as a knowledge scale, 
where respondents are ranked by how many questions they answer correctly (Carpini and 
Keeter 1996; Holmberg and Oscarsson 2004; Zaller 1992). Despite their popularity, both 
these methods have their drawbacks. Most importantly one single item can seldom measure 
the complexities of political sophistication and will thus inevitably tend to become extremely 
imprecise (Levendusky 2003). Nevertheless, given that a common definition of perceptions is 
that it refers to the cognitions or beliefs that voters have of different political phenomena, 
such as: ‘party A is opposed to death penalties’ or that ‘party B is a left winged feminist 
party’ (Granberg and Holmberg 1988). I prefer to use this question as a measure for voters’ 
perceptions rather than voters’ political knowledge. Especially since knowledge, in my view, 
is a broader and more comprehensive concept that demands several different empirical meas-
ures compared to perceptions.  
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tions of parties (van der Brug 1999a).  
Party positions often serve as anchors and at least two kinds of party po-
sitions can be distinguished from a voter perspective: ideological positions 
and positions on concrete issues. Ideological positions on a left-right di-
mension have been shown to summarize party policies effectively on a wide 
range of specific policies and issues, both in terms of position issues and 
priorities. Earlier research has shown that cues, such as the left-right posi-
tions of political parties, have validity and often are highly accurate. In sev-
eral studies it has been proven that the aggregated mean or median position 
among voters when placing parties or candidates on various scales tend to 
be reasonably accurate when confronted with alternative sources of the 
same assessment (Granberg 1993; Page 1978; van der Brug and van der 
Eijk 1999b; van der Brug 1997; 1998).  
In a study by Wouter van der Brug (2001) in the Netherlands, voters’ 
perceptions of party positions were contrasted with alternative indicators 
of parties’ policy positions such as party manifestos, surveys among the 
member of the parliament and roll-calls. The results showed that voters’ 
perceptions of party positions on six different issues were in general accu-
rate, even for the least informed group of voters. These results are also con-
firmed in van der Brug and van der Eijk’s study of the European parliament 
election in 1994 in which they compared the perceptions of voters in the 
member states with the perceptions of the members of the European par-
liament on similar issues. The results showed that voters’ perceptions of 
party positions were moderately to strongly related to the parties’ ‘true’ 
positions. The results also indicated that the accuracy was considerably 
higher in the case of left-right positions (van der Brug and van der Eijk 
1999b). Voters who use left-right ideologies as cues or information short-
cuts to assess parties’ stand-points on specific issues may thus acquire ade-
quate perceptions even when all direct information concerning the parties’ 
positions is missing. 
If elections are to function as vehicles for preference aggregation, a 
party’s election platform must however, to some extent be perceived in a 
similar manner by a vast majority of the voters (Downs 1957; Stokes 
1963). PA is a relevant constituent in this respect. 
Perceptual agreement is, however, not necessarily the same as perceptual 
accuracy as the possibility that all voters are wrong simultaneously cannot 
be excluded. That has happened, even though it is an exceptional event. 
Philip Converse drew attention to the example of the 1968 primary elec-
tions for the U.S. party nominations, where Eugene McCarthy opposed the 
sitting president, Lyndon, B Johnson. McCarthy was the ‘dove’ fighting 
against the ‘hawk’ with a main election pledge to disengage the U.S. from 
the Vietnam War. In the election, McCarthy received 42 percent of the 
votes against 48 percent for the sitting president, a result that was inter-
preted as a major victory for the peace movement. However, survey data 
later showed that the major support for McCarthy came from ‘hawks’ in 
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who’s opinion the Johnson administration was not pursuing the war with 
enough vigor. The ‘hawks’ who had supported McCarthy assumed that he 
disagreed with Johnson for the same reasons as they did (Quoted from van 
der Brug 1997). Misunderstandings between voters and their representa-
tives, as in this example, are probably rare. It nonetheless, illustrates the 
importance of effective communication and that voters’ accurately perceive 
the parties’ or the candidates’ positions on different issues or conflict di-
mensions.  
Finding valid indicators of a party’s true position is a problem related to 
the question of perceptual accuracy and is especially a problem in compara-
tive research. An objective measure for accuracy would of course be suit-
able but as far as I am concerned, the closest comparative and ‘neutral’ 
source would be to use election manifestos. Such data do exist through the 
work conducted by the Comparative Manifesto Project ((CMP) see Budge 
et al. 2001) but only for a limited number of countries, and this is inade-
quate for this study as it requires the variable for all the country/election 
data points.18 However, in the Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems 
dataset (CSES) the placement of parties have been made by both voters and 
experts in almost each country. Table 1 presents the results from a com-
parison between voters and experts when placing parties on an eleven point 
left-right scale. Accuracy is here measured as the absolute deviation be-
tween the mean position for a specific party in a country as perceived by 
the voters and the placement of the same party made by a country ex-
pert(s). The coefficient thus indicates the average deviation in each country 
between voters and experts. Agreement is calculated as van der Eijk’s 
measure for agreement on ordered rating scales (van der Eijk 2001). The 
coefficient is bound between -1 and +1, where -1 indicates total disagree-
ment and +1 is the same as maximum agreement. A uniform distribution 
yields an agreement value of 0.19  
 
 
 
                                                   
18 Moreover, in order to construct a left-right scale based on election manifestos one need a 
solid knowledge about the parties over time in all the countries, and that is difficult to ac-
quire. An inductive solution on the problem could be to look for relationships within the 
election manifestos by factor analysis, a method used by the CMP. Nevertheless, since the 
left-right dimension is a spatial concept, there will be a proximity relationship between the 
election manifestos and the left-right position, where parties on the left-wing will emphasize 
left issues and visa versa. Factor analyses are prone to generate deceptive results for this rea-
son (van der Brug 2001). Another drawback related to the use of factor analysis on manifesto 
data is that the variables tend to outnumber the cases (Franzmann and Kaiser 2006; Pelizzo 
2003). 
19 This measure is explained further later in the book. 
Introduction – Voters’ Perceptions of Party Politics 
 37  
 
 
Table 1. Perceptual accuracy and agreement among voters in 32 countries 
between 1996-2005. 
Country Year Ac
cu
ra
cy
 
Ag
re
em
en
t 
n: 
 
Country Year Ac
cu
ra
cy
 
Ag
re
em
en
t 
n: 
Spain 2000 .00 .54 1208  Norway 2001 .52 .63 2052 
Great Britain 2001 .07 .61 3326  Denmark 2001 .52 .64 2026 
Iceland 2003 .13 .63 1446  Ireland 2002 .56 .48 2367 
Netherlands 1998 .15 .64 2101  Sweden 1998 .58 .67 1157 
USA 2004 .16 .40 1066  Canada 1997 .58 .35 1851 
Portugal 2005 .17 .48 2801  New Zealand 2002 .65 .43 1741 
Canada 2004 .21 .65 1674  Finland 2003 .69 .54 1196 
Chile 2003 .28 .57 1418  Korea Rep. of 2004 .71 .39 1500 
Spain 2004 .29 .56 1212  Hungary 1998 .76 .47 1525 
Germany 2002 .30 .54 1023  Mexico 2003 .78 .19 1991 
Slovenia 1996 .30 .34 2031  Germany 1998 .78 .50 2019 
Sweden 2002 .33 .67 1060  Peru 2000 .83 .18 1102 
Israel 2003 .33 .51 1212  Romania 1996 .83 .25 1175 
Czech Rep. 2002 .35 .62 948  Hungary 2002 .89 .55 1200 
Austria 1996 .36 .44 1798  Spain 1996 .89 .54 1212 
Denmark 1998 .36 .69 2001  Czech Rep. 1996 .98 .56 1229 
Portugal 2002 .44 .61 1303  Netherlands 2002 .99 .65 1574 
Israel 1996 .45 .50 1091  France 2002 1.03 .44 1000 
Taiwan 1996 .46 .39 1200  Belgium (flan.) 1999 1.04 .37 2179 
Taiwan 2001 .49 .36 2022  Poland 2001 1.20 .46 1794 
Chile 1999 .49 .54 2048  Mexico 1997 1.33 .15 2033 
Bulgaria 2001 .50 .18 1482  Brazil 2002 1.41 .66 2514 
Austria 2004 .51 .41 1769  Mexico 2000 1.43 .18 1766 
Great Britain 1997 .51 .47 2897  Poland 1997 1.55 .51 1302 
New Zealand 1996 .52 .51 1855  Korea Rep. of 2000 1.75 .45 1100 
Over all (mean): - - - -  - 2000 .63 .48 1652 
Comment: Data is from Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), Module 1 & 2. Accuracy is measured as the 
absolute deviation between the mean position for a specific party in a country as perceived by the voters and the 
placement of the same party made by a country expert(s). Agreement is calculated as van der Eijk’s measure of 
agreement for ordered rating scales (van der Eijk 2001).  
 
 
The result supports earlier findings that the mean placement of parties 
made by voters is highly similar to that of experts. The exceptions are to be 
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found in countries where the left-right dimension may not be a relevant or 
salient ideological dimension such as Korea (1.75), Poland (1.55), Mexico 
(1.43) and Brazil (1.41) (see appendix for a detailed description of the 
countries).  
The fact that the average and the median perception of party positions 
among voters tends to reflect some kind of ‘true’ position is, of course, en-
couraging. Nevertheless, even if the mean or median voter perception tends 
to be accurate it does not necessarily tell us anything about the relevance of 
the perceptions for the vast majority of the voters, since individual short-
comings tend to cancel out on an aggregated level. Clearly, there is varia-
tion among voters when placing parties on a left-right scale due to percep-
tual distortions and the fact that ideologies are abstract and to varying ex-
tent may mean different things for different voters. A vague or blurred 
ideological position or party profile renders perceptual distortions which in 
turn may obstruct the emergence and formation of public opinions, result-
ing in unsupported policies getting enabled (Holmberg, Westerståhl, and 
Branzén 1977). Vague or ambiguous positions among the parties may also 
invite higher degrees of wishful thinking among the voters as “it is easier to 
see what you want to see if what you look at is a bit fuzzy and far away” 
(Holmberg 1999b:236-237). If public policies are to reflect the will of a 
majority of the people, the perceptions of policy should be accurate for as 
many voters as possible. Otherwise this may lead to a serious distortion in 
the relationship between citizens and its government. It is therefore not 
enough to only focus on accuracy for the mean or the median voter posi-
tion. One also has to consider the agreement in voters’ perception on par-
ties’ policy positions. This aspect is one that prior research often has ne-
glected.  
Convinced by the findings by the authors mentioned above and the re-
sults in table 1, this study will turn towards and focus on the agreement 
among voters on parties’ policy positions. If we can be convinced that the 
mean and/or the median position of a party most of the time depicts a 
party’s ‘true’ policy position, then votes based on PA will yield meaningful 
mandates for the policies that the parties propose (van der Brug 1999a). PA 
among voters on parties’ ideological left-right positions can thus work as a 
guarantor for successful political communication and representation.20  
 
 
                                                   
20 Most of the times the interpolated median and the mean values are approximately equal 
However, an argument why the interpolated median sometimes is a better indicator on a 
party’s position than the mean value can be illustrated by the case of ‘Fremskrittspartiet’, the 
progressive party, in Norway in the election of 1973. The party was founded the same year 
and the voters were obviously confused about the party’s left-right position. According to the 
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The concept of perceptual agreement was originally used by Granberg 
and Holmberg, although they labeled it as perceptual consensus (Granberg 
and Holmberg 1988).21 Nevertheless, this book will use a measurement on 
PA invented by Cees van der Eijk. This coefficient builds on the distribu-
tion of voters’ placement of a party’s position on in our case, a left-right 
scale. It was originally developed for measuring agreement in ordered rat-
ing scales and can be used as a measurement for single parties but it may 
also be aggregated to serve as a comprehensive measure for the party sys-
tem as a whole. The coefficient is bound between -1 to 1 and it reaches it 
minimum of -1 when half the sample places a party on either extreme of 
the scale respectively, that is, maximum disagreement. On the other hand, 
when all respondents place the party in the same category – that is, as 
maximum agreement - the coefficient attains +1. A uniform distribution 
yields an agreement value of 0 (van der Eijk 2001). A more detailed de-
scription of the measure can be found in each of the articles in the study. 
It needs to be mentioned already here that since PA is an aggregate 
measure of dispersion among groups of voters, it does not tell anything 
about the perceptions of individual voters which are the unit of analysis in 
the third article of this book. This limitation has been overcome by focus-
ing on the deviation between the median position of the parties, based on 
the results from the placement of the parties for the whole electorate, and 
the placement of parties made by individual voters on a left-right scale. By 
focusing on the deviation among individual voters in the third article (re-
ferred to as perceptual deviation (PD)), we have the opportunity to study 
the impact of different individually related factors on the perceptions of 
parties’ left-right positions among voters.  
From this perspective, I argue that the concept of perceptual agreement 
is well suited as a measurement of the strength of the link between citizens 
and their elected representatives. If voters are agreeing on the position of 
parties, this means that they share a common view on the choices they have 
in an election, something that reduces the probability for misunderstand-
ings between voters and their representatives (see also van der Brug 1997). 
                                                                                                                       
frequencies in the election study, the voters placed the party accordingly, from left to right: 
169, 48, 20, 35, 19, 49 and 391. It is rare that voters actually are disagreeing (PA -.05) on a 
party’s position such as in the case with Fremskrittspartiet in 1973 (even if there were some 
agreement on that the party should be placed on an extreme position but not on which of the 
two extremes).  However, a frequency like this yields a mean value of 4.91 with a standard 
deviation of 2.58 and a variance of 6.66 while the interpolated median value is thus 6.57. 
Considering that the mode is 7 the median position, after all, seems to be the most valid es-
timate for a party’s left-right position. 
21 Most commonly, this coefficient indicates to what extent voters agree on a party’s or a 
candidate’s position usually measured on an ordinal scale.  
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If the PA is high among voters in a specific group or in a certain context, 
this will be interpreted as an indication of successful communication be-
tween the voters’ and their representatives. If voters are aware of, i.e. agree-
ing on party positions, then the elections can be considered to work as a 
channel between the mass and the elite. PA is thereby an indirect measure 
of accuracy among individuals. On the other hand, if voters agree to a large 
extent on the position of a party or a candidate, but their aggregated per-
ception is inaccurate, then it can be discussed as to whether it is the repre-
sentatives or the voters that failed or how otherwise can so many be wrong 
simultaneously?  
Theoretical expectations – towards an integrated general model 
of perceptual agreement 
Political representation is a result of interactions among parties and voters 
or other organizations – with particular interests and ideas – about what 
course of action should be taken. The sum of these interactions constitutes 
the policy process. But this interactive process is part of a wider environ-
ment, or context. Understanding contexts or rather the impact of different 
contexts on voting behavior in general and voters’ PA in particular is vital 
for understanding different policy processes. The political context shapes 
the ways in which policy processes work. 
Inspired by an institutional rational choice perspective, context here re-
fers to those aspects of the political arena that are relevant for action. Con-
text matters for political representation in a range of interrelated ways. 
Context shapes the effectiveness or appropriateness of different actions 
among actors. In some contexts, it will be more effective to act in a certain 
way; in other contexts, acting in the same way would be ineffective (Nash, 
Hudson, and Luttrell 2006). Political context refers here to aspects such as 
formal and informal rules that govern the interactions among parties and 
voters, such as electoral systems and party systems. Usually, the concept of 
a party system is defined as a set of formal and informal rules that influ-
ence the behavior and the interactions of the significant parties within a 
given country (Keman 1997; McLean 1996), which is also a common defi-
nition of the concept of institutions (Peters 1999). In this book, a distinc-
tion is made between formal and informal rules, where formal rules refer to 
the electoral systems and informal rules to the party systems. Together 
formal and informal rules compose the context at the level of the system. 
But for individual voters even the parties per se are a part of the context at 
the middle level, which affects individual voting behavior on a micro level 
(see f.c. Cox 1997; Holmberg and Oscarsson 2004; Snyder 2002; van der 
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Brug, Franklin, Popescu, and Toka 2008; van der Eijk, Franklin, and van 
der Brug 1999). In that sense, even political parties may be regarded as in-
formal institutions acting on a middle level that affects the behavior among 
individual voters, at the same time as both parties and voters are affected 
by the institutional structure on the system level. Consequently, we expect 
formal or informal institutions to create an incentive based structure for 
bounded rationality (see Downs 1957; Gordon and Segura 1997; Norris 
2004; Peters 1999), affecting both parties and voters. The outcome is thus 
dependent on a combination of individual preferences and the rules that 
govern the game, where the latter are assumed to be exogenous22 to indi-
vidual behavior (Johnson 2002). From this perspective, the causal mecha-
nisms are constituted by the fact that different institutional or contextual 
factors are expected to either have motivational or facilitative effects on 
individual voters. A motivational factor will thus induce voters to obtain 
information about the political parties while a facilitative factor will sim-
plify this process. Both motivational and facilitative factors can therefore 
be expected to affect the voters’ perceptions of the party positions in terms 
of PA (see Franklin 1996; Franklin, van der Eijk, and Oppenhuis 1996 for 
a further discussion on motivational and facilitative determinants of voting 
behavior). 
 In conclusion, we believe that different factors related to all three levels 
are interacting and affecting voters’ PA of parties left-right positions such 
shown in figure 2.  
 
 
 
                                                   
22 Assuming exogeneity is not unproblematic. As an example it can be discussed whether it is 
the proportional formula itself that tends to create more fragmented party systems or do 
divided societies prefer proportional systems rather than more majoritarian systems (John-
son, Shively, and Stein 2002; Norris 2004). 
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Figure 2. Theoretical relationships between individual, party, and system 
related factors and voters’ perceptual agreement. 
 
 
 
The impact of system related factors on voters’ perceptual agree-
ment 
Formal political institutions 
Just as James Madison asserted more than two centuries ago, it is widely 
believed today that one of the corner stones of a well-functioning represen-
tative democratic system lies in the architectural creation of political insti-
tutions (Quoted from Ferejohn and Kuklinski 1990). Or as Bingham Pow-
ell put it: “Elections are not the only instruments of democracy. They must 
be helped by [… ] rules [or institutions] that encourage communication and 
cooperation” (Bingham Powell 2000:4). A common notion within the lit-
erature is that the adoption of proportional- or more majoritarian formulas 
creates incentives for rational vote-seeking politicians to emphasize either 
programmatic or particularistic benefits during the election campaigns 
(Farrell 1997; Norris 2004). The electoral threshold and the district magni-
tude have been proven to affect the degree of national competitiveness, 
which has consequences for how parties organize and compete. Large pro-
portional districts tend to imply more centralized party organization, which 
in turn are expected to induce more programmatically oriented parties 
(Bingham Powell 1986; Farrell 1996). Proportional systems with a strong 
focus on cohesive parties may thus correspond better to representation ac-
cording to the RPM, where voters vote prospectively for parties according 
to their policy preferences; while more majoritarian systems may contribute 
to grater strains of government accountability and retrospective voting as 
System-related factors 
Party-related factors 
Individually-related factors 
Perceptual agreement 
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these systems tend to emphasize single candidates and strong governments 
(Holmberg 2006; Sartori 1997).  
Large vote-seat disparities may, however, affect the incentives for indi-
vidual voters to obtain political information and the usefulness of getting 
informed about the policy positions of the parties may be more limited. 
This aspect refers to Duverger’s mechanical- and psychological effects of 
different electoral systems. The mechanical effect refers to the actual differ-
ence between vote-shares and seat-shares, produced by the electoral for-
mula.23 The psychological effect is in turn a result of the mechanical effect 
since knowledge of the mechanical effect will affect the behavior of the ac-
tors (Duverger 1954). Accordingly, voters are expected not to vote for 
small parties when the size of the constituency is small or the legal thresh-
old is high, as they would not want to waste their vote on a party with a 
small chance of entering parliament. A high degree of disproportionality in 
a system may hence induce voters to view the elections as a process of se-
lecting government while elections in a more proportional system may tend 
to be regarded as an expression of preferences (Downs 1957). In short, 
when the size of the constituency is small and the threshold is high, we pre-
sume that voters will be less motivated to acquire information about the 
policy positions of the smaller national parties, whilst the opposite will be 
true for the bigger parties. The more proportional the nature of an electoral 
system is the higher will then the incentives for the parties and the candi-
dates be to adhere to programmatic ideological campaigning; this should 
generate a higher PA among voters on parties’ policy positions.  
Generally, the effects of electoral systems on individual voters are as-
sumed to be indirect and expressed through the impact of electoral systems 
on the political parties and the party systems. Electoral systems have con-
sequences for the party systems since as Downs (1957) argued, more ma-
joritarian electoral rules are most likely to produce centripetal two-party 
systems where the competing parties will be clustered in the centre of the 
ideological or political spectrum. Sartori (1976) provided a complementary 
argument that a multiparty system would generate centrifugal incentives 
for party competition (see also Cox 1990; Merrill and Adams 2002). 
Hence, we believe that system related factors will affect both parties and 
voters and that there will be both an important direct effect of the system 
related variables on voters’ PA and an indirect effect mediated by the po-
 
 
                                                   
23 The term electoral system is generally referring to four different concepts, namely the dis-
trict magnitude, the legal threshold, the ballot structure and the electoral formula (Arnold 
2007).  
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litical parties. Theoretically we believe that a) different formal and informal 
institutional factors may facilitate and/or motivate voters when receiving or 
apprehending political information at the same time as b) different institu-
tional settings may affect voters’ PA indirectly by their impact on the be-
havior of parties. The institutional context will thus affect the degree or 
rather the direction of the competition among parties in the form of cen-
trifugal or centripetal party competition. It is reasonable to assume that 
higher degrees of centrifugal competition will lead to greater divergence in 
the parties’ ideological positions (i.e. greater distances between the parties’ 
positions in the policy space) which may make it easier for voters to discern 
the parties’ positions and thereby also cause higher degrees of PA. Diver-
gence hence will function as an intervening variable in the model. We are in 
this respect dealing with a set of interaction terms between the effective 
number of parties and the system related factors that may affect the degree 
of competition among parties. 
The ballot structure is another aspect of electoral systems that, according 
to Norris, creates incentives for rational vote-seeking politicians to empha-
size either programmatic or particularistic benefits during election cam-
paigns (Norris 2004). Usually, the ballot structure is closely related to the 
basic type of electoral system even though theoretically, different ballot 
types can be used within all systems. Broadly speaking, ballots can be di-
vided into four subgroups consisting of 1) party ballots, 2) candidate bal-
lots, 3) preference ballots and 4) dual ballots (Farrell 2001; Norris 2004). 
A hypothetical consequence of the use of these ballot types is that in the 
cases of the candidate and the preference ballots, politicians will face 
stronger incentives to distinguish themselves from their competitors within 
their own party by emphasizing particularistic policies or benefits offered 
through constituency service. In contrast, politicians in proportional sys-
tems using closed party ballots will hypothetically face greater incentives to 
rationally focus on collective party appeals and party cohesion by empha-
sizing programmatic and ideological benefits and policies (Norris 2004). 
However, there may also be a direct effect of the ballot structure on PA 
since party-ballots offer fewer choices (i.e. require less political knowledge 
and thus have lower decision costs) and this could assist voters and thus 
generate higher degrees of PA.  
The constitution, of a country i.e. whether it has a parliamentary, semi-
presidential or presidential system is also likely to affect the levels of PA 
beyond the effects of electoral rules and party systems. The reason for this 
is that it may be more difficult for voters to discern parties’ policy positions 
in systems where there is a separation of powers, since this creates a more 
complex institutional environment. Legislative and presidential parties have 
different roles in the policymaking process in presidential systems. From a 
voter perspective, parties in parliamentary systems may thus appear as 
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more solid since they only have one face to present to voters compared to 
parties in presidential systems (Arnold 2007), which can be expected to 
facilitate voters’ perceptions of parties’ left-right positions. PA is hence ex-
pected to be higher among voters in parliamentary political systems. 
Informal political institutions 
When it comes to informal political institutions, we know that PA over 
parties’ ideological positions is also dependent on both the salience of the 
respective ideological dimensions in a polity and on the extent to which the 
parties define themselves along these dimensions (Oscarsson 1998; van der 
Brug 1997). According to Thomassen, simple and unidimensional belief 
systems are desired characteristics of representative democracies, since po-
litical representation may be difficult to obtain if voters have idiosyncratic 
sets of policy preferences that motivate their decisions (Thomassen 1999). 
The core idea here is simplicity in the political world as an important com-
ponent of effective political representation. According to this perspective, 
ideology provides the fundamental means of communication and consti-
tutes a linkage between citizens and elected representatives. A simple and 
unidimensional system will thus have a facilitating effect on the voters be-
cause the parties are defined according to the same policy dimension, and 
in that parties and voters share a political language. This will in turn make 
the cognitive cues used by voters more efficient and, with only one policy 
dimension, there is also less to learn about the parties’ policies. But a sim-
ple and highly unidimensional party system is not enough by itself. Accord-
ing to Thomassen, it also needs to be structured according to a left-right 
dimension so that the communication between voters and their representa-
tives is clear and efficient. For this reason we expect voters’ PA to be higher 
for parties in systems that are more unidimensional and structured accord-
ing to a left-right dimension.24  
However, if voters shall be represented satisfactorily, the ‘breadth of al-
ternatives’ is important as well. For example it has been argued that a 
broader range of parties leads to greater representation of diverse values 
(John M. Carey cited from Hoffman 2005), minority groups (Lijphart 
1999) and women (Norris 2004).25 With an increasing number of political 
 
 
                                                   
24 Just as in Thomassen’s simplicity hypothesis where the importance of a shared one-
dimensional belief system is emphasized, Downs’ original model of party competition is also 
based on the assumption that all parties compete along a unidimensional left-right continuum 
(Downs 1957). 
25 This is not to say that a two-party system is less democratic than a multiparty system as 
they both meet the requirements from democratic theory (Sartori 1997). 
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alternatives the motivation to seek information about the parties can be 
expected to increase among voters. A high degree of party system fragmen-
tation will also encourage the parties to differentiate themselves in terms of 
ideology from the competitors in an attempt to mobilize their electoral 
support (Downs 1957). The effective number of parties may thus be an im-
portant causal force behind the degrees of agreement in voters' perceptions 
and thereby also a prerequisite for a functional representation. However it 
cannot be excluded that there might be an upper limit with diminishing 
returns, where too many parties implies increasing decision costs (Hoffman 
2005), which will affect PA among voters as well. 
Earlier studies have proven that a high degree of competition among 
parties for the ‘same’ voters will affect voters’ will to participate (Franklin, 
van der Eijk, and Oppenhuis 1996). If many voters are likely to support 
more than one party, it is expected that this will raise further incentives for 
the party leaders to mobilize their voters, which in turn can be expected to 
both motivate and facilitate voters when acquiring political information.26  
As mentioned earlier, the institutional context is expected to affect the 
direction of the party competition within a political system in terms of cen-
trifugal or centripetal party competition. Centrifugal party competition will 
in turn, imply greater divergence in the parties’ ideological positions. That 
parties shall present divergent policy positions is also a criterion asserted by 
the RPM. The more divergent the parties’ policy positions are with respect 
to one another, the more likely it is that the voters will correctly apprehend 
the party’s policy position correctly. Divergence is hence an important at-
tribute of the party systems that will have a positive impact on voters’ PA. 
Overall, eight different explanatory factors related to the electoral and 
political system can be identified in the literature. Among the factors classi-
fied as formal institutions we have 1. the effective threshold/proportion-
ality, 2. the ballot structure and 3. type of constitution. Among the infor-
mal institutionally related factors we find: 4. the effective number of par-
liamentary parties, 5. the degree of unidimensionality, 6. the strength of the 
left-right dimension and 7. the degree of competition and 8. divergence. 
 
 
                                                   
26 Voters can, of course, be mobilized on other factors beyond their value or issue orientations 
as well. At the same time, we know that the amount of party affiliated voters has steadily 
decreased during the last decades as has the impact of social class on voting behavior in gen-
eral (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Narud and Allberg 1999; Thomassen 2005). 
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Table 2. The expected direction of the effect of the independent system re-
lated variables on divergence and perceptual agreement. 
Independent variables Dependent variables 
Formal institutional factors Divergence* Perceptual agreement 
The effective threshold - - 
Proportionality + + 
Ballot structure + + 
Type of constitution + + 
Informal institutional factors   
Effective number of parliamentary parties + (-) + (-) 
Unidimensionality + + 
Strength of the left-right dimension + + 
Degree of party competition + + 
Comment: (+) indicates an expected positive impact of the independent variable on the dependent variable and (-) the 
opposite. *Divergence is here treated as being both a dependent and independent variable. This since the institutional 
context is expected to cause divergence in the party system while divergence in turn is expected to have an inde-
pendent positive impact on PA. 
 
The role of political parties for voters’ perceptual agreement 
Political parties rather than single candidates are today the main actors in 
most modern representative systems even if there are signs of that parties in 
general have become more candidate centered in recent years (Dalton and 
Wattenberg 2000). Political parties are however, an important ingredient in 
a representative system as carriers of continuity, values and ideologies (Dal-
ton 1985; Granberg and Holmberg 1988; Hoffman 2005; Katz and Mair 
1995). Even though many political parties today face problems with declin-
ing memberships (Mair and van Biezen 2001), they may still have a viable 
and important function as orientational instruments for voters when be-
coming informed about political matters. The RPM also emphasizes the 
importance of cohesive parties with responsibly formulated stable and di-
vergent policy positions. A direct consequence in this aspect is that if par-
ties present stable and divergent policy positions, this should have an in-
creasing positive effect on voters’ PA. As earlier mentioned, less divergent 
policy positions could thus impede the process of information acquisition 
among voters since it may be difficult to discern the differences between the 
parties (divergence is hence an important attribute connected both to indi-
vidual parties and to party systems as such). For the same reason, less sta-
bility in a party’s policy position may be another factor that will obstruct 
the emergence of PA among voters. Especially since voters are often sup-
posed to evaluate a party’s policy position based on information about cur-
rent, past and expected future performance (Downs 1957). In both cases 
stability and divergence are expected to increase PA since these two factors 
may have a facilitative effect among individual voters.  
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Where the RPM highlights the behavior of political parties, other theo-
ries on political parties are more focused on various characteristics and at-
tributes. It has been proven for example, that the electoral size of a party 
may affect voting behavior among individuals in terms of strategic voting 
(Holmberg and Oscarsson 2004; van der Eijk, Franklin, and al. 1996).27 
According to Kirchheimer, catch-all parties are characterized as being big 
and having vague ideological positions as a distinctive feature (Dittrich 
1983; Kirchheimer 1990). Inspired by Kirchheimer’s work, it is reasonable 
to expect that bigger parties in general will be less ideologically distinctive 
compared to smaller parties such as interest based or regional ones. In or-
der to gather a large national electoral base, all else being equal, a party 
needs to bring together groups of voters with sometimes diverse interests. 
This is best done by downplaying ideological differences and promoting 
issues that are less likely to meet resistance in the electorate. If bigger par-
ties tend to be less distinctive in their ideological positions, a party’s elec-
toral size thus can be expected to have implications for the clarity of voters’ 
perceptions of the policies. Party size should have a negative effect on PA.  
Political parties are also more or less attached to different dimensions 
(Budge 1994; Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 1987) and research has shown 
that perceptual agreement varies considerably between different party fami-
lies (Dahlberg, Berlin, and Oscarsson 2005). An acceptable explanation of 
this phenomenon may be that parties that are closely attached to the left-
right dimension often have names such as ‘social democrats’, ‘liberals’ or 
‘conservatives’ that in themselves work as brands signaling a position on 
the left-right continuum (Budge et al. 2001). It has been suggested that 
these labels sometimes works as cues for voters when acquiring informa-
tion about parties’ policies or their left-right positions (Downs 1957; Sny-
der 2002). A party’s ideological affiliation, if revealed in the name of the 
party, may then guide the voters when acquiring information and promote 
PA.  
Another party characteristic related factor that can be expected to influ-
ence the perceptions among voters is the age of a party. Logically, it should 
be easier to know something about the position of an old established party. 
In addition, newer parties are also likely to more frequently adjust or 
change their policies and ideological profiles, which in turn may be confus-
ing for voters (van der Brug, Franklin, Popescu, and Toka 2008). Hence we 
expect PA to be higher for older and longer established parties.  
 
 
                                                   
27 For example that bigger parties may have greater chances of getting their policies enacted 
in the parliament or that smaller parties will find it hard to pass the electoral threshold. 
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To conclude, five different factors related to the political parties can be 
discerned, two are behaviorally related factors: 1. stability and 2. diver-
gence in the parties’ left-right positions and three are characteristically re-
lated factors: 3. electoral size, 4. ideologically related party labels and 5. 
party age. 
 
Table 3. The expected direction of the effect of the independent party re-
lated variables on perceptual agreement. 
Independent variables Dependent variable 
Behaviourally related party factors  Perceptual agreement 
Stability + 
Divergence + 
Characteristically related party factors  
Eelectoral size - 
Ideologically related party labels + 
Party age + 
Comment: (+) indicates an expected positive impact of the independent variable on the dependent variable and (-) the 
opposite.  
 
Causes of misperceptions among individual voters 
Much research has been spent on the impact of individual-level characteris-
tics on voting behavior and party choice, such as socio-economic status, 
education and party identification (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 
1960; Fiorina 1981; Holmberg and Oscarsson 2004). When it comes to 
political perceptions, factors such as political knowledge, left-right self 
placement and party sympathy have proven to be influential (Granberg 
1993; Granberg and Holmberg 1988; Popkin 1991; van der Brug 1997). 
The study of perceptions has a long tradition within the research field of 
election studies. Nonetheless Granberg and Holmberg claim that research 
on the factors that account for the adequacy of political perceptions is 
something that is needed in particular (Granberg and Holmberg 1988). 
Earlier research in this specific area has, however, shown that perceptions 
among voters with greater levels of political knowledge is often more accu-
rate and that the degree of political knowledge also affects the PA among 
voters (van der Brug 1997). 
Education and age often are stressed as important factors behind voting 
behavior in general and political knowledge or sophistication in particular. 
The level of knowledge of voters affects which information is used when 
getting informed about political matters. It has been suggested that more 
highly educated voters rely on a wider range of sources of information than 
do less educated voters. However, more education does not necessarily 
mean more factual knowledge since educated voters are also sampling in-
formation and using various cues. The main difference between voters with 
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differing levels of education lies in that highly educated voters use the 
available cues more efficiently (Popkin 1991). Political knowledge is also, 
as mentioned, one of the factors that have been proven to affect the percep-
tions among voters (van der Brug 1997).28  
However, political knowledge is not exclusively obtained through formal 
education. Empirical results indicate that older people in general know 
more about politics compared to younger people (Milner 2002; Popkin 
1991). This could be interpreted as a consequence of socializing where a 
voter becomes more and more familiar with election procedures, parties 
and politicians within a society. In a comparative study made by Sören 
Holmberg and Henrik Oscarsson the effect of education, age and gender on 
political information indicates that older educated men tend to be better 
informed about political matters (Holmberg and Oscarsson 2004).29 These 
three factors thus may be expected to have a facilitative influence on voters 
and thereby positively influence PA, since more political knowl-
edge/sophistication should mean lower decision costs.  
Political ideologies, such as the left-right positions of political parties 
have both an affective and a cognitive component. Most voters are able to 
relate to parties in terms of left and right, which is the cognitive part, and 
at the same time many voters identify themselves with an ideological pre-
disposition on the same dimension, which is the affective part.30 According 
 
 
                                                   
28 It can be questioned whether education is the actual source of political knowledge, how-
ever, education is one of few voter characteristics that can be measured and used for country 
comparative studies, which is why education often functions as a proxy for different levels of 
political sophistication. 
29 In the literature on voting behavior it has often been stressed that political interest is an 
important determinant of the degree of political sophistication among voters (Franklin, van 
der Eijk, and Oppenhuis 1996). Unfortunately, there is no question included in the datasets 
for measuring political interest among voters.  
30 In prior research it has been asserted that the ideological, the partisan and the social com-
ponents are three major constituents of individuals’ self-placement on the left–right dimen-
sion. The ideological component refers to the link between an individual’s left–right self-
placement and his/her attitude toward the major value conflicts in western democratic sys-
tems such as socioeconomic, religious, or the new politics (Ingelhart and Klingemann 1976; 
Knutsen 1995b; Knutsen 1997). The party component implies that a voter may primarily 
identify him/herself with a specific party instead of an ideological position. This in turn im-
plies that voters may adopt ideological labels for themselves derived from the parties they 
identify with, which in turn may be unrelated to their own issue orientations (Fuchs and 
Klingemann 1990; Ingelhart and Klingemann 1976; Knutsen 1997). Finally, the social com-
ponent refers to the citizens’ social identities and their locations in the social structure in 
relation to their left–right orientation (Freire 2006; Ingelhart and Klingemann 1976). Accord-
ing to Klingemann’s and Ingelhart’s study, the party component has the strongest impact on 
voters’ left-right self placement followed by the ideological component. This means that for a 
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to the balance theory proposed by Heider (1946), people are motivated 
strongly to maintain cognitive balance. Cognitive balance is a tendency for 
individuals to impose order and structure on the world in a psychological 
processing of events. As a consequence, when placing parties or candidates 
on various relational scales, individuals tend to locate parties or candidates 
that they like closer to themselves whilst those that are disliked will be 
pushed away. The tendency to ‘push and pull’ on the basis of liked or dis-
liked is also known in social judgment theory as contrast effects, which is a 
form of perceptual distortion. This phenomenon, also known as ‘wishful 
thinking’, is a less formal way to deal with cognitive imbalances. A direct 
consequence of wishful thinking is subjective agreement between self 
placement and party- or candidate placements, which in turn tends to result 
in perceptual distortions. Displacement theory is emphasizing assimilation 
and contrast and proposes that perceptual distortions occur due to ego in-
volvement and one’s affective orientation toward parties or candidates 
(Granberg 1993; Granberg and Holmberg 1988; Popkin 1991). Results 
from earlier studies on perceptions have also shown that there is a u-shaped 
relationship between self placement among voters and the perceived dis-
tance of parties, where voters with more extreme self placements tend to 
perceive greater distances between the parties than do centrist individuals 
(Granberg 1993). Consequently, we expect that party sympathy, such as 
whether a voter likes- or dislikes a specific party, and the ideological dis-
tance between a voter’s self-placement and the placement of parties on the 
left-right continuum will have a negative impact on PA. 
Taken together, five different independent factors that can be expected 
to affect voters’ PA and that are related to individual voters are identified: 
1. party sympathy, 2. the ideological distance between a voter’s self-
placement and the placement of parties on the left-right continuum, 3. edu-
cation, 4. age and 5. gender. 
                                                                                                                       
large number of voters the left-right terminology has a major component that is based on 
party identification instead of issues or value orientations. However, in a more comprehen-
sive study made by Knutsen (1997), the results show that the impact of the party component 
on voters’ left-right selfplacement is not as big as Klingemann and Ingelhart suggested. 
Moreover, if value orientation is set as prior to party choice in a causal sense, found empiri-
cal support that it is value orientation rather than party choice that have the greatest impact 
on individuals’ left-right self-placement in most countries included in his study. The results 
from a study made by van der Eijk and Niemöller (1992) also show that voters’ ideological 
orientations are more or less independent of their social positions, at least in the case of the 
Netherlands. 
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Table 4. The expected direction of the effect of the independent individual 
related variables on perceptual agreement. 
Independent variables Dependent variable 
 Perceptual agreement 
Party sympathy  - 
Ideological distance  - 
Education + 
Age + 
Gender + 
Comment: (+) indicates an expected positive impact of the independent variable on the dependent variable and (-) the 
opposite.  
Determinants of perceptual agreement 
Despite a large field of research on perceptions and misperceptions among 
individual voters, not much is known about various contextual influences 
on voters’ perceptions of parties’ policy positions. From earlier research we 
know that the level of PA varies between different countries (Dahlberg, 
Berlin, and Oscarsson 2005; Dahlberg and Oscarsson 2006). One can hy-
pothesize that these differences result not so much from diversity among 
the electorates but from differences among the political systems. Hence we 
expect the system and party related variables to have an independent im-
pact on voters’ PA and that individually related features might be interact-
ing with the political context. 
For example, in the theoretical section it was suggested that proportional 
electoral systems tend to promote more centralized and programmatically 
and ideologically oriented party organizations. In more disproportional 
systems, on the other hand, the parties are expected to be downplaying 
ideological differences and promoting policies and issues that are less likely 
to meet resistance in the electorate in order to gather a large national elec-
toral support base (Norris 2004). Reasonably, if ideologically committed 
and centralized party organizations using bonding rather than bridging 
strategies, is a profound attribute in more proportional political systems, 
then the voters in these systems could be expected to develop stronger and 
more affective attachments to the parties. This in turn could increase their 
inclination towards wishful thinking and, hence, generate lower degrees of 
PA. 
An alternative hypothesis in this respect, following Holmberg’s argu-
ment, is that wishful thinking appears when voters are looking for parties 
who’s positions are fuzzy and unclear (Holmberg 1999b). If party represen-
tatives in more proportional or competitive systems are more eager to de-
fine their party as clearly apart from their competitors as possible, these 
system related variables could alternatively work as a facilitative contextual 
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factor. A facilitative contextual factor may thus have a decreasing impact 
on the effect of the affectively related variables on voters’ perceptions and, 
hence, the voters’ inclination to wishful thinking, which should generate 
higher degrees of PA. For the same reason, we could also expect a similar 
effect from the remaining contextual party related variables. If parties hold 
divergent policy positions, have labels that signal theirs positions on the 
left-right continuum and are of small or medium electoral size this should 
facilitate voters when acquiring information about the parties and conse-
quently, bring clarity in their perception of the parties’ policy positions. 
Concludingly, in an attempt to specify which causal mechanisms that are 
at hand, all factors listed above related to the right hand-side of the equa-
tion can, as mentioned, be divided into the three broader and to some ex-
tent also overlapping classes of facilitative, motivational and affectively 
related factors. These are in turn working at three different levels, system- 
party- and individual level and are expected to influence PA among voters 
of parties’ ideological positions. A motivational factor is here understood 
simply as a factor that mainly will make voters more motivated to seek in-
formation about the parties’ policies or policy positions. A facilitative fac-
tor will on the other hand, have a simplifying effect and make it easier for 
voters to obtain information about the parties’ policies or discern the par-
ties’ policy positions. Taken together, we believe that facilitative and/or 
motivational factors will have a positive impact on voters’ PA. An affective 
factor will in turn have a disturbing effect on the perceptions of voters 
which may imply higher degrees of ‘wishful thinking’.31 This is of course a 
simplistic division and many factors can be considered to varying extents as 
being facilitative, motivational and/or affective. The purpose with this dis-
tinction is, however, to try to deepen our understanding of what exactly 
makes some independent variables to covary with PA and not others.  
 
 
 
                                                   
31  In this respect Franklin (1996) makes a division between instrumental motivation, re-
sources and mobilization instead of facilitative and motivational factors. Among the factors 
behind instrumental motivation we have contextual explanations such as the degree of pro-
portionality in the electoral system. Resources are referred to as mainly being individual 
characteristics such as education or age. Mobilization in turn is referred to as factors related 
to the electoral campaign such as saliency of different issues etc. (see also Franklin et al. 
1996). The data on which this study is based unfortunately does not allow us to include any 
variables of mobilization, thus only the concepts of facilitative and motivational factors will 
be used. The facilitative factors are thus referring to the same category of variables as does 
the term resources. 
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Figure 3. Determinants of perceptual agreement at system-, party- and in-
dividual level and whether they are to be reckoned as being motivational or 
facilitative in character.  
 
 
Comment: (M) = motivational factor, (F) = facilitative factor and (A) = affective factor. (a1-a6) = arrow 1-6. 
 
 
In figure 3, we find the effective threshold/proportionality among the moti-
vationally related system factors since voters are expected to avoid voting 
for small parties when the size of the constituency is small or the legal 
threshold is high, as they do not want to waste their vote on a party with 
little chance of gaining entrance to the parliament. As such, they will also 
be less motivated to acquire information about all parties. With an increas-
ing number of political alternatives represented in the parliament, i.e. the 
effective number of parties, the motivation to seek information can on the 
other hand be expected to increase among voters. 
Party-ballots reside among the facilitatively related system factors, since 
these offer fewer choices. A simple and unidimensional belief system struc-
tured along a left-right dimension can, together with parliamentary consti-
tutional systems also be expected to have a facilitative effect on voters’ per-
ceptions of parties’ left-right positions. Moreover, if voters find a number 
of different parties potentially worthy of support, it can be expected that 
the degree of competition among the parties will increase, which in turn 
System-related factors 
S1 – Eff. threshold/proport. (M) 
S2 – Eff. number of parties (F & M) 
S3 - Ballot structure (F) 
S4 - Parlamentarism (F) 
S5 - Unidimensionality (F) 
S6 - Strength of left-right dim. (F) 
S7 - Competition (F & M) 
S8 - Divergence (F) 
Party-related factors 
P1 - Stability (F) 
P2 - Divergence (F) 
P3 - Ideological party family (F) 
P4 - Party age (F) 
P5 - Party size (F) 
Individually-related factors 
I1 - Like-dislike (A) 
I2 - Left-right distance (A) 
I3 - Education (F) 
I4 - Age (F) 
I5 - Gender (F) 
 
Perceptual 
agreement 
 
  
a6 
a1 
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will raise further incentives for the party leaders to mobilize their voters, 
which will motivate and facilitate for voters when acquiring information 
about the parties. Divergence in the parties’ policy positions will also have 
a facilitative effect by making it easier for voters to discern the parties’ po-
sitions. With respect to the effective number of parties it is also reasonable 
to expect that the competition in multiparty systems will tend to be more 
focused on the parties which will force them to appeal more clearly to the 
voters. Thus the mechanism can be reckoned to be both facilitative and 
motivational in character, with the exception of that too many parties may 
decrease PA. 
Turning to the facilitative party related factors, voters are supposed to 
evaluate a party’s policy position based on information about current, past 
and expected future performance (Downs 1957). In both cases greater sta-
bility and divergence are expected to increase PA since they may have a 
facilitative effect among individual voters. A party’s ideological affiliation 
(if revealed in the name of the party) and the age of a party (as it will be 
easier to apprehend or to know something about the position of an old es-
tablished party) may also guide the voters when acquiring information and 
thereby promote higher degrees of PA. However, if bigger parties tend be 
less distinctive in their ideological positions, a party’s electoral size can also 
be expected to have implications for voters’ PA. Hence, we expect PA to be 
lower for bigger parties and vice versa. 
Considering the remaining facilitative and individually related factors of 
education, age and gender, earlier research has shown that more educated 
and older people and men in general are better informed about political 
matters (Holmberg and Oscarsson 2004). Since more political information 
reasonably means lower decision costs these three factors can be expected 
to have a facilitative influence on voters’ perceptions, which in turn should 
generate higher levels of PA. It is not clear-cut whether factors such as 
party sympathy or the ideological distance between voters and parties, 
should be considered facilitative or motivational in character. Since these 
two components are best described as cognitive factors that are either 
clearly motivational or facilitative, I prefer to label them as affective factors 
that may have a disturbing effect on an individual voter’s perceptions of the 
parties’ policy positions, which in turn may affect PA. 
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Data, research design and outline of the study 
The research questions addressed above all require some kind of cross-
sectional time-series data.32 Unfortunately, it is today not possible to both 
get comprehensive cross-sectional and time-series data on systems, parties 
and voters from a single data-set. Different sources of data have been used 
due to this obstacle. Moreover, since the explanatory factors from all three 
levels outlined earlier together make a total of 17 independent variables, 
potential interaction effects excluded, the model quickly becomes incom-
prehensible. The study is therefore, as mentioned, divided into three steps 
represented by three separate articles, where each article has its focus di-
rected towards a specific level or combination of levels of explanatory fac-
tors but with voters’ PA as the dependent variable in all. The first article 
focuses on the impact of factors related to electoral and party systems on 
voters’ PA of parties’ left right positions. In the second article examines the 
effect of the behavior and the characteristics of the political parties on vot-
ers’ PA. Finally, the third article examines the impact of individual parties 
and system related features together with the effect of individually related 
factors on PA.  
 
 
 
 
                                                   
32 Time-series data is in this respect needed for investigating the impact of stability in parties’ 
ideological positions on voters’ PA. 
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Table 5. Article summary and outline of the study 
 
 
In article 1 and 3 the analyzes are based on data from the Comparative 
Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) module 1 and 2, collected in post elec-
tion surveys in 32 countries during 1996-2001 and 2001-2004 respectively. 
The dataset covers a total of 63 elections with 396 political parties and 
56 067 voter respondents. The strength with the dataset, besides that it is 
cross-national, is that it contains both micro-level data that include vote 
choice, candidate and party evaluations etc. and macro-level data on aggre-
gate electoral returns, electoral rules and party characteristics. This con-
junction allows for conducting cross-national analyses on the effects of in-
stitutions on voting behavior. The data can be obtained from the CSES Se-
cretariat, Centre for Political Studies, Institute for Social Research, Univer-
sity of Michigan. The data can also be downloaded from: http://www.um-
ich.edu/~cses.  
The accomplishment of the CSES study implies that some countries are 
represented up to three times and others less often, which might bring 
problems related to the use of time-series cross-sectional data. As time 
points are so few, the dataset cannot be considered as a time series but still 
there are observations over time. The dataset has therefore been analyzed 
for the presence of autocorrelation but neither a Correlogram test nor the 
Article 1 - Perceptual Agree-
ment in Different Institutional 
Contexts 
 
Investigates the direct and indi-
rect impact of factors related to 
electoral systems and party 
systems on PA by focusing on 
their impact on a) divergence in 
party positions through centripe-
tal- or centrifugal competition and 
b) voters’ PA.  
Divergence in party positions is 
in this respect expected to have 
an important facilitative effect on 
PA. 
In more detail it tests the impact 
of effective thresholds, ballot 
structures, the number of parties, 
dimensionality and the strength of 
the left-right dimension on diver-
gence in party positions and 
voters’ PA.  
 
(arrow 1 in figure 3) 
Article 2 - Political Parties and 
Perceptual Agreement 
 
 
Focuses on the effect of the be-
havior and characteristics of 
political parties on voters’ PA.  
More specifically it evaluates a) 
the effect of behavior related 
factors such as stable and diver-
gent party positions on voters’ PA 
and b) the impact of characteristic 
related factors such as the parties’ 
age, electoral size and ideological 
family belonging on PA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(arrow 4 in figure 3) 
 
Article 3 - Misperceptions and 
Effective Representation 
 
 
Examines the simultaneous 
impact of characteristics related 
to individual voters, political 
parties and system related quali-
ties on PA among individual 
voters.  
It also investigates to what ex-
tent individually related factors, 
such as perceived ideological 
distance between voters and 
parties, affects PA and interacts 
with the contextual factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(arrows 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 in 
figure 3) 
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Durbin-Watson statistic indicates any great degree of autocorrelation. 
However, since the analysis sets out to investigate the impact of contextu-
ally related factors on voters’ PA, it is less desirable that countries appear 
an unequal number of times. For this reason the data in article number 1, 
has been weighted according to how many times each country is repre-
sented in the data set.  
In article 2, where the effects of stability in party positions on voters’ 
perceptions is examined, one needs time-series data. This requirement is 
problematic. In Sweden, for example, national election studies have been 
carried out since 1956 but the question about parties’ left-right positions 
was only included since 1979. To obtain enough cases for efficient esti-
mates, time-series data from election studies in Norway, Sweden, Germany 
and The Netherlands were pooled into one data-set with 26 parties covered 
in 35 elections from the mid-seventies onwards. In practice this means 26 
parties in an average of eight elections in each country which gives an effec-
tive N of 187 parties. The data was gathered from the database constructed 
by the European Voter Project and can be obtained from the Central Ar-
chive for Empirical Social Research (ZA) at the University of Cologne with 
the study number 3911 (Mochmann, Oedegaard, and Reiner 1998). Com-
plementary data for the post-1998 elections not included in the European 
Voter database has in the case of elections in The Netherlands' in 2002 and 
2003 been gleaned from Irwin (2005), that for Norway in 2001 and for 
Sweden in 2002 comes from the Swedish Social Science Data Archive 
(SSD), http://www.ssd.gu.se. Data for Germany in 2002 has been taken 
from the CSES-project.  
One could also consider a strategy of weighting the data in article num-
ber 3 as was done in article number 1, since the analyses sets out to investi-
gate the impact of contextually related factors on voters’ perceptions. Such 
a design would, without the inclusion of any weights or by not controlling 
for the election waves, in practice implies that the computer treats them as 
individual and unique country observations. This may in turn result in an 
overestimation of the effects of the system related variables, since most 
countries that appear several times in the data are west European countries 
with proportional multiparty systems. However, by controlling for the elec-
tion waves (i.e. repeated cross section observations for some countries) we 
do not need to consider the fact that the design of the CSES study implies 
that some countries are represented up to three times while other countries 
only are represented once. The study is conducted with a multilevel design 
with three levels based on a stacked data-matrix with data on individual 
voters and various system characteristics in 29 countries. Moreover, since 
PA is an aggregated measure of dispersion on a party level, nothing can be 
said about the effect of the independent variables on the perceptions among 
individual voters. For this reason, the third article is based on perceptual 
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deviations (PD) as an alternative operationalization to PA, perceptual de-
viation is constructed as the absolute deviation for an individual’s place-
ment of a party and the median placement of the same party. The depend-
ent variable is hence working as a proxy for perceptual agreement (and to 
some extent also perceptual accuracy) on an individual level. 
All together, the articles on which this book is based covers 34 countries 
that are: 
 
Figur 4. Countries included in the study 
 
1 Australia 10 France 19 Netherlands 28 Slovenia 
2 Belgium 11 Germany 20 New Zealand 29 Spain 
3 Brazil 12 Hungary 21 Norway 30 Sweden 
4 Bulgaria 13 Iceland 22 Peru 31 Taiwan 
5 Canada 14 Ireland 23 Philippines 32 Ukraine 
6 Chile 15 Israel 24 Poland 33 United Kingdom 
7 Czech Republic 16 Japan 25 Portugal 34 United States 
8 Denmark 17 Lithuania 26 Republic of Korea  
9 Finland 18 Mexico 27 Romania   
 
 
A more detailed description of the research design, methods and different 
operationalizations or measurements used in the study can be found in each 
article. 
Limitations of the study 
Both perceptual agreement and political contexts are, of course, produced 
by a range of factors that are not included in this study, such as the inten-
sity of an election campaign, the perceived importance or excitement of an 
election (see Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; Oscarsson 1998) or media 
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structure and economy (Arnold 2007). However, there are several reasons 
for only including contextual factors related to electoral systems, parties 
and party systems or voters in this study. The factors listed above have all 
been identified theoretically or empirically in current research or in other 
related literature on the subject as being important determinants behind 
voting behavior. However, in this study the most relevant factors concern 
differences between systems, which means the comparisons must be be-
tween countries in order to obtain variation in the factors. Comparative 
studies of voting behavior of this sort is complicated since: 1) we are con-
strained to using secondary data which means that theoretically important 
variables are sometimes missing; and 2) even if certain questions or vari-
ables are present in different national election studies, it is not always pos-
sible to make valid comparisons. For example, how do we construct a truly 
objective comparative measure of political knowledge or of the excitement 
or importance of an election? Of course, one could consider including dif-
ferent global measures of corruption, freedom of the press, state of the 
economy, GDP etc. However, most countries yielding relevant and compa-
rable data on voting behavior are, with few exceptions, highly industrial-
ized and from the western hemisphere and can be seen as highly similar 
with regard to measures such as freedom of the press or corruption. Even if 
political representation, as mentioned, is the result of different interactions 
among a range of different actors such as political parties, interest organi-
sations, lobby groups, media etc. it probably is not that controversial to 
maintain that parties and voters, with few exceptions, are the most central 
actors, within most political systems of today (Dalton 1984; Sjöblom 
1968).  
Results – how contexts affect voters’ perceptual agreement 
The three studies forming this project have produced a number of empirical 
findings that extend our understanding of how agreement in voters’ percep-
tions of parties’ policy positions can be obtained. Hereafter, summaries of 
the findings follow along with a more general discussion of their theoretical 
implications.  
Perceptual agreement in different institutional contexts 
The first article takes the rich literature of electoral systems and constitu-
tional design as its point of departure. In the traditional literature of consti-
tutional design and electoral outcomes the focal point is mainly on how 
parties and party systems are affected by different institutional factors, 
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which in turn are assumed to influence voters as well (see for example Du-
verger 1954; Lijphart 1984; Sartori 1976). Recently there has been a re-
newed interest in electoral engineering where researchers have set out to 
empirically investigate how voting behavior, per se, is affected by the insti-
tutional context (Norris 2004; Reynolds 2002; van der Eijk and Franklin 
1996). The first wave of research focused on the impact on parties and as-
sumed that voters would be affected as well, whilst the second wave of re-
search mainly investigated how voters are affected by the context by as-
suming that the political parties mediate the impact of system factors on 
voters.  
The effect of electoral system design on both parties and voters in most 
studies is seldom empirically tested simultaneously. The present study in-
tends to do exactly that, using data on electoral systems, parties, and vot-
ers. More specifically the aim is to investigate how formal and informal 
electoral institutions are affecting voters’ PA of parties’ left-right positions, 
both directly by bringing to bear different facilitative or motivational incen-
tive structures and indirectly via the impact of the institutional context on 
the political parties in terms of centrifugal or centripetal party competition.  
This means that the study deals with a causal model with two dependent 
variables - where the main dependent variable being voters’ PA. The second 
dependent and mediating variable is divergence in parties’ left-right posi-
tions brought about by centrifugal or centripetal party competition caused 
by differences in the institutional settings.  
Figure 4 shows the theoretical relationship between the variables at each 
level included in the study  
 
Figure 4. Causal model of different determinants of voters’ perceptual 
agreement. 
 
Comment: (M) = motivational factor, (F) = facilitative factor.  
System-related factors 
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- Effective number of parties (F & M) 
- Ballot structure (F) 
- Parlamentarism (F) 
- Unidimensionality (F) 
- Strength of left-right dim. (F) 
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The impact of the electoral context on party system divergence 
Theoretically it is expected that formal and informal institutions will gen-
erate different incentives for parties and voters. In relation to the parties it 
is supposed that parliamentary and more proportional electoral multiparty 
systems using closed party ballots and structured along a strong left-right 
dimension will raise incentives towards centrifugal party competition, in 
terms of which the parties will appeal more ideologically or programmati-
cally to the voters. An increasing degree of centrifugal competition should 
generate more divergent party systems that in turn should smooth the proc-
ess of voter information gathering, which should have an increasing impact 
on PA.  
The empirical results show that the number of parties, per se, has a 
negative effect on party system divergence, which is not surprising since 
more parties logically means less unique space for each party. On the other 
hand, the effective threshold - which is a combination of the average dis-
trict magnitude and the electoral threshold - has a positive impact on party 
system divergence. The positive effect of the effective threshold is intelligi-
ble because higher thresholds usually result in fewer political parties. There 
also was a rather strong positive effect of parliamentarism on divergence 
which is well in line with our theoretical expectations, since parliamentary 
systems are assumed to bring greater focus on the parties, which is ex-
pected in turn to increase the competition among parties.  
According to Downs’ theory (1957), centrifugal competition is most 
likely to appear in multiparty systems. In order to correctly specify the 
theoretical model, the analysis included interaction terms between the effec-
tive number of parliamentary parties and unidimensionality, the strength of 
the LR-dimension, the ballot structure and parliamentarism (i.e. all vari-
ables that are expected to affect the degree of competition among parties). 
Accepting Downs' proposition, it is a reasonable expectation that the effect 
of these four variables on party system divergence is dependent on the 
number of parties. An increasing amount of competition among parties in a 
two-party system should then result in centripetal incentives for the parties 
while the opposite should be true in multiparty systems. 
The empirical results revealed that the interactions between the effective 
number of parties and the ballot structure, the strength of the left-right di-
mension and parliamentarism had significant and positive effects on diver-
gence. This is an interesting finding by itself since a) it supports the hy-
pothesis that party ballots and parliamentarism (assumed here to imply 
centralized party organizations and party cantered political systems) affect 
the degree of competition among parties, and b) it empirically supports 
Downs’ hypothesis regarding of the centrifugal tendency of competition in 
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a multiparty system. It indeed seems that the effect of the ballot structure 
and parliamentarism on the degree of divergence depends on and increases 
with the number of parties. 
The impact of the electoral context on voters’ perceptual agreement 
Considering the effects of the electoral context, it is expected that the effec-
tive threshold, the ballot structure, the degree of unidimensionality, the 
constitution and strength of the left-right dimension together with the 
number of parties will have an independent effect on the PA among voters 
as well. Lower thresholds will suppress the feeling of ‘wasted votes’ and 
thereby raise incentives to obtain information about the policy positions of 
the parties, which will have a positive impact on PA. Strong, unidimen-
sional left-right oriented parliamentary constitutional systems on the other 
hand, are expected to produce a simpler political structure which will facili-
tate the voters’ understanding of the parties’ policies. In addition, the use of 
party ballots together with party system divergence is expected to have a 
facilitative effect on voters’ perceptions. These factors altogether will have 
a positive impact on voters’ PA.  
Positive and significant effects were found in the case of the direct effects 
on PA, namely the effective number of parties, parliamentarism and party 
system divergence. A rather strong effect of party system divergence sup-
ports the expectation derived from the RPM that divergent policy positions 
are important not only for single parties but also for party systems so that 
voters are given meaningful electoral choices.  
A positive effect of the number of parties on PA is an interesting finding. 
According to the theoretical expectations, an increasing number of parties 
will a) force the parties to profile themselves ideologically more clearly for 
the voters, and b) motivate voters to inform themselves about the parties’ 
policy positions since there is a greater variety of choice. It also was hy-
pothesized that a positive effect of the number of parties would be associ-
ated with greater information costs for the voter, which in turn was sup-
posed to have a negative impact on PA. This hypothesis found no support 
in this study.  
Another expectation was that parliamentary constitutional systems 
would have a simpler political structure which should facilitate the voters’ 
in gathering information about the parties’ policy positions. A positive and 
direct effect of parliamentarism on voters’ PA confirms this hypothesis. 
Substantively, this implies that if the USA, or any other presidential system, 
switched to a parliamentary system such used by Norway, the Netherlands 
etc., the PA among voters might increase by approximately 20 percent. 
The results overall show that institutions matter. There are significant 
and positive relationships between party system divergence and parliamen-
tarism, the effective threshold, the ballot structure and the degree of unidi-
Introduction – Voters’ Perceptions of Party Politics 
 64  
mensionality in an electoral system. There is also a positive and significant 
relationship between the degree of party system divergence and voters PA.  
Significant direct effects on PA among voters can be found from the ef-
fective number of parties. This factor was considered as having a motiva-
tional effect on voters, which confirms the theoretical assumption that the 
‘breadth of alternatives’ may motivate voters to get informed about the 
parties’ policy positions. Direct and significant effects were also found be-
tween PA and parliamentary systems. This factor was assumed to be 
mainly facilitative in character. Voters therefore seem to find it easier to 
apprehend the positions of parties in parliamentary systems with a stronger 
focus on the political parties. The fact that both these classes of variables 
had significant effects on PA indicates that voters do not necessarily need to 
be cognitive misers, as simplicity in the political system is not the only fac-
tor that accounts for higher degrees of PA.33 
In conclusion, the results show that there exist both direct effects on vot-
ers’ PA produced by the electoral and political context and an important 
indirect effect mediated by the parties, since one of the strongest effects on 
PA was caused by party system divergence. Representation in the form de-
fined by the RPM, hence seems to work best in parliamentary multiparty 
systems, that have many parties that hold divergent policy positions.  
This study consequently, contributes to a deepened understanding of 
how factors related to both electoral systems and party systems affect vot-
ers’ PA. It also makes a contribution to research on the impact of electoral 
systems on party systems, by testing how differences in electoral systems 
generate incentives for varying degrees of centrifugal or centripetal compe-
tition among political parties.  
 
 
                                                   
33 The positive and significant effect of the effective number of parliamentary parties on per-
ceptual agreement warrants cautious interpretation for several reasons. 1) The relationship 
can of course result from the fact that voters in general tend to become more motivated to 
seek information actively about the parties. 2) It might, however, also result from the fact 
that the competition in multiparty systems tends to be more focused and centred around the 
parties which forces them to appeal more clearly to the voters, and thus the mechanism be-
hind higher degrees of PA is more facilitative than motivational in character (many factors of 
course, are to a varying extent both facilitative and motivational). 3) It can also be an effect 
of methodological short-comings in the sense that when placing parties on an eleven point 
left-right scale, there is ‘less space’ for variation for each party. For example, a voter may 
well be familiar with two or three of the national parties but not the rest. However, s/he 
might well have some vague sense of the positions of these other parties and by knowing the 
positions for some parties s/he can also figure out where to place the rest of the remaining 
parties on the left-right scale.  
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Political parties and perceptual agreement - the influence of party 
related factors on voters’ perceptions in proportional electoral sys-
tems 
The RPM emphasizes a number of conditions that must be met in order to 
reach the normative ideals of political representation, where public policy 
reflects the will of a majority of the voters. Principle among these condi-
tions is the presence of responsible parties that hold stable and divergent 
policy positions thereby giving voters a meaningful set of electoral choices. 
Less divergent policy positions could thus impede the process of informa-
tion gathering by voters since it may be difficult to discern the differences 
between the parties, and this may in turn affect the degree of PA among 
voters.  
Whereas the RPM highlights the behavior of political parties, other 
theories on political parties focus more on various characteristics and at-
tributes such as electoral size, age and party labels. For example, according 
to Kirchheimer, big catch-all parties are characterized as being less distinc-
tive in their ideological positions (Kirchheimer 1990). A party’s electoral 
size can then be expected to have implications for the agreement in voters’ 
perceptions of the parties. Other scholars have suggested that the labels of 
the parties can work as cues for voters when acquiring information about 
parties’ policies or their left-right positions (Budge 2001; Downs 1957; 
Snyder 2002). It has also been suggested that newer parties are likely to 
adjust or change their policies and ideological profiles more frequently, 
which in turn may be confusing for voters (van der Brug, Franklin, Pope-
scu, and Toka 2008). 
The second article therefore focused on how agreement among voters’ 
perceptions of parties’ policy positions is affected by 1) the behavior of the 
parties such as the degree of stability and divergence in their policy posi-
tions and 2) by various party characteristics such as the electoral size, the 
age and the labels of the parties.  
Figure 5 shows the theoretical relationship between the variables in-
cluded in the study  
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Figure 5. Causal model of different determinants of voters’ perceptual 
agreement. 
 
Comment: (F) = facilitative factor 
 
How party related factors affect perceptual agreement among voters  
The analyzes show that both stability and divergence have significant ef-
fects and that they are of considerable importance in explaining variation 
in voters’ PA. The degree of divergence in a party’s ideological position es-
pecially seems to have a decisive impact on PA among voters. An interpre-
tation of these results is that it simply becomes easier to obtain information 
when the position of parties are more stable over time and divergent from 
one another, as this reduces the information costs. Responsible parties with 
stable and divergent policy positions thus are normatively appealing and an 
important condition behind effective representation as outlined by the 
RPM.34 
Concerning the characteristically related variables, the age of a party is 
of minor importance, as the effect of this variable was not significantly dif-
ferent from zero in any of the analyzes. It should, however, be mentioned 
that party labels (i.e. the parties’ ideological family affiliation) does have a 
rather strong and positive impact on PA but the effect is only significant in 
the analyses reported in the third article.35  
Shifting attention to the variables that have a negative impact on voters’ 
PA, it becomes clear that the effect of party size on PA is small but robust 
 
 
                                                   
34 A study by Knutsen and Kumlin (2005) also proved that ideological polarization among 
the main political actors in a system has a rather strong impact on voters’ value orientations. 
The authors conclude that greater ideological divergence among political alternatives affects 
the extent to which voters can receive ideological cues from the parties, which in turn affects 
their value orientations.  
35 One reason behind this result could be that in the CSES dataset the number of parties is 
296 instead of 135 as in the European voter dataset. 
Party-related factors 
- Stability (F) 
- Divergence (F) 
- Ideological party family (F) 
- Party age (F) 
- Party size (F) 
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compared to the effect of the two behaviorally related variables. It appears 
that greater electoral support for a party means less agreement among vot-
ers on its policy position. The result is not unexpected as ‘catch-all’ parties, 
according to Kirchheimer’s theory, should be less ideologically committed 
in order to appeal to a wider electorate (Kirchheimer 1990).36  
A common conclusion on the causes of PA is that voters’ perceptions of 
party positions is a result of ideological predisposition (Granberg 1988) 
and cognitive capabilities (Granberg 1988; van der Brug 1997) as well as 
the salience of the different issues (van der Brug 1997; 1999b; Oscarsson 
1998). The present study shows that voters’ perceptions also are affected 
by different features related to the political parties and that it is the behav-
ior rather than the characteristics of the parties that is of importance for PA 
among voters. In general, voters seem to find it easier to perceive the posi-
tion of small- to medium sized political parties that hold stable and diver-
gent policy positions and that belong to ideological party families related to 
the left-right dimension. In contrast to the literature on voting behavior 
that emphasizes the importance of well-informed and knowledgeable voters 
as an important ingredient in effective policy representation, the second 
article of this book shows that responsible parties that represent stable and 
divergent policy positions are needed as well.  
 
Misperceptions and effective representation - the simultaneous im-
pact of party systems, electoral systems, political parties and indi-
vidual characteristics on voters’ perceptions  
The first two articles on which this book is based focus on the effect of par-
ties, party systems and electoral systems on PA of parties’ left-right posi-
tions among voters. In order to make a more comprehensive analysis of the 
factors that cause and influence PA, it is necessary to pay attention to the 
individually related variables that can be expected to affect the PA. The 
focus of the third article is on how both individually related features and 
various contextual factors related to parties and the political systems can 
 
 
                                                   
36 However, since bigger parties also are more electorally successful (given an operationaliza-
tion of size in terms of share of votes) it is counter-intuitive that more successful parties may 
promote weaker PA, given their likelihood of incumbency, resources, and opportunities to 
communicate policy agendas. Nevertheless, parties may be succeeding due to the perceptual 
disagreement they are able to construct within their electorates but this question is well be-
yond the scope of this article. 
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affect voters’ perceptions. The study also investigates how factors related to 
both individual voters and political parties interact with the institutional 
context and thereby affect the PA.  
Much research has been spent on the impact of individual-level charac-
teristics on political perceptions, where factors such as political knowledge, 
left-right self placement and party sympathy have been proven to be influ-
ential (Granberg 1993; Granberg and Holmberg 1988; Popkin 1991; van 
der Brug 1997). It has also been shown that individuals tend to place par-
ties or candidates that they like closer to their self-identified position while 
parties or candidates that are disliked will be pushed away when placing 
parties or candidates on various scales. Perceptual distortions or ‘wishful 
thinking’ occur due to ego involvement and an affective orientation toward 
parties or candidates (Granberg 1993; Granberg and Holmberg 1988; Pop-
kin 1991).  
However, since PA is an aggregate measure of dispersion among groups 
of voters (see Granberg & Holmberg 1988; van der Eijk 2001) it does not 
inform about the perceptions of individual voters. As mentioned, this limi-
tation has been overcome by focusing on the deviation between the median 
position of the parties, based on the results from the placement of the par-
ties for the whole electorate, and the placement of parties made by individ-
ual voters on a left-right scale. By focusing on the deviation among individ-
ual voters (hereafter referred to as perceptual deviation (PD)), we have the 
opportunity to investigate how different individually related factors are 
affecting the misperceptions among individual voters concerning the par-
ties’ left-right positions.  
The objective of this study is twofold. Firstly, the aim is to investigate 
which factors or groups of factors related to either individuals, parties or 
the electoral/political systems that exert the greatest influence on the per-
ceptual deviations among individual voters. Secondly, the aim is to examine 
to what extent individual behavior is affected by or interacts with the con-
text, i.e. characteristics related to the parties or the systems. We know from 
the literature of electoral systems that the adoption of proportional- or 
more majoritarian formulas creates incentives for rational vote-seeking 
politicians to either emphasize programmatic or particularistic benefits dur-
ing the election campaigns (Farrell 1997; Norris 2004). We thus can ask 
whether contextual differences exaggerate or mitigate the tendency among 
individual voters to yield to ‘wishful thinking’ and thus affect the voters’ 
perception of the parties? 
Figure 6 shows the theoretical relationship between the variables at each 
level that are included in the study  
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Figure 6. Causal model of different determinants of voters’ perceptual de-
viations. 
 
Comment: (M) = motivational factor, (F) = facilitative factor and (A) = affective factor.  
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empirical results of the third article clearly show that it is the perceived left-
right distance between a voter’s own position and the position of the par-
ties that has the greatest negative influence on voters’ PD, no matter kind 
of party or political system. This result strengthens earlier findings in this 
field that ‘push and pull’ effects grow stronger the greater the perceived 
distance between a voter and a specific party.  
Education exerts the greatest impact among the individually related fac-
tors that have a decreasing effect on PD. Just as expected, the predicted 
levels of PD decrease with greater education or when moving from women 
to men. Excepting that the effect of age is not significant, these results re-
semble those of Holmberg and Oscarsson (2004) showing that the degree 
of political knowledge or sophistication is higher in general among edu-
cated men, which, reasonably, should also generate a lower degree of per-
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ceptual deviation.  
Among the party related factors, the results of the third article confirm 
again that divergence in a party’s left-right position has the most significant 
total effect on PD among individual voters. The more a party differs in its 
left-right position from its' opponents, the lower the PD will be among vot-
ers. Turning to the system related variables, it is only the degree of compe-
tition that has a significant effect on the deviations among individual vot-
ers. More competitive party systems to some extent do motivate voters and 
promote party representatives to profile a party’s position more clearly in 
terms of ideology, even though the effect is rather small. According to 
Downs (1957), it is strategically reasonable and important for party leaders 
to emphasize the differences between the parties in more competitive sys-
tems, where voters are likely to be favorably disposed to a number of par-
ties. Concludingly, party related factors are the single most important 
group of variables for explaining voters' PD closely followed by individual 
factors. The greatest total effect was also found from the degree of diver-
gence in parties’ left-right positions. The system related variables in con-
trast, seem to have the lowest influence on voters’ PD.  
How factors related to individual voters, parties and political systems are 
interacting and affecting perceptual deviations among voters.  
Results to this point have shown that the perceived ideological distance 
between voters and parties has a strong impact on voters’ perceptual devia-
tions. However, it was expected theoretically that proportional electoral 
systems would promote more centralized, programmatic and ideologically 
oriented party organizations. In more disproportional or majority systems 
on the other hand, the parties are expected to be more ‘all embracing’ and 
downplay ideological conflicts and focus on more particularistic policies 
since they seek to appeal to the ‘whole’ electorate (Norris 2004). A similar 
logic applies to the aspect of more vs. less competitive party systems. The 
more competitive a system, the more motivated the party leaders will be to 
profile their parties by emphasizing differences to their competitors. Ideo-
logical undertones and statements might be of great importance when dis-
tinguishing ‘us from them’ in this respect. Reasonably, if ideologically 
committed and centralized party organizations and the use of bonding 
rather than bridging strategies, is a fundamental attribute of more competi-
tive political systems; then the voters in these systems could be expected to 
develop stronger and more affective attachments to the parties. This should 
in turn even further increase the affective effect of the ideological distance 
between voters and parties.  
In contrast, following Holmberg’s argument, wishful thinking appears 
when voters are looking at parties that are a bit fuzzy and unclear (Holm-
berg 1999b). If party representatives in more competitive systems are more 
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eager to profile their parties as clearly as possible compared to other com-
peting parties, the degree of competition could alternatively work as a fa-
cilitative contextual factor that might have a decreasing impact on the ef-
fect of the affectively related variable ideological distance on voters’ PD.  
The results showed that there is a small but significant additional inter-
action effect of left-right distance and competition under control for all 
other variables included in the model, and this supports the alternative hy-
pothesis inspired by Holmberg. This means that the negative effect of left-
right distance on PD decreases as competition increases. This strengthens 
the suspicion that the affective part of left-right distance is increasing in less 
competitive systems as the parties are expected to downplay the differences 
between themselves and the competing parties under such circumstances. 
This in turn makes it harder for voters to discern the parties’ policy posi-
tions which accentuate the tendency to ‘wishful thinking’ among voters. In 
more competitive systems, on the other hand, the parties are more inclined 
to profile themselves in terms of ideology and other policy positions. 
Moreover the effect of left-right distance on PD also decreases as diver-
gence increases and increases for every increase in party size.  
A conclusion from the results is that voters in the main, do not seem to 
be as affectively related to the parties as earlier research claimed. Instead it 
seems as ‘push and pull’ effects occur when the policy positions of the par-
ties are blurred because a position is shared by several parties or the party 
is big or the party does not have an ideological brand name that gives a 
clue to its expected position or the degree of competitiveness with in a sys-
tem. It therefore seems that to a large extent misperceptions are the product 
of a complex and indistinct party space. In line with Heider’s argument 
(Heider 1946), voters wish to maintain cognitive balance and in order to 
achieve this they want structure and clarity in the party space and they will 
turn to wishful thinking if this is not forthcoming.  
The explanatory variables in this study were divided into three broad 
categories of facilitative, motivational and affective factors. The results in 
this article give support to just one fully affective factor, namely the dis-
tance between a voter’s self-placement and the placement of parties. The 
greater the distance, the more blurred the perceptions of the parties’ posi-
tions seems to be. A row of facilitative factors can however, mitigate this 
tendency. Among the individually related factors, more highly educated 
men displayed lower degrees of PD. Among the party related factors, a 
party’s electoral size tended to render more distorted perceptions, a finding 
that is well in line with our expectations about big ‘catch-all’ parties. The 
factor that promoted lower PD the most was divergence. Being able to re-
late a party label to the left-right dimension also promoted lower PD to 
some extent.  
A not too far fetched conclusion then is that the greater responsibility 
Introduction – Voters’ Perceptions of Party Politics 
 72  
for obtaining an effective system of representation in terms of policy lies 
with the political parties. Wishful thinking among voters seems to occur 
when party positions are blurred or unclear. On the system level, a high 
degree of competition tended to yield less PD among voters. What these 
factors have in common is that they are facilitative rather than motiva-
tional in character. An objection might be that competition qualifies as a 
motivational factor as well. This is true in the sense that voters may be 
more motivated by increased electioneering but at the same time, when the 
competition is high, parties are expected to profile themselves more clearly.  
Discussion, theoretical implications and conclusions 
Clear and common perceptions among voters on parties’ policy positions 
are an essential ingredient of effective policy representation. The traditional 
literature has often emphasized that parties matter, not only as sources of 
information, but also as anchors that increase the efficiency of heuristic 
processing. It is well-documented today that the amount of detailed infor-
mation among voters often is poor (Bartels 1996; Delli Carpini and Keeter 
1996). Significantly, it has been shown that voters do not necessarily need 
detailed information in order to make complex decisions, since they tend to 
use heuristics i.e. information short-cuts. Cues from political parties are 
essential in this regard, as voters can compensate by substituting knowledge 
of party ideology for lacking information on concrete issues (Zaller 1992; 
Lupia 1998; Slothuus 2008). Thus, voters may actively use their knowledge 
of the parties to interpret complex political issues and messages. Voters’ 
perceptions of the parties’ policy positions are essential in this context since 
they affect the extent to which voters are meaningfully represented in a po-
litical system. If there is neither agreement nor accuracy among voters on 
what parties stand for, individual choices guided by policy preferences will 
be indistinguishable from random noise (Granberg 1988; van der Brug 
1999b). 
The overarching aim with this book has been to investigate the circum-
stances under which perceptual agreement among voters on parties’ policy 
positions can be obtained. Whereas earlier studies of the causes of percep-
tual agreement argued that perceptions of party positions among voters 
result mainly from internal individually related features (Granberg 1988; 
Oscarsson 1998; van der Brug 1997; 1999b), this study shows that voters’ 
perceptions also are affected by external factors related to the political and 
electoral systems as well as the political parties. 
Research on constitutional design and electoral outcomes has tradition-
ally focused either on how different institutional factors affect parties and 
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party systems or how electoral systems affect individual voters. Whilst the 
former focus mainly assumed the influence of institutions on individual 
voters, the latter assumed the influence of institutions on parties. The 
analyses reported in this book aimed to contribute to this research field by 
taking a more comprehensive grip of one of the issues and investigate how 
both parties and voters are affected simultaneously by the institutional con-
text. The results show that institutions matter and that there exist signifi-
cant direct effects produced by the electoral and political context on voters’ 
PA but also significant indirect effects mediated by the political parties. 
Constitutional design matters for voters’ PA but the influence is mainly in-
direct since constitutions and rules seem primarily to affect the behavior of 
parties, which in turn has decisive impact on voters’ perceptions of parties’ 
policy positions. 
The common characteristic of the contextually related factors shown by 
this study to improve the perceptual process among voters is that they 
mainly are facilitative. Consequently, political representation, as defined by 
the RPM, seems to works best in multiparty parliamentary systems with 
proportional representation and a strong left-right dimensional structure, in 
which parties holds stable and divergent policy positions. Simplicity in the 
political system may thus increase the agreement among voters when per-
ceiving the positions held by the parties. 
The particularly large impact of party related factors on voters’ PA 
points towards the fact that the responsibility for obtaining efficient policy 
representation lies in the hands of the political parties to a large extent. 
Wishful thinking among voters in particular seems to occur when party 
positions are blurred or unclear due to a complicated and indistinct party 
space. Hence, the RPM has proved to be a fruitful model to proceed with 
when striving to understand how to obtain effective political representa-
tion. 
A rather widespread and pessimistic view about the weakened links be-
tween parties and voters that is prevalent amongst scientists in Western 
Europe at least, may thus need to be nuanced. Political parties today clearly 
are facing a widespread decline in membership and a disengagement by 
citizens from party politics (Mair and van Biezen 2001; Holmberg 2007). 
This trend may not however, mean a concomitant decline in meaningful 
representation, as voters still are able to form accurate opinions about the 
policy positions of the parties. Cues from the political parties are nonethe-
less central for the formation of meaningful opinion among voters (Zaller 
1992; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Slothuus 2008). Bryce (1921) was 
probably correct in that modern representative democracies cannot func-
tion effectively without political parties, as they obviously are important 
actors in the process of representation. In this respect, PA among voters on 
parties’ policy positions is essential and the behavior and characteristics of 
parties are here central as being the most important determinants of PA.  
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Appendix 
Table 1. Institutional characteristics in 35 countries in 58 elections between 
1996-2004. 
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Denmark 1998 List PR 7.9 2.0 Pref. 179 3.7 2.4 1.5 1.0 .5 1.9 2.0 Parl .7 
Sweden 1998 List PR 1.7 4.0 Pref. 349 3.9 1.9 1.7 1.0 .5 1.0 4.0 Parl .7 
Sweden 2002 List PR 1.7 4.0 Pref. 349 4.2 2.6 1.6 .8 .5 1.2 4.0 Parl .7 
Bulgaria 2001 List PR 7.7 4.0 Party. 240 2.4 1.8 1.6 .7 .5 6.5 4.0 Parl .7 
Netherlands 2002 List PR 15.0 .7 Party. 150 5.0 3.8 1.5 .8 .4 1.3 2.6 Parl .7 
Netherlands 1998 List PR 15.0 .7 Party. 150 4.4 2.7 1.4 1.0 .4 1.1 .7 Parl .6 
Denmark 2001 List PR 7.9 2.0 Pref. 179 5.2 2.1 1.6 .6 .5 .8 2.0 Parl .6 
Norway 1997 List PR 8.6 .0 Party. 165 4.4 2.0 1.6 1.0 .5 3.7 4.0 Parl .6 
Iceland 2003 List PR 1.5 5.0 Party. 63 4.0 2.2 2.1 .2 .5 1.9 16.0 Parl .6 
Norway 2001 List PR 8.3 .0 Party. 165 5.6 3.2 1.5 1.0 .4 2.3 4.0 Parl .6 
Czech Rep. 2002 List PR 14.3 5.0 Pref. 200 3.9 1.6 1.7 1.0 .5 5.1 5.0 Parl .6 
Netherlands 2003 List PR 15.0 .7 Party. 150 6.0 3.8 1.3 .8 .4 1.4 2.3 Parl .6 
Portugal 2002 List PR 1.5 .0 Party. 230 3.2 1.1 1.9 .8 .5 5.0 6.6 Parl .6 
Great Britain 2001 Majority (FPP) 1.0 - Cand. - 2.7 1.9 1.7 1.0 .6 16.6 37.5 Parl .6 
Iceland 1999 List PR 6.2 5.0 Party. 63 3.5 2.2 2.0 .2 .3 1.2 16.0 Parl .6 
Chile 2003 List PR 7.7 .0 Pref. 200 2.3 1.8 2.0 1.0 .6 2.4 25.0 Div .6 
Spain 2004 List PR 6.7 3.0 Party. 350 3.1 1.0 2.1 1.0 .6 5.1 9.7 Parl .6 
Czech Rep. 1996 List PR 25.0 5.0 Pref. 200 4.3 1.6 1.8 .5 .6 9.0 5.0 Parl .6 
Hungary 2002 Qvasi-Maj. Mixed 1.0 .0 Dual. 176 2.7 1.3 1.8 .8 .7 25.1 4.0 Parl .6 
Spain 1996 List PR 7.0 3.0 Party. 350 2.8 1.3 1.7 .9 .4 5.6 9.7 Parl .5 
Finland 2003 List PR 13.3 .0 Pref. 200 4.8 3.2 1.3 .2 .3 3.0 5.2 Div .5 
Germany 2002 Qvasi-Prop. Mixed 1.0 .0 Dual. 299 3.4 2.3 1.5 .8 .6 3.1 5.0 Parl .5 
Chile 1999 List PR 7.6 - Pref. - 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.0 .5 5.9 25.0 Div .5 
Spain 2000 List PR 7.0 3.0 Party. 350 2.5 1.0 1.6 .6 .7 5.1 9.7 Parl .5 
Switzerland 1999 List PR  - Pref. - 4.4 1.9 1.5 - - 3.1 8.6 Parl .5 
Israel 2003 List PR 12.0 1.5 Party. 120 4.2 2.1 1.4 1.0 .6 2.0 1.5 Parl .5 
New Zealand 1996 Qvasi-Prop. Mixed 1.0 .0 Dual. 69 4.0 1.7 1.6 .3 .4 4.5 5.0 Parl .5 
Poland 1997 List PR 7.5 5.0 Pref. 460 3.9 2.0 1.7 .1 .5 1.7 5.0 Parl .5 
Japan 1996 Qvasi-Maj. Mixed 1.0 
16.
7 Dual. 300 4.0 1.9 1.8 1.0 .3 13.2 25.1 Parl .5 
Israel 1996 List PR 12.0 1.5 Party. 120 3.7 1.4 1.4 .9 .7 1.9 1.5 Parl .5 
Germany 1998 Qvasi-Prop. Mixed 1.0 .0 Dual. 299 3.4 3.1 1.2 1.0 .5 3.1 5.0 Parl .5 
Ireland 2002 STV 4.0 .0 Pref. 166 3.3 2.7 1.3 .4 .3 6.4 14.9 Parl .5 
Lithuania 1997 Semi-Prop. 1.0 - Dual. - 2.5 1.9 1.3 .3 .5 14.6 5.0 Parl .5 
Hungary 1998 Qvasi-Maj. 1.0 .0 Dual. 176 3.5 1.9 1.6 .5 .6 22.4 4.0 Parl .5 
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Mixed 
Great Britain 1997 Majority (FPP) 1.0 - Cand. - 2.8 1.1 1.4 1.0 .5 16.8 37.5 Parl .5 
Poland 2001 List PR 11.2 5.0 Pref. 460 3.7 1.7 1.5 .3 .4 5.4 5.0 Parl .5 
Korea Rep. 
of 2000 
Qvasi-Maj. 
Mixed 1.0 .0 Dual. 243 2.8 1.0 1.0 .5 .6 14.5 32.0 Div .5 
Belgium 
(wall) 1999 List PR 7.5 - Pref. - 3.8 .7 .5 .3 .4 2.6 8.8 Parl .5 
France 2002 Two-Round System 1.0 
12.
5 Pref. 577 4.8 1.9 1.0 .5 .4 17.7 37.5 Div .4 
Austria 1996 Majority (Alt. Vote) 1.0 - Cand. 150 2.9 2.0 1.4 .6 .5 11.6 37.5 Parl .4 
New Zealand 2002 Qvasi-Prop. Mixed 1.0 .0 Dual. 69 3.8 2.0 1.4 1.0 .4 1.9 5.0 Parl .4 
Austria 2004 Majority (Alt. Vote) 1.0 .0 Cand. 150 2.8 2.0 1.6 .9 .5 7.9 37.5 Parl .4 
USA 2004 Majority 1.0 .0 Cand. 435 2.1 .9 2.0 1.0 .4 2.5 37.5 Div .4 
Korea Rep. 
of 2004 
Qvasi-Maj. 
Mixed 1.0 .0 Dual. 243 3.4 1.2 1.6 .0 .6 12.1 32.0 Div .4 
Taiwan 1996 Qvasi-Maj. Mixed 9.1 .0 Dual. 225 2.5 .3 1.8 .5 .2 5.6 11.3 Div .4 
Belgium 
(flan.) 1999 List PR 7.5 - Pref. - 5.5 1.4 .9 1.0 .4 2.6 8.8 Parl .4 
Taiwan 2001 Qvasi-Maj. Mixed 5.7 .0 Dual. 225 3.5 1.8 1.3 1.0 .5 3.6 11.3 Div .4 
Canada 1997 Majority 1.0 - Cand. - 3.9 .9 1.4 .9 .4 13.2 37.5 Parl .4 
Slovenia 1996 Semi-Prop. 11.0 - Pref. - 4.3 1.7 1.3 .6 .6 2.5 3.0 Parl .3 
Ukraine 1998 Semi-Prop. 1.0 - Dual. - 3.2 1.9 .9 .7 .4 8.9 4.0 Div .3 
Romania 1996 List PR 11.0 - Pref.  3.3 2.8 1.2 .2 .4 5.8 3.0 Div .3 
Mexico 2003 Qvasi-Maj. Mixed 1.0 2.0 Dual. 500 3.2 2.0 1.4 .9 .5 8.4 22.7 Div .2 
Brazil 2002 List PR 19.0 .0 Cand. 513 5.0 1.7 .9 .1 .4 3.3 3.8 Div .2 
Peru 2000 List PR 12.0 - Pref. - 2.2 1.9 .5 .7 .5 6.1 .6 Div .2 
Mexico 2000 Qvasi-Maj. Mixed 1.0 2.0 Dual. 500 3.0 1.8 1.4 .8 .5 8.4 22.7 Div .2 
Mexico 1997 Qvasi-Maj. Mixed 1.0 2.0 Dual. 500 3.4 1.2 1.3 1.0 .5 8.4 22.7 Div .2 
Peru 2001 List PR 4.8 - Pref. - 4.1 1.9 .8 .1 .5 14.6 .6 Div .1 
Comment: Data on effective threshold and district magnitude is taken from Anckar (2002). Data on ballot structure is 
taken from Norris 2004. The effective number of parliamentary parties was calculated on the vote-shares using the 
index of Laakso and Taagepera, also known as Herfindahl’s index of concentration (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). 
Disproportionality is calculated according to Gallagher’s least square index (Gallagher 1991). Competition is an addi-
tive index based on the questions “like-dislike party a-i”. If a voter has given a party a score of 6 or higher the variable 
is coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. The variables are then added together into one single variable with a maximum value 
of 9 in the case where a voter prefers all parties. Perceptual agreement is based on van der Eijk’s measure of agree-
ment (van der Eijk 2001). Divergence is calculated as the average distance between the parties in a party system, 
weighted by the size of the parties. Unidimensionality is based on the CSES-question ‘like-dislike’ and calculated with 
a multiple unidimensional scaling technique using ‘Mudfold’ (van Schuur and Post 1990). Only respondents that as-
signed a ‘like-dislike’ to all parties are included in the unfolding analyses. Since a dichotomous unfolding model 
(MUDFOLD) was employed, cut-points for ‘picked’ party had to be selected. A party was considered ‘picked’ by a 
respondent if the party scored 6-10 on the eleven-point like-dislike-scale. This range of evaluative response had to be 
adjusted to find better j-scales: a) range 5-10, b) range 4-10. There are a number of possible reasons why a stimuli 
(party) may not be unfoldable, such as if the stimuli is too popular or too unpopular, if a stimuli is very close to another 
stimuli, or if a stimuli does not fit the scale (the responses to the stimuli was guided by a completely other principle, or 
ideology, than all other stimuli). Strength of left-right dimension is the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between 
voters’ ordering of parties in terms of left-right (mean values) and the ordering of parties according to the first dimen-
sion received by the unidimensional scaling procedure. Information about the division of powers is taken from: 
http://en.wikipedia.org /wiki/List_of_countries_ by_system_of_ governmen t#Full_presidential_ systems. All other 
information is taken from CSES.  
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Perceptual Agreement in 
Different Institutional Contexts 
Abstract 
The large amount of research on constitutional design and electoral out-
comes has long focused on how parties and party systems are affected by 
different institutional factors. These factors in turn have been assumed to 
influence voters as well. The present study aims to make a contribution to 
this research field by combining two strands of research and investigating 
how parties and voters are affected simultaneously by the institutional con-
text. More specifically, the aim is to test how various formal and informal 
electoral institutional settings affect voters' perceptual agreement of parties’ 
left-right positions, both directly by bringing to bear different facilitative or 
motivational incentive structures and indirectly by the impact of the institu-
tional context on the parties in terms of centrifugal or centripetal forces on 
party competition. The results show that institutions matter and that there 
are significant direct effects on voters’ perceptual agreement. Moreover, 
there are also important indirect effects mediated by the political parties. In 
short, the study shows that in more proportional and unidimensional po-
litical systems parties tend to position themselves more clearly in terms of 
ideology, which in turn contributes to higher degrees of perceptual agree-
ment among voters. 
 
Key words: perceptual agreement, electoral systems, policy representation, 
left-right ideology, party competition. 
Introduction 
Modern representative democracies are most properly described as gov-
ernment by the consent of the governed rather than government by the 
people (Manin 1997; Schattschneider 1960). Elections are central in this 
context and several scholars of modern democratic theory have struggled to 
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determine the circumstances under which meaningful and effective repre-
sentation can exist. One of the more prominent models that often is used 
for theorizing on these matters is the responsible party model (RPM), 
which outlines a number of conditions under which policies will reflect 
mass opinion (APSA 1950; Thomassen 1999). A founding assumption that 
can be deduced from this model is that an electorate with clear and com-
monly held perceptions of the party space is an important prerequisite for 
successful political representation (Converse 1975; Schmitt and Thomassen 
1999; van der Brug 1997).37 Political perceptions affect the extent to which 
voters are meaningfully represented in a political system and thus they are 
important determinants of the outcomes of electoral processes (Granberg 
and Holmberg 1988). 
Prior research on political perceptions among voters has mostly focused 
on the impact of individual-level characteristics, cognitions or values, 
where factors such as political knowledge (Brug 1997), left-right self 
placement and whether a voter likes or dislikes a specific party have proven 
to be influential (Granberg 1993; Granberg and Holmberg 1988; Popkin 
1991). Other studies have shown that contextually related features such as 
the nature of the political system (Granberg and Holmberg 1988) or the 
saliency of an issue (Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; Oscarsson 1998; van 
der Brug 1997) also influence voters’ perceptions of party positions. Not-
withstanding the findings of these authors, not much is known about vari-
ous contextual influences on voters’ perceptions; and the relevant question 
whether it is external political stimuli or internal features among individu-
als that mainly determine the perceptual process remains unanswered.  
The large amount of research on constitutional design and electoral out-
comes has long focused on how different institutional factors affect parties 
and party systems, which is assumed to influence voters as well (Duverger 
1954; Lijphart 1984; Sartori 1976). For example, it is widely believed that 
proportional representation tends to produce multiparty systems with ideo-
logically committed and cohesive parties, while plurality/majority represen-
tation is known for producing more stable two-party systems with what 
tend to be all-embracing policy platforms. These differing circumstances 
are in turn expected to have consequences for voting behavior since pro-
portional systems will motivate voters to vote prospectively according to 
 
 
                                                   
37 The concept of perception refers to the cognitions or beliefs that voters have about differ-
ent political phenomena. An individual’s perceptions may be conveyed as: ‘party A is op-
posed to death penalties’ or that ‘party B is a left wing feminist party’. The main difference 
between attitudes and perceptions is that the former builds on evaluative judgments while the 
latter does not (Granberg and Holmberg 1988). 
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the RPM, while voters in more majoritarian systems will tend to vote retro-
spectively, according to the accountability model (Holmberg 2006; Prze-
worski, Stokes, and Manin 1999).38  
Access to comparative data on voters in different countries has increased 
in recent years and this has renewed interest in institutional design and the 
outcomes there of. Instead of just assuming that electoral systems have an 
impact on voting behavior, recent studies have set out to investigate em-
pirically how the institutional context affects voting behavior per se (Norris 
2004; Reynolds 2002). While the first wave of research on constitutional 
design focused on the impact on parties and assumed that voters would be 
affected as well, the second wave of research has mainly investigated the 
impact of electoral systems on voters by assuming that the effect partly is 
mediated by the effect of the context on the parties. 
The present study aims to make a contribution both to the research of 
political perceptions among voters and to the field of constitutional design. 
It does this by taking a more comprehensive grip on one of the issues and 
investigating how both parties and voters simultaneously are affected by 
the institutional context. More specifically, the aim of this study is to bring 
institutions into the equation and investigate how various formal and in-
formal electoral institutional settings might affect voters’ perceptual agree-
ment (PA) of parties’ left-right positions. Theoretically, the institutional 
context is expected to affect voters’ PA both directly - by bringing to bear 
different facilitative or motivational incentive structures - and indirectly - 
by the impact of the institutional context on the parties in the form of cen-
trifugal or centripetal party competition (higher degrees of centrifugal 
competition will reasonably imply greater divergence in the parties’ ideo-
logical positions, which should make it easier for voters to discern the par-
ties’ positions). A common notion within the literature on electoral institu-
tions is that the adoption of different electoral formulas creates different 
behavior modifying incentive structures, both for individual voters and ra-
tional vote-seeking politicians (Farrell 1997; Norris 2004). For similar rea-
sons, it can be expected that different institutional settings may also bring 
different incentives that will motivate and assist voters when acquiring in-
formation about the parties’ policy positions and in turn this may have 
consequences for voters’ PA (see Franklin, van der Eijk, and Oppenhuis 
 
 
                                                   
38 The main difference between these two models from a voter perspective is that the elections 
in the first case are viewed as an expression of preferences while in the latter case are seen as 
an opportunity for voters to hold their governments and representatives accountable for pre-
vious actions (Downs 1957; Holmberg 2006).  
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1996 for a further discussion on motivational and facilitative factors). 
Consequently, the present study deals with two dependent variables, the 
main one being voters’ PA of parties’ left-right positions and the second 
and mediating variable being the divergence in parties’ left-right positions 
brought about by centrifugal or centripetal party competition due to the 
differences in the institutional settings. The study builds on data from the 
Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems (CSES) which combines contex-
tual features (variables) of electoral systems and individual party character-
istics with cross-national surveys of voting behavior.  
The next section provides a discussion of some of the basic requirements 
of the RPM for effective representation, and follows with a discussion of 
the importance of left-right ideology as a cue for voters when acquiring 
information. Next is an introduction to the dependent variable PA, fol-
lowed by a theoretical discussion of the impact of formal and informal elec-
toral institutions on PA. The penultimate section presents considerations 
about the data, the research design and some methodological reflections. 
The paper concludes with a presentation and summary of the empirical 
findings.  
The role of belief systems and perceptual agreement for effec-
tive policy representation 
The responsible party model presumes that parties present policy programs 
during election campaigns which serve as a basis for voters' choices and 
consequently as prospective electoral mandates. According to the model, 
political parties are reckoned to be the central actors in this indirect process 
of linking the preferences of the citizen to public policies. A criterion of the 
model is that parties should present divergent and stable policy programs 
so that voters are given meaningful electoral choices. The model assumes 
theoretically that voters base their vote-decisions on a comparative evalua-
tion of the policy programs presented by the competing parties and candi-
dates and choose the program that matches best with their own preferences 
(Adams 2001; APSA 1950; Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; Thomassen 
1999).39 An assumption that can be deduced from the model is that an elec-
 
 
                                                   
39 Even if there are signs that parties in general have become more candidate-centred in recent 
years, it is in most Western democracies and especially among the European democracies still 
the political party rather than the individual candidate that is the main actor in parliament 
(Dalton 1985; Granberg and Holmberg 1988; Katz and Mair 1995; Dalton and Wattenberg 
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torate with clear and shared perceptions of the party spectrum is an impor-
tant prerequisite for successful political representation (Converse 1975; 
Schmitt and Thomassen 1999; van der Brug 1997). Hence, the quality of 
political perceptions affects the extent to which voters are meaningfully 
represented in a political system and thus is an important determinant of 
the outcomes of electoral processes (Granberg and Holmberg 1988). 
However, several studies carried out during the past decades have shown 
that American voters in general are not particularly well informed on po-
litical or societal matters (Bartels 1996; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and 
Stokes 1960; Carpini and Keeter 1996; Page and Shapiro 1992). There is 
little reason to suppose the American case is unique and thus it is possible 
that reasoned choices are beyond the capabilities of the vast majority of 
democratic citizenry (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). In spite of this, one 
argument why political representation in mass democracies can work at all 
is that citizens and elites often share political concepts (Bartels 1996; 
Luskin 2003) and that rational voters use heuristics such as ideologies, 
cognitive schemas or belief systems as cost-reducing devices or shortcuts 
(see Downs 1957; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Zaller 1992).  
The idea that voters use heuristics and to some extent can make rea-
soned choices on the basis of limited information, i.e. low information ra-
tionality, is a fairly well established concept within the field of voting stud-
ies (see Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Popkin 1991).40 The role of 
belief systems such as political ideology in models of political representa-
tion has also been emphasized by Jacques Thomassen (1999). However, the 
existence of a common cognitive map of the political landscape is not 
enough to achieve effective representation. For the functioning of modern 
mass democracies the communication between masses and elites also needs 
to be clear and simple and this is best served by the existence of a simple 
common political language, spoken and understood by both elites and 
masses. According to Jacques Thomassen, “the effectiveness of the respon-
sible party model depends on the extent to which the policy views of both 
the masses and elites are constrained by a one-dimensional conflict dimen-
                                                                                                                       
2000). For this reason the analyses in this article will focus on the perceptions of party posi-
tions rather than those of individual candidates. The theoretical implications are, however, 
equally applicable for candidates. 
40 The debate between heuristics versus information has in recent years become more nuanced 
due to the diverse and many times discouraging results from a number of empirical and more 
rigorous tests of the theories of heuristics. A more recent conclusion is thus that information 
matters and that short-cut, after all, cannot fully replace an absence of factual political 
knowledge. Nevertheless, cognitive short-cuts can under certain circumstances be used as an 
information substitute that allows individuals to perform better than by pure chance (Bartels 
1996; Blais, Gidengil, Fournier, and Nevitte 2009; Kumlin 2001; Lau and Redlawsk 2006; 
Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Luskin 2002; Oscarsson 2007).  
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sion, more specifically, a left-right dimension” (Thomassen 1999:34). From 
this perspective, a unidimensional conceptual system is a much desired 
characteristic of representative democracies and as such, the left-right ide-
ology provides the fundamental means of communication and constitutes a 
crucial linkage between citizens and their elected representatives (compare 
Downs 1957).  
The existence of a simple political language understood by both elites 
and masses, thus is an important requirement for the functioning of mo-
dern mass democracies.41 Compared to more issue specific positions, the 
advantage with knowledge of parties left-right ideological positions is that 
it can be used as an information short cut to the parties’ standpoints on 
many concrete issues (Downs 1957; Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Holm-
berg 1981; Holmberg and Oscarsson 2004; Oscarsson 1998; van der Brug 
1997; 1999a).42 The bipolar left-right construction has shown remarkable 
resilience, reproducing itself in new historical and social contexts, con-
stantly challenged and reshaped by new political dimensions. The incorpo-
rative power of the left-right semantics is impressive. For instance, reli-
gious, liberal economic and materialist values all contribute to rightist iden-
tification among citizens, while secular, economic leftist and post-
materialist values contribute to a leftist identification (Knutsen 1995; Knut-
sen 1999; Oscarsson 1998). Although the substantive meaning and inter-
pretation of the left-right distinction have not remained the same over the 
centuries – albeit with the exception of the key element of ‘equality’ (Bob-
bio 1996) – the distinction has played a crucial role as an information cost 
reducing device for political actors (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Inglehart 
and Klingemann 1976). Thus, the merit of the left-right distinction is to a 
large extent its simplicity and not its content. Based on prior research, I 
emphasize that if voters, in a context of limited information, indeed can 
make adequately informed electoral choices using cognitive cues, one of the 
more prominent and valid information shortcuts available to them is the 
party's ideological left-right position. 
 
 
                                                   
41 Just as in Thomassen’s simplicity hypothesis, where the importance of a shared one-
dimensional belief system is emphasized, Downs original model of party competition also 
assumes that all parties compete along a unidimensional left-right continuum. The presence 
of a unidimensional left-right oriented policy space may thus be an important requirement 
when testing Downsian theoretical assumptions. 
42 There is very likely a reciprocal relationship between parties left-right positions and how 
voters perceive them: voters use their perception of parties left-right positions to assess party 
positions on concrete issues and recursively, concrete issues affect how they are perceived in 
terms of left-right (van der Brug 1997). 
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Vote-decisions based on ideology can however, only result in meaningful 
representation if the perceived positions of the parties reflect their actual 
policies and if the voters’ agree among themselves in their perceptions of 
the parties’ left-right policy positions. Votes based on agreement between 
voters on left-right characterization and between voters and their candidate 
representatives on proposed policy will then yield meaningful mandates for 
the parties (van der Brug 1999a). One must, however, draw attention here 
to a distinction between accuracy and agreement in voters’ perceptions.  
If perceptual accuracy is understood as the agreement among voters and 
their representatives on proposed policies, then a related problem is to find 
a valid indicator of a party’s true position. Alternative sources of party-
related data concerning parties’ policy positions such as party manifestos, 
surveys among the members of the parliament or parliamentary vote roll-
calls are, from a country comparative perspective, difficult to find and 
sometimes even more difficult to compare. However, such a study made by 
Wouter van der Brug on the Netherlands showed that voters’ aggregated 
perceptions of party positions on six different issues were accurate in gen-
eral, even for the least informed group of voters (van der Brug 1998).  
If public policies are to reflect the will of a majority of the people, the 
perceptions of those policies should be accurate for as many voters as pos-
sible. Otherwise this may lead to a serious distortion in the relationship 
between citizens and government where unsupported policies get enacted. 
Even if the mean- or the median voter position reflects a party’s position 
accurately, it does not necessarily tell that much about the quality in the 
perceptions of voters, since individual misperceptions will tend statistically 
to be canceled out on an aggregated level. To know about quality one also 
must consider the agreement among voters in their perception of the par-
ties’ ideological positions. Assuming that voters’ aggregated left-right per-
ceptions accurately reflect the ‘true’ policy positions of the parties, then 
votes based on PA about policies will yield meaningful electoral mandates 
(van der Brug 1999a). Hence, PA is an indication of successful communica-
tion within a political system and can thus work as a guarantor for success-
ful political representation.  
Donald Granberg and Sören Holmberg (1988) originated the concept of 
perceptual agreement, although they used the term perceptual consensus. 
The present article uses a measurement of PA devised by Cees van der Eijk 
(2001). This coefficient builds on the distribution of voters’ placement of a 
party’s position on, for example, a left-right scale. It was originally devel-
oped for measuring agreement in ordered rating scales and can be used ei-
ther as a measurement for single parties or aggregated to form a compre-
hensive measure for the party system as a whole. The coefficient ranges 
between values -1 (maximum disagreement) to 1 (maximum agreement). 
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How do institutional contexts affect voters’ perceptual agree-
ment?  
Neither the literature on voting behavior nor that on political systems offer 
many clear theoretical assumptions on how different contextually related 
factors might affect voters’ PA. Rational choice institutionalism however, 
takes as its theoretical point of departure the claim that formal and infor-
mal rules and institutions generate different incentive structures that are 
able to shape and constrain political behavior. Following the work of Pippa 
Norris (2004), the present article rests on the assumptions that: a) formal 
and informal institutional rules shape the incentives for both politicians 
and voters and, b) politicians are rational vote-maximizers who respond 
strategically to the institutional incentives when striving for office.  
As mentioned, this study aims to investigate how different formal and 
informal electoral institutional settings directly and indirectly affect voters' 
PA of parties’ left-right positions. Theoretically we believe that a) specific 
formal and informal institutional factors may facilitate and/or motivate 
voters when receiving political information, simultaneously, and b) differ-
ent institutional settings may also affect voters’ PA indirectly by the impact 
of the institutional context on the behavior of parties.43 According to 
Downs (1957) and Sartori (1976) the institutional context affects the direc-
tion of the competition among parties in terms of centrifugal or centripetal 
tendencies. Higher degrees of centrifugal competition will reasonably imply 
greater divergence in the parties’ ideological positions, which in turn should 
make it easier for voters to discern the parties’ positions and thereby result 
in greater PA. The degree of divergence in parties’ left-right positions is, 
therefore, an indication of ideological distinctiveness among the parties. 
 
 
                                                   
43 Inspired by an institutionalistic rational choice perspective, context refers here to those 
aspects of the political arena that are relevant for action. Context matters for political repre-
sentation in a range of interrelated aspects as it shapes the effectiveness or appropriateness of 
different actions among actors. It will be more effective to act in a certain way in some con-
texts and not in others (Nash, Hudson, and Luttrell 2006). Political context refers here to 
formal and informal rules that govern the interactions among parties and voters such as elec-
toral systems and party systems. Usually the concept of a party system is defined as a set of 
formal and informal rules that direct and influence the behavior and the interactions of the 
significant parties within a given country (Keman 1997; McLean 1996). In this article a dis-
tinction is made between formal and informal rules, where formal rules refer to the electoral 
system and informal rules to the party system. Together they compose the context. 
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In conclusion, the present study deals with a structural model where the 
main dependent variable is PA and where divergence is working as an in-
tervening variable.  
 
Figure 1. Causal theoretical model of the effect of formal and informal in-
stitutions on divergence and perceptual agreement. 
 
 
 
 
 
Effects on divergence 
Formal institutional factors 
Pippa Norris (2004) formulated the hypothesis that the nature of the elec-
toral thresholds creates incentives for parties to adopt either bridging or 
bonding strategies during the election campaigns. The logic here is that in 
plurality, or majority elections - where the electoral obstacles are higher 
since ‘the winner takes it all’ - parties will lean towards deploying bridging 
strategies since they need a majority or a simple plurality of the votes in 
order to win a district. A bridging strategy hypothetically, will focus on 
valance issues or issues that usually are widely shared among the public in 
order to bring together diverse groups of voters into loose and shifting coa-
litions. In more proportional elections on the other hand, the electoral ob-
stacles are lower and parties will therefore be more inclined to adopt bond-
ing strategies and appeal to certain groups of voters instead of the whole 
electorate. The basis of this is that the parties are not dependent on a ma-
jority of the voters in order to become represented, and they could hardly 
acquire such support in practice. Hypothetically, a bonding party will turn 
towards more homogeneous groups of voters such as environmentalists, 
Perceptual agreement  Divergence 
Informal institutional factors 
Formal institutional factors 
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workers, trade-unions, religious people or ethnic minorities by focusing on 
ideology or other common beliefs.44  
These ideas match the theoretical propositions made by Anthony Downs 
(1957) and Giovanni Sartori (1976) about how different electoral and 
party systems may tend towards either centripetal or centrifugal party 
competition.45 There will be consequences for the nature of party systems if 
parties lean towards bridging strategies under majoritarian electoral rules, 
since majority electoral arrangements most likely will induce centripetal 
incentives from the parties i.e. competing parties will tend to cluster at the 
median voter position in the center of the ideological or political spec-
trum.46 Sartori developed this idea further and argued that a two-party sys-
tem would produce centripetal incentives while a multiparty system would 
generate centrifugal competitive incentives (see also Cox 1990; Klingemann 
2005; Merrill and Adams 2002). According to Sartori, the degree of com-
petition between parties is not important in itself; instead, what is of inter-
est is the direction of the competition. Thus differences in the forms of 
competition mediated by the degree of party system fragmentation directly 
affect the ideological distance between the parties (Sartori 1976). One can 
here talk about party competition in terms of penetration in society, which 
in multiparty systems characteristically yields campaign strategies that ex-
aggerate the conflicts between parties in order to appeal explicitly to party 
loyalists (Ware 1996). 
In the case of more proportional electoral systems where competing par-
ties are expected to lean towards bonding strategies, the contrasting expec-
tation is emergence of centrifugal incentives and the adoption of more di-
vergent and dispersed positions on the ideological continuum or issue di-
mensions. Proportional electoral systems more often than not result in a 
large number of political parties and parties attempting to mobilize elec-
toral support will, at least theoretically, try to position themselves more 
ideologically in order to differentiate themselves as much as possible from 
competitors (Downs 1957; Sartori 1976; Sjöblom 1968). Moreover, parties 
 
 
                                                   
44 The distinction between parties in terms of bridging or bonding is of course, an oversimpli-
fication with the single purpose to bring order in a complex reality. 
45 The term electoral system generally refers to four different concepts, namely the size of the 
electoral district, the legal threshold, the ballot structure and the system used for transferring 
votes into seats (Arnold 2007).  
46 There is an obvious reciprocal relationship between the behavior of parties and the nature 
of the party systems. An electoral system affects both party strategies and voting behavior, 
which shapes the party system and at the same time the party system affects the strategies of 
the parties. 
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in multiparty systems do not necessarily compete with all other parties, but 
may rather contest with their ideological neighbors (Ware 1996).  
Downs and Sartoris' theory has gained empirical support in that the size 
of the constituencies in multi-party elections tends to promote a higher de-
gree of centrifugal party competition, something that should signify more 
ideologically committed parties (Merrill and Adams 2002). In single mem-
ber constituencies it will be easier for candidates to develop a kind of prin-
cipal-agent relationship with voters while in multi-member districts a more 
successful party strategy is to create a party to voter linkage by stressing 
common ideological principles or programmatic party platforms (Norris 
2004). In this aspect Bingham Powell talks about the degree of national 
competitiveness as a factor in how different electoral systems affect party 
organization and competition. Large districts tend to imply more central-
ized party organization, which in turn can be expected to induce more pro-
grammatically orientated parties (Bingham Powell 1986).47 
The structure of the ballot is another aspect of electoral systems that 
creates incentives for rational vote-seeking politicians to emphasize either 
programmatic or particularistic benefits during the election campaigns 
(Norris 2004). Ballot structure normally is closely related to the basic types 
of electoral systems even though different ballot types theoretically can be 
used within all systems. Broadly speaking, there are four types of ballot: 1) 
party ballots, 2) candidate ballots, 3) preference ballots and 4) dual bal-
lots.48 
Hypothetically, in the case of the preference ballots, candidate politi-
cians will face incentives to distinguish themselves from competitors within 
their own party by emphasizing particularistic policies or benefits offered 
 
 
                                                   
47 It should be noted that plurality elections, where one member from each constituency will 
be elected, do not require political parties. Even though candidates often are supported or 
even appointed by political parties they may, be free, independent individuals. In contrast, 
proportional elections in all varieties and forms that are used when several representatives 
from each constituency will be elected presuppose the presence of political parties. Parties are 
needed for making the lists and/or to nominate candidates. Proportionalism furthermore 
presupposes entities in the legislature that can be proportionally represented. Proportional 
methods, with the exception for the single transferable vote, are therefore unthinkable with-
out political parties (Moberg 2005).  
48 Party ballots are normally used in closed-list multi-member districts where voters cast a 
single ballot for a party. Candidate ballots are used in single-member districts where voters in 
each constituency cast a single ballot for an individual candidate. Preference ballots are nor-
mally used in open-list multi-member districts where citizens cast a ballot for a single party 
but also have the opportunity to express their preferences for a particular candidate. Finally, 
dual ballots are used in combined/mixed electoral systems where voters can cast separate 
ballots in both single- and multi-member districts (Norris 2004). 
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through constituency service. In contrast, politicians in proportional sys-
tems using closed party ballots will have a greater incentive hypothetically 
to rationally focus on collective party appeals and party cohesion by em-
phasizing programmatic and ideological benefits and policies (Norris 
2004). Ballot structure thus can serve as a proxy for the degree of party 
centralization. Under circumstances when ideology is of greater importance 
during the campaigns, parties will face stronger centrifugal incentives to 
lean towards bonding campaign strategies.  
Another factor likely to affect the degree of divergence in the party sys-
tems is whether or not a country has a parliamentary, semi-presidential, or 
presidential system of governance. Hypothetically we can expect a greater 
focus on the parties in parliamentary systems where there is no separation 
of powers such as exists in presidential systems with the president and leg-
islative chambers having different roles in the policymaking process (Ar-
nold 2007). A greater focus on parties may in turn affect the degree of 
party competition and hence also the degree of divergence in the parties’ 
ideological positions. 
Informal institutional factors 
A multidimensional policy space may decrease the probability of ideologi-
cally committed and profiled parties. Multiparty competition in a multidi-
mensional policy space could result in a situation where representatives of 
each party do not engage with common issues. If the parties are inclined to 
focus on different issues then the prominence of each policy dimension 
along with characteristics such as issue ownership may be more decisive for 
party competition i.e. how the parties are appealing to the voters (Budge 
1994; Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996). For example, three or more 
parties competing in a unidimensional left-right policy space will each need 
to emphasize its position in relation to the others. On the other hand, a 
three-way competition in a multi-dimensional policy space could result in 
each party emphasizing positions in different dimensions where they believe 
they hold an advantage over their competitors (this is also the essence of 
the saliency theory, see Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, and Ta-
nenbaum 2001; Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994; Robertson 
1976) Richard McKelvey introduced a similar idea in arguing that the pol-
icy positions of parties competing in a multidimensional policy space 
should be more randomly distributed than in the case of parties competing 
in unidimensional spaces. This occurs because it is more difficult for party 
strategists to obtain information about the preferences of the voters in all 
the different policy dimensions (McKelvey 1979). Hence, if the parties 
compete along the same conflict dimension, it is more likely that they will 
depend more intensively on bonding or bridging strategies depending on 
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the number of parties. This will in turn have implications for the divergence 
among parties due to greater/lesser degrees of ideological competitiveness. 
The strength of the left-right ideological dimension can be expected to 
raise even further incentives for parties in multiparty systems to differenti-
ate and engage in centrifugal competition, since the left-right ideology is 
reckoned to be a near-global political communicative device, used and un-
derstood by both the masses and the elite (Thomassen 1999). Divergent 
and differentiated policy position will thereby become even more important 
for the parties when appealing to the electorate. 
Another factor that is closely related to the electoral system is the effec-
tive number of parties. From earlier studies we know that the number of 
parties may affect the direction of the competitiveness among parties. As 
mentioned earlier, Downs assumed that a two-party system would produce 
centripetal incentives for the parties whereas Sartori argued that a multi-
party system would generate centrifugal incentives for party competition 
(Sartori 1976; see also Cox 1990; Merrill and Adams 2002). According to 
Anthony Downs, parties in multiparty-systems will try to position them-
selves ideologically in order to differentiate themselves as much as possible 
from their competitors (Downs 1957; see also Sjöblom 1968).49  
In conclusion, all factors that can be expected to increase the competi-
tion among parties systemically will, as a function of the number of parties, 
affect the direction in the party competition. In particular, a situation of 
more divergent policy positions is expected to increase PA among voters. 
Consequently, we will deal here with interaction terms between the effec-
tive number of parties and unidimensionality, the strength of left right-
dimension, the ballot structure and parliamentarism. 
Effects on perceptual agreement 
Formal institutional factors 
Generally, the effect of electoral systems on voter perceptions of parties’ 
policies is assumed to be an indirect consequence of the impact of electoral 
systems on the political parties and the party system. Large vote- seat dis-
parities may, however, lower the incentives for individual voters to obtain 
 
 
                                                   
49 An objection against the assumption that multiparty systems would raise centrifugal incen-
tives with increasing ideological distances between the parties is the fact that parties in multi-
party systems often needs to cooperate both informally and formally through coalitions 
(Ware 1996). This does, however, not necessarily need to imply that the distances between 
the parties are decreasing (Sartori 1976). 
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political information, as the benefit of getting informed about the policy 
positions is more limited than when the disparities are low. This aspect re-
fers to the mechanical- and psychological effects of different electoral sys-
tems (Duverger 1954): the mechanical effect is the difference between vote-
share and seat-share resulting from the electoral formula (see also Taa-
gepera and Shugart 1989); knowledge of the mechanical effect constitutes 
the basis for the psychological effect, which affects the behavior of the ac-
tors. Voters thus are expected to avoid voting for small parties when the 
size of the constituency is small or the legal threshold is high, as they do 
not want to waste their vote on parties having a small chance of gaining 
entry to the parliament. Consequently, electoral systems may be expected 
to affect the behavior of both parties and voters directly. A high degree of 
vote- seat disproportionality in a system may induce the voters to view the 
elections just as a process of selecting government while elections in a more 
proportional system may tend to be seen as also facilitating an expression 
of preferences (Downs 1957). Parties and candidates in more proportional 
electoral systems will, as mentioned, have a higher incentive to undertake 
programmatic ideological campaigning and this could generate greater PA 
among voters on parties’ policy positions.  
The effect of electoral systems on voters’ PA is, hence, a dual process 
where certain electoral formulas may a) encourage the parties to appeal 
more clearly to the voters and b) make the voters more or less motivated to 
actively seek information about the parties’ policies. 
However, according to Carsten Anckar (2002) it is unlikely that voters 
directly evaluate which system is being used, or how big is the voting dis-
trict. Instead, the psychological effect results from the impact of aggregated 
vote-seat disparities. For this reason Anckar claims that the degree of pro-
portionality in fact is the most obvious effect that an electoral system has 
on the degree of party diversity (Anckar 2002). This might be true when it 
comes to party system fragmentation but the question is whether this also 
is true when it comes to PA among voters? One problem here is that by 
using proportionality as an index of differences between electoral systems, 
one cannot tell exactly which mechanisms are affecting voters’ PA. This is 
because the degree of proportionality within a political system is a result of 
both the district magnitude together with the type of electoral system and 
the legal threshold. Following Anckar (2002), I too doubt that individual 
voters actually consider the district magnitude or which system is used for 
translating votes into seats. Rather, I argue that it is more likely that the 
effective threshold is the decisive factor when it comes to voters considering 
whether or not to support a party. A vote for a party that has but a small 
chance of receiving a mandate can be reckoned as a waste. Consequently, 
voters will be less motivated to acquire information about the policy posi-
tions of the smaller national parties, with only limited chance to gain en-
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trance to the parliament, which in turn can be expected to affect the voter 
PA.  
A direct effect of the use of party ballots on PA is that voters’ knowledge 
about the parties’ ideological positions should increase since as mentioned, 
politicians under such rules are expected to promote programmatic rather 
than particularistic policies. Moreover, both party ballots and candidate 
ballots are often nominal and voters must choose either one party or one 
candidate. This implies that there are ‘less choices’ available for a voter 
compared to the other two ballot types. Lower decision costs can in turn 
imply greater PA since there is less to learn. This is in contrast with prefer-
ence- and dual ballots, where voters have the opportunity to choose party 
and to rank the candidates on the list or, in the case of the dual ballot, have 
the opportunity to choose between both a party and a candidate. Voters 
here are offered ‘more choices’ (Farrell 2001; Norris 2004). An alternative 
hypothesis could be formulated stating that the opportunity of greater 
choices can make voters more motivated to participate and, since greater 
choices hypothetically also demand more knowledge, PA should also be 
higher. It is more likely however, that both dual and preference ballots will 
direct the focus away from the parties and that PA after all will be higher 
for party policies in systems using party ballots. 
Whether a country has a parliamentary, semi-presidential, or presiden-
tial system is also likely to affect the levels of PA, in addition to the effects 
of electoral rules and party systems. The reason for this is that it may be 
more difficult for voters to discern parties’ policy positions in systems 
where there is a separation of powers since this creates a more complex 
institutional environment. Legislative and presidential parties have different 
roles in the policy making process in presidential systems. From a voter 
perspective, parties in parliamentary systems may thus appear as more solid 
since they only have one face to present to voters compared with parties in 
presidential or semi-presidential systems (Arnold 2007). The extent to 
which separation of powers obscures party positions in semi-presidential 
systems may, however, depend on the relative strength of the presidency 
versus the government. With the exception of the United States, most coun-
tries with presidential systems tend to be semi-presidential and differ widely 
in the relative strength of the executive. In Arnold's study, the effect of 
semi-presidentialism did not have a significant effect on voters’ knowledge 
about parties’ left-right position (Arnold 2007). Consequently, this study 
will contrast the respective effects of parliamentary systems and presiden-
tial and semi-presidential systems collectively. If parliamentary systems im-
ply a greater focus on the parties, this will in turn facilitate an increase PA 
among voters.  
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Informal institutional factors 
While the early institutionalists asserted that party systems and party com-
petition mainly was the product of formal institutions, contemporary soci-
ologists emphasized the importance of social conflict and cleavages in this 
regard (Ware 1996). Schattschneider (1960) criticized the sociological ap-
proach to party competition and rejected the view that parties will auto-
matically arise in order to reflect the conflict dimensions that exist in a so-
ciety. According to Schatschneider, parties cannot create cleavages but they 
can and will use them for mobilizing potential voters and for that reason, 
some cleavages will become more important than others within a political 
system. However, according to Thomassen (1999), simplicity in the politi-
cal world is important for effective political representation. Ideology from 
this perspective provides the fundamental means of communication and 
constitutes a linkage between citizens and elected representatives. A simple 
and unidimensional system will thus have a facilitating effect on the voters 
in that each of the contesting parties is defined according to the same policy 
dimension and because parties and voters share a common political lan-
guage. This in turn will make the cognitive cues used by voters more effi-
cient and, with only one policy dimension, there is also less to learn about 
the party policies. But a simple and highly unidimensional party system 
alone is insufficient to ensure clear and efficient communication between 
voters and their representatives. For effective communication to occur, ac-
cording to Thomassen (1999), the party system also needs to be structured 
according to a left-right dimension. For this reason we expect voters’ PA to 
be higher for parties in systems that are more unidimensional and struc-
tured according to a left-right dimension.  
Lastly, the number of competing parties – earlier argued to be a factor in 
determining the nature of party competition and the degree of policy diver-
gence - may also have a direct effect on PA as there will be more alterna-
tives from which voters must choose. On one hand, more choice may bring 
a sense of greater meaning to the selection, which may motivate voters to 
obtain information about the parties’ policy positions. On the other hand, 
there may quite reasonably be an upper limit beyond which there will be 
diminishing returns: too many parties leading to high decision costs and 
thus a negative effect on PA. The number of parties can thus be expected to 
have both a motivational and a facilitative effect on PA but the interaction 
is an inverse one. A large number of parties can motivate voters to actively 
seek information since there are more alternatives to choose between but 
equally, a smaller field might be much easier to know something about. 
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Hypotheses and theoretical expectations  
A common denominator in the hypotheses presented above is, as men-
tioned, that formal and informal factors related to the electoral system will 
have both a direct and an indirect impact on voters’ PA.  
The indirect impact refers to a situation when the victory threshold is 
low and there are a large number of parties competing in a unidimensional 
left-right oriented policy space under a parliamentary constitutional system. 
The parties are assumed here to adopt bonding strategies due to increased 
competition, and ideologies and policy programs will become important 
instruments in the election campaign. These factors in turn are expected to 
give rise to centrifugal tendencies in politicians and parties, leading to more 
dispersed positions on the political spectrum. According to the RPM, voters 
should be given meaningful electoral choices and in this respect, divergent 
policy positions are an important feature contributing to effective represen-
tation (APSA 1950). Divergent policy positions thus can be considered to 
facilitate for voters by bringing clarity to their perceptions of parties’ posi-
tions, and this will generate higher PA.  
Conclusively, the expectation that they will affect the degree of competi-
tion among parties is the most significant common factor of unidimension-
ality, the strength of LR-dimension, the ballot structure and parliamenta-
rism. Parliamentary systems are supposed to bring greater focus on the par-
ties while the use of party ballots should promote centralized and pro-
grammatically oriented party organizations. The degree of unidimensional-
ity and the strength of the left-right dimension are also expected to affect 
the competition among parties, since it is more likely that the parties will 
be located in the same policy space when both are high. According to 
Downs (1957) and Sartori (1976), however, the effect of these variables on 
the spatial direction in party competition is conditioned by the number of 
parties involved. An increasing amount of competition in a two-party sys-
tem should raise centripetal incentives for the parties while the opposite 
should be true in multiparty contexts. 
The direct impact on voters' PA derives from the assumption that voters 
will find it easier to perceive the position of parties in parliamentary and 
unidimensional left-right dominated multiparty systems, where the diver-
gence in the party positions is high. The number of competing parties is 
expected to affect the voters in that a greater number may bring an in-
creased sense of meaningfulness to the party choice, which may then moti-
vate voters to investigate the parties’ policy positions. The ballot structure 
is another factor that can directly affect PA. Hypothetically, closed party 
ballots present fewer choices and thus should make it easier for the voters 
to make informed decisions. This type of ballot should also create incen-
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tives for politicians to favor programmatically oriented campaigning rather 
than to espouse particularistic policies. As the candidate is not the focal 
point in programmatic campaigning this should improve PA among voters.  
The district size is a factor that, together with the electoral system and 
the legal threshold, affects the degree of proportionality within a political 
system. Nevertheless, because it is quite unlikely that the majority of voters 
evaluate such matters, it is the effective threshold for entry to parliament 
that promotes a psychological effect. When the entry threshold is high, then 
voters will be less motivated to obtain information about parties they per-
ceive as not having a realistic chance of entering parliament. In this case, 
the principal mechanisms at work are simplicity and meaningfulness: I be-
lieve that simplicity in the political system will reduce the information costs 
among voters to the benefit of PA; it is however, also meaningful to seek 
and assimilate political information.  
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In conclusion, when it comes to the hypothesized indirect effect of insti-
tutional characteristics on PA, mediated through party system divergence, 
the mechanism is assumed to be mainly facilitative. Concerning the hy-
pothesized direct effect of institutional characteristics on PA, the mecha-
nisms are assumed to be both motivational and facilitative. 
 
Table 1. A summary of the expected direct- and indirect effects of different 
institutional settings on voters’ perceptual agreement. 
Variables Indirect effects (Divergence) Direct effects (PA) 
Unidimensionality  - A more unidimensional party system is 
likely to increase the degree of competition 
among parties, which will generate cen-
trifugal or centripetal incentives, depending 
on the eff. nor. of parties.  
(f) - A more unidimensional party system 
will facilitate for voters when obtaining 
information about the parties, which means 
greater PA. 
 
Strength of left-right 
dimension  
- If the most prominent dimension within a 
system is a left-right dimension, ideology 
will become even more important as a 
campaign instrument, which in turn will 
affect left-right divergence in a party sys-
tem depending on the nr. of parties.  
(f) - If the first or strongest dimension within 
a system resembles an ordering of parties 
in terms of left-right ideology, it will be 
easier for voters to apprehend the party 
positions, which will increase PA.   
 
The effective num-
ber of parliamentary 
parties  
-The eff. nr. of parties is expected to influ-
ence party competition, which in turn will 
bring centrifugal or centripetal incentives 
that will affect party system divergence.  
 
(m) - The eff. nr. of parties is expected to 
affect PA in that a greater amount of par-
ties will motivate voters to obtain informa-
tion about the parties due to a greater 
variety of alt. to choose from.  
(f) - However an upper limit with diminish-
ing returns may exist where too many 
parties, reasonably, means increasing 
decision costs, which should decrease PA. 
The effective 
threshold  
-The electoral threshold is expected to 
generate incentives for bonding or bridging 
strategies, which in turn will yield centrifu-
gal or centripetal incentives that will affect 
the degree of divergence within a party 
system.  
(m) - A high electoral threshold is expected 
to make voters less motivated to obtain 
information about the parties, which will 
decrease PA in general. 
 
Party ballots  -Party ballots are here reckoned to be 
characterizing for centralized party organi-
zation, which in turn means more ideologi-
cally or programmatically oriented parties 
and party representatives; which may raise 
centrifugal or centripetal incentives de-
pending on the nr. of parties. 
(f) - Party ballots are expected to facilitate 
for voters since fewer choices means 
decreasing information costs, which in turn 
should increase PA. 
 
Parliamentarism  - Parliamentary systems are expected to 
generate a greater focus on the parties, 
why it is likely that this in turn may increase 
the competition among parties, depending 
on the nr. of competing parties, which may 
affect the degree of divergence in a sys-
tem.  
(f) - Compared to presidential systems, 
parliamentary systems are expected to 
facilitate for voters when discerning the 
parties’ policy positions since a separation 
of powers creates a more complex institu-
tional environment. 
 
Comment: (f)=facilitative, (m)=motivational. 
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Data and methodological considerations  
Aggregated data from different national election studies will be used with 
single parties as the unit of analysis. The data are derived from the CSES 
(Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) modules 1 and 2, which respec-
tively represent post election surveys conducted in 33 countries during 
1996-2001 and 2001-2004. A cross-national purview, the presence of both 
micro-level (including vote choice, evaluations of candidates and parties 
etc.) and macro-level data (aggregate electoral returns, electoral rules and 
formulas) is the strength of the dataset. These observations allow us to 
conduct robust cross-national analyzes on the effects of institutions on the 
agreement in voters’ perceptions.50  
The present dataset covers a total of 66 elections and 311 political par-
ties. Unremarkably, countries are excluded from the analysis where rele-
vant data on left-right positions are missing. In addition, countries such as 
Ukraine that were not determined as free during the survey period accord-
ing to the Freedom House index have been omitted.51 All “don’t know” 
answers are coded as ‘missing’. The time span involved means that some 
countries are represented up to three times, which from a small-N perspec-
tive is positive but it might bring other problems related to the use of time-
series cross-sectional data. In order to check for autocorrelation, the data-
set was subjected to a Correlogram and a Durbin-Watson test. Neither test 
indicated any kind of autocorrelation with the exception of Peru in 2001 
and the Netherlands in 2002, but these proved not to have any evident ef-
fect on the overall results. A panel corrected standard error model was also 
used in order to detect any discrepancies but it generated similar results as 
the usual OLS-model with only small differences in the standard errors.52 
 
 
                                                   
50 The data can be downloaded from: http://www.umich.edu/~cses. The data for Netherlands 
in the elections of 2002 and 2003 comes from Irwin (2005). Data for Norway in 2001 and 
Sweden 2002 has been received from: Swedish National Data Service (SND) at http://www. 
snd.gu.se. Data for Great Britain has been received from the European voter project and can 
be downloaded from: http://www.gesis.org/en/research/EUROLAB/evoter/. 
51 ‘Freedom in the world 2006. ‘Selected data from freedom house’s annual global survey of 
political rights and civil liberties’. http://www.freedomhouse.org. 
52 In contrast to the CSES module 1, three additional parties are included in the module 2 
taking the total number of parties from six to nine. In order to ensure maximum comparabil-
ity across countries all the measures have been based on just the six main parties, even 
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However, since the analysis investigates the impact of contextually related 
factors on voters’ PA, it is undesirable that some countries appear up to 
three times while others occur once. Accordingly, the data has been 
weighted by how many times each country is represented. 
Turning to the right hand side of the equation used for estimating the 
theoretical model, all variables are system related which, in practice, means 
that they are all constants within each country. Considering that statistical 
analysis should be performed ideally with variables referring to the same 
level as the dependent variables - excepting in the case of a hierarchical 
model - this has some implications for the statistical part of the analysis as 
the available number of country/year observations consists of 57 cases. A 
problem arises in that the model consists of eight variables with four inter-
action terms, which means 66 possible combinations, yet the rule of thumb 
when performing the analysis at hand is that one should have at least five 
observations per variable combination. Since the final dependent variable, 
PA, can be constructed both for single parties and for the party system as 
such, carrying out the statistical analysis on the party level instead of ag-
gregated country level was a solution to this problem. 
Performing the statistical analysis on the party level dramatically in-
creased the number of observations from 57 to 311. However, this means 
that some alternative explanations for the degree of PA must be taken into 
account before carrying out the analysis. For example, the directional the-
ory of issue-voting assumes that voters mostly are not able to perceive 
slight differences in the positions held by parties on various issues. Parties 
that hold views that are more extreme on an issue dimension have the ad-
vantage of conveying a messages in a more persistent and credible manner 
(Gilljam 1997; Macdonald, Listhaug, and Rabinowitz 1991; Rabinowitz 
and Macdonald 1989; Westholm 1997). Moreover, for obvious reasons the 
presence of parties on the left or right extremes may also affect the extent 
of divergence in a party system. It is therefore sensible to control for the 
effect of left-right extremist parties on both divergence and PA. We also 
know that parties are more or less attached to different dimensions (Budge 
1994; Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 1987) and that PA is dependent not 
only on the salience of the left-right dimension in a polity (Oscarsson 1998; 
van der Brug 1997) but also on the extent to which parties define them-
selves along it (Dahlberg, Berlin, and Oscarsson 2005). Since this article 
focuses upon the left-right dimension it is a good idea to control for differ-
                                                                                                                       
though this may imply less accuracy and a deviation from other sources. The alternative 
would have been to only use data from module 2 but with the undesirable effect of drasti-
cally reducing the number of observations. The analyses were, however, also performed with 
all available parties from module 1 and module 2 included in the data set but this did not 
affect the results to any significant extent.  
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ent party families so that there is no discrimination against parties or coun-
tries that are less attached to this dimension.  
The age and the size of a party can be expected to influence perceptions 
among voters. It is a reasonable assumption that it may be easier to know 
something about the position of an old, established party than it would 
about a younger one. In addition, the electoral size of a party may also be 
decisive given Kirchheimer's (1990) point that bigger parties tend to be 
more ‘catch-all’ and have vague ideologies as one of their distinctive fea-
tures (Dittrich 1983; Kirchheimer 1990). If bigger parties tend be less ideo-
logically distinctive, then a party’s electoral size can be expected to have 
implications for voters’ PA.  
We also know that the composition of an electorate may affect the de-
gree of PA among voters. People tend to interact within particular social 
and or economic contexts, so that individuals in one context have more in 
common than they do with individuals in another. These factors are mainly 
aggregated versions of different individual level variables such as education 
and age. Citizens living in an ‘older’ or a ‘better educated’ demographic 
context may be more capable of correctly perceiving the policy positions of 
the parties compared to citizens from other contexts, since they will benefit 
from their environment (Franklin, van der Eijk, and Oppenhuis 1996). The 
problem here is that we cannot control for all these factors due to the lim-
ited degrees of freedom available within the data. Nevertheless, earlier 
studies have found that political knowledge is the most decisive factor be-
hind PA of individuals (van der Eijk, Franklin, and van der Brug 1999). 
The CSES-data does not include comparative measures for knowledge but 
there are measures for education which reasonably could be used as a 
proxy for knowledge. In this way we can control for varying degrees of 
education in each country, which might in turn affect the degree of PA. 
The five control variables can be reduced to three by separately regress-
ing the effects of the party related variables that are relevant for PA. We 
will receive a set of predicted values of PA from this procedure, which then 
can be used in the overall analysis as a replacement for the effects of the 
party related variables on PA - a so called block-wise regression (see van 
der Eijk, Franklin, et al. 1996 for a similar procedure).  
Moreover, since we are dealing with a causal model where one of the 
variables (divergence in parties’ policy positions) is working both as an in-
dependent and a dependent variable, a Structural Equation Model (SEM) is 
well-suited. A SEM is often used for confirmatory theory testing with the 
advantage that variables can be treated as being simultaneously exoge-
nous/independent and endogenous/dependent. This makes the SEM very 
useful for causal modeling compared to ordinary regression in which the 
models cannot be tested unless they are divided and the analysis performed 
in two or more steps, which under present circumstances is not an optimal 
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solution (Saris and Stronkhorst 1984).  
Yet another issue that appears when working with a comparative design 
like the one discussed here, is that the independent variables and the de-
pendent variable, as mentioned earlier, are measured at different levels. The 
dependent variable consists of voters’ PA about the left-right position of 
each party within an electoral system, while the independent variables re-
late to system characteristics that are constants within each country. In 
practice, this means that we are dealing with an unmeasured contextual 
effect where parties nested in similar contexts will appear as more alike 
than a random sample of parties from different contexts would do. This in 
turn may imply that one might risk exaggerating the effect of the contex-
tual independent variables. A drawback related to multilevel modeling is that 
the observations on each level are assumed to be drawn from a random sample 
of observations. This criterion is seldom met and especially is not met in this 
study and this threatens the applicability of a multilevel design (Hox 1995; 
Stoker 2002). Fortunately, we can mitigate this problem by using cluster 
corrected standard errors and treat the countries as clusters. 
Operationalizations 
Measuring perceptual agreement 
In this article a measurement of PA constructed by Cees van der Eijk 
(2001) will be used. The reason for this is that customarily measures of 
dispersion such as standard deviations are misleading and non comparable 
when applied on bounded rating scales such as the left-right scale used by 
CSES. For example, a highly peaked distribution where the median is far 
from the center will yield a larger standard deviation than a less peaked 
distribution with a median located in the center of the rating scale. How-
ever, the empirical distributions of observations in different categories of 
rating scales can be decomposed into layers represented by patterns consist-
ing of 0’s and 1’s with associated weights. All patterns can then be de-
scribed with a value for agreement that conforms to a number of proper-
ties, such as correspondence to perfect (dis)agreement, insensitive to the 
length of rating scales and the location of empty categories. Because the 
empirical distribution is decomposed into layers, the degree of agreement 
can be expressed as the weighted average of agreement in each of the con-
stituent layers, distinguished by an index i. where the proportions of cases 
contained in the layers are used as weights as:  
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where i is an index for distinguishing the layers (i = 1. . . k). wi is the pro-
portion of cases of the empirical distribution that is contained in layer i and 
Ai is agreement in layer i (van der Eijk 2001). The coefficient is bound be-
tween -1 to 1 and it reaches its minimum of -1 at maximum disagreement 
when half the voter sample places the party on one extreme and the other 
half of the sample places it on the opposite extreme. Maximum agreement 
is when all respondents place the party in the same category and the coeffi-
cient attains +1. A uniform distribution yields an agreement value of 0. The 
coefficient can be used as a measurement for single parties but it may also 
be aggregated and serve as a comprehensive measure for the party system 
as a whole. 
Variations in the questions asked during different national election sur-
veys are a frequent problem associated with comparative studies. When it 
comes to the left-right dimension, this is a minor problem since a similar 
and straight forward question has been used in each national election sur-
vey. The basic form of question reads: “In politics people sometimes talk of 
left and right. Where would you place party A on a scale from 0 to 10 
where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?”53 Of course, the most im-
portant and salient issue-dimensions in each country would be the ideal 
data, since we know that the left-right dimension is not necessarily the only 
or most salient issue-dimension in many countries. Nevertheless, the left-
right dimension is one of the few comparable measurements for political 
belief systems available and is considered as one of the more common and 
salient issue-dimensions within several political systems (Budge, Robertson, 
and Hearl 1987; Jones 2004; Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994; 
Schmitt and Thomassen 1999). 
A problem related with a rather broad and abstract question like this 
however, is that it might be understood in different ways by different indi-
viduals. A solution that sometimes is proposed is to include concrete exam-
ples or anchoring vignettes (see King 2004). However, I argue that when 
measuring agreement of parties’ ideological positions among individuals in 
different countries, it is more of an advantage than a problem to use a 
broad and more abstract survey question like the left-right question posed 
above. We know or at least we can expect that the specific contents of the 
left-right dimension differ between countries depending on history, tradi-
tions, culture, etc (see Knutsen 1995). A more abstract question that does 
not consider what the left-right dimension means or contains in every single 
 
 
                                                   
53 In the Netherlands, a ten-point scale 1-10 was used for the elections of 2002 and 2003 
instead of the usual eleven-point scale. 
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country thus overcomes this problem. The use of anchor vignettes is 
thereby of less value here since we mainly are interested in differences in 
agreement among individuals in different countries and not about what the 
left-right dimension means absolutely. But it is of great importance that 
citizens in each country perceive and understand the left-right concept in a 
similar manner. The use of examples or anchor vignettes could be more 
valuable in this aspect; however, vignettes demand a solid knowledge about 
the history and politics of each country and they might make the survey 
questions too different to be truly comparable.  
Considering that previous research has shown that within Europe at 
least a moderate to strong left-right dimension is present in all countries 
(Klingemann 1995)54 I argue that keeping the wording of the question at a 
general level, without specifying any explicit contents, is one of the most 
important guarantors that the left-right concept will be perceived and un-
derstood in a similar manner in each country.  
Measuring divergence 
Divergence for both single parties and party systems has been measured as 
the weighted average distance of a party to the other parties in a specific 
party system. The weights are based on the percentages of votes received by 
the parties and are applied in order to manage the effect of small extremist 
parties on the average distance between the main alternatives. The measure 
can formally be expressed as: 
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where ppi is the left-right position of party i based on the interpolated me-
dian and pvi is the vote-share of party i and np is the total number of par-
ties. 
Measuring the impact of electoral systems 
An electoral system is generally defined as the rules that are used for trans-
forming votes into seats, where the most common division is made between 
majoritarian, proportional and mixed electoral systems (Anckar 2002; 
Bingham Powell 2000; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). The greatest differ-
ence between them, at least for the first two categories, is the degree of 
 
 
                                                   
54 Ireland being the interesting exception where religion outscores left-right ideology. 
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proportionality. Proportionality is, however, not only an effect of the elec-
toral formula but also a result of the level of the legal threshold and the size 
of the constituency (Lijphart 1994). A legal threshold mostly is used in 
countries with proportional systems, i.e. having large constituencies, while 
countries with more majoritarian formulas, i.e. having small constituencies, 
do not require a legal threshold. Electoral thresholds are usually assumed 
to have the same effect as small constituencies on the degree of proportion-
ality within a system.55 This implies that these two variables are highly re-
lated to one another and therefore cannot be included in the same model 
due to multicollinearity. Consequently, we need a measure that captures 
both these dimensions such as that first developed by Taagepera and 
Shugart (1989) and later modified by Lijphart (1994). According to Taa-
gepera and Shugart the effective magnitude is based on the minimum 
amount of votes a party needs in order to receive a mandate and the maxi-
mum amount of votes a party can get but still lose a mandate. The effective 
magnitude is then approximated to lie in between the minimum and maxi-
mum thresholds. Lijphart’s modification of this measure consists of trans-
forming the effective magnitude into the effective threshold such as:  
 
1
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Where m is the size of the constituency. In this study the effective threshold is 
based on Lijphart’s formula.  
Measuring dimensionality and the strength of the left-right dimension 
Interpretative evaluations of qualitative sources can be used to construct a 
measure of dimensionality in each polity, a procedure used by Lijphart 
(1984). This approach however, is dependent on a solid knowledge of the 
politics in the particular countries. Another solution could be to rely on 
alternative sources of party-related data such as party manifestos, surveys 
among the member of the parliament or expert surveys. A problem with 
the latter two sources is acquiring comparable data over a period of time. 
 
 
                                                   
55 Of course, the effective threshold, the district magnitude and the electoral system variables 
to some extent tap the same underlying concept and thus are rather highly correlated. A fac-
tor analysis of these variables confirms earlier findings that these variables can be substituted 
by a factor which is highly correlated to the degree of vote/seat disparities i.e. the degree of 
proportionality within a system (see appendix). However, the purpose in the present study is 
to a) on a theoretical basis isolate the causal mechanism between electoral systems and PA 
and b) for practical reasons reduce the number of variables included in the study.  
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Party manifestos however, could be a fruitful path, especially since mem-
bers of the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) have collected and ana-
lyzed the election manifestos of parties in 25 countries from 1945 and on-
wards (Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, and Tanenbaum 2001). Never-
theless, as we noted, the left-right structure is not time and context invari-
ant and the construction of a left-right scale based on election manifestos 
would require a solid knowledge of the parties over time in each country 
and this is difficult to acquire. An inductive solution to the problem could 
be to look for relationships within the election manifestos by factor analy-
sis, a method used by the CMP. Nevertheless, since the left-right dimension 
is a spatial concept, there will be a proximity relationship between the elec-
tion manifestos and the left-right position, where parties on the left and 
right wings will emphasize left and right issues respectively. Factor analyses 
are prone to generate deceptive results under such circumstances (van der 
Brug 2001). A further drawback related to the use of factor analysis on 
manifesto data is that the variables tend to outnumber the cases (Benoit, 
Laver, and Mikhaylov 2009; Franzmann and Kaiser 2006; Pelizzo 2003). 
A third alternative method to gain insight to the dimensionality in each 
polity is to rely on election study data and use some kind of multidimen-
sional unfolding technique. An indirect measure of the degree of dimen-
sionality within a political system can be obtained by using survey ques-
tions concerning how much the voters like or dislike different parties. At-
tractive multidimensional unfolding algorithms are, however, very data 
demanding and one must have at least eight political stimuli for each polity 
in order to obtain robust solutions (Dahlberg and Oscarsson 2006). Since 
most party systems contain less than eight parties the present study will 
deploy an alternative method known as a multiple unidimensional unfold-
ing procedure (MUDFOLD), which focuses on the degree of unidimension-
ality (van Schuur and Post 1990).  
The coefficient of scalability (Loevinger’s H) varies from 0 to 1 and tells 
us to what extent voters’ preference-orderings are in agreement with a per-
fect unfolding model, i.e. the degree of unidimensionality within a political 
system. The unfolding procedure tries all possible orderings of the parties 
and selects the unfolding model that best fits the data, i.e. the party order-
ing with the largest H-value.56 For any given set of party preferences, there 
 
 
                                                   
56 An H coefficient smaller than .30 indicates that the structure in the data is insufficient to 
justify using individual items as indicators of a single latent dimension (van Schuur and Post 
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is often more than one plausible solution to the unidimensional unfolding 
problem. The guiding principle in this iterative search is that each unfold-
ing scale should, if possible, include all main parties. The recovered unidi-
mensional scale should be common to as a large proportion of voters as 
possible. Plausible models where all the large parties are included have been 
selected over models with better fit but where one of the relevant national 
parties is left out. For the unfolding analysis an evaluative measure has 
been used where the respondents were asked to rate the parties in terms of 
like-dislike. The questionnaire read: “I’d like to know what you think 
about each of our political parties. After I read the name of a political 
party, please rate it on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you strongly 
dislike that party and 10 means that you strongly like that party“. 
The unfolding procedure however, does not itself tell anything about the 
content of that ideological dimension since it only produces an ordering of 
the parties along the dimension (a so called qualitative j-scale) i.e. the or-
dering that fits best to the original like-dislike data. One way to solve this 
problem is to correlate the ordering of the parties in the unfolded j-scale 
with external data such as the respondents’ placements of the parties along 
a left-right scale. The higher the correlation between the j-scale ordering of 
parties and an order based on the parties mean left-right positions, the 
higher is the probability that left right ideology actually is the latent princi-
ple that produced the structure of political preferences in the first place. For 
this purpose Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient has been used (Spear-
man’s Rho). A simple measure of the strength/saliency of left-right dimen-
sion within a polity has then been created by multiplying Loevinger’s H 
coefficients with the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients.  
Results – does the institutional context affect voters’ perceptual 
agreement? 
In table 2, three different structural equation models are presented. Since 
the underlying theoretical assumption is that the effect of the system related 
variables on PA partly is mediated through their effect on the divergence 
among parties in a party system, each model is presented in two steps. The 
first depicts the effect of the independent system related variables on party 
system divergence, which is the first dependent and intervening variable; 
                                                                                                                       
1990). Mudfold is distributed by ProGAMMA, P.O. Box 841, 9700 AV Groeningen, The 
Netherlands.  
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the second part shows the effect on PA of all independent variables to-
gether with divergence, now functioning as an independent variable.  
The first model in Table 2 shows the effect of each independent variable 
under control for all other variables. However, according to Downs and 
Sartori’s theory, the spatial direction in party competition is contingent on 
the number of parties and so it is necessary to include interaction terms in 
order to correctly specify the theoretical model empirically. This is done in 
the second model where four interaction terms are included between the 
effective number of parties and the degree of unidimensionality, the 
strength of the left-right dimension, parliamentarism and the ballot struc-
ture. The third model is a continuation of the first two with the exception 
of the inclusion of control variables. Since the units of analysis are political 
parties the control variables refer to different factors related to the parties 
that otherwise may affect voters’ PA (see earlier discussion). The third 
model is illustrated in a path diagram (figure 2).  
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Table 2. The institutional effect on party system divergence and perceptual 
agreement among voters in 35 countries between 1996-2004 (unstandard-
ized LISREL ML-estimates with cluster corrected standard errors.) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Divergence PA Divergence PA Divergence PA 
Formal institutional factors      
Effective threshold .310*** -.038 .212*** -.038 .239*** -.047 
 (.053) (.051) (.055) (.051) (.053) (.051) 
Party ballot -.119** .039** -.215*** .039 -.229*** -.017 
 (.052) (.048) (.052) (.048) (.050) (.046) 
Parliamentarism .687*** .426*** .750*** .426*** .651*** .374*** 
 (.053) (.061) (.053) (.061) (.054) (.058) 
Informal institutional factors      
Unidimensionality .032 -.046 -.128** -.046 -.134*** -.041 
 (.057) (.044) (.052) (.044) (.050) (.042) 
Strength LR-dim. -.043 .111** -.034 .111** -.016 .051 
 (.052) (.047) (.052) (.047) (.050) (.051) 
Eff.# parties -.144*** .167*** -.093** .167*** -.075 .135*** 
 (.053) (.049) (.055) (.049) (.053) (.046) 
Divergence - .296*** - .296*** - .191*** 
  (.054)  (.054)  (.053) 
Interactions       
Eff.part*unidim. -  .030  .054  
   (.060)  (.057)  
Eff.part*strength LR -  .175***  .177***  
   (.054)  (.052)  
Eff.part*partbal -  .262***  .241***  
   (.068)  (.065)  
Eff.part*parlament -  .232***  .212***  
   (.061)  (.059)  
Control variables       
Party vars. (ŷ)  -  -  .166*** 
      (.046) 
Education (mean)  -  -  .032 
      (.044) 
Divergence (parties) - - - - .232*** .213*** 
     (.046) (.046) 
SMCSE ≈ R2 .58 .48 .51 .48 .47 .42 
RMSEA .158 .158 .157 .157 .100 .100 
Godness of Fit: .952 .952 .965 .965 .990 .990 
Adj . Godness of Fit: .586 .586 .581 .581 .795 .795 
א2 110.466 110.466 78.699 78.699 22.556 22.556 
N: (Listwise) 291 291 291 291 291 291 
Comment: * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p <.01. Cluster corrected standard errors are shown within parentheses. SMCSE 
(Squared Multiple Correlations for Structural Equations) is approximately equal to R2. Data has been weighted accord-
ing how many times each country is represented in the data-set. The classification of different party families has been 
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made by the collaborators of the CSES (see appendix III). The variable is constructed as a dummy where communist-, 
socialist-, social democratic-, left, liberal and right liberal-, and conservative parties - which all are party families that 
reasonably belong to the traditional left-right distinction (Ware 1996) - have been coded as one and all other party 
families as zero.57 The age and size of a party is basically the amount of years since it first was represented in the 
national parliament and the size is the percentage of votes received in respective elections. The effective number of 
parliamentary parties is calculated from the vote-shares using the index of Laakso and Taagepera -also known as 
Herfindahl’s index of concentration (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). The variable parliamentarism is coded as a dummy 
where a one indicates parliamentary systems and zero semi-presidential or presidential systems. The constitutive 
variables for the interactions have been centred by their mean due to multi-collinearity and to avoid singularity in the 
covariance matrix (i.e. linear dependencies among the variables). The models have been calculated with LISREL 8.72 
and the coefficients are unstandardized. For information about variance inflation factors (VIF), see appendix II. 
 
 
In the theoretical section it was predicted that in systems with a low effec-
tive threshold and with a high number of parties competing in a unidimen-
sional policy space, the parties would adopt bonding strategies where ide-
ologies and policy programs will become important instruments in the elec-
tion campaigns. This in turn is expected to raise centrifugal incentives for 
parties, which will generate greater divergence in the party systems with the 
parties taking more dispersed positions on the political spectrum (which is 
expected to have a facilitative effect on voters’ PA). According to the results 
in table 2, it is clear that the effective number of parties, per se, has a sig-
nificant and negative impact on divergence (-.144***) while the effective 
threshold (which is a combination of the average district magnitude and the 
electoral threshold) and parliamentarism exerts a positive effect (.310*** 
and .687***). Initially, these results appear to refute Downs’ assumptions. 
It is not surprising however, that the number of parties, per se, has a nega-
tive effect, since more parties reasonably means less space for each individ-
ual party on the left-right continuum. From this perspective, the positive 
effect of the effective threshold is also reasonable since higher thresholds 
usually mean fewer parties. Theoretically however, we expected less diver-
gence among parties in systems with higher thresholds since this is assumed 
to bring centrifugal incentives for party competition, where the parties are 
expected to appeal to the median voter. This does not seem to be the case 
due to the positive impact of the effective threshold on divergence.58 Never-
 
 
                                                   
57 The party families are: 01. Ecology Parties, 02. Communist Parties, 03. Socialist Parties, 
04. Social Democratic Parties, 05. Left Liberal parties, 06. Liberal Parties, 07. Right Liberal 
Parties, 08. Christian Democratic Parties, 09. Conservative Parties, 10. National Parties, 11. 
Agrarian Parties, 12. Ethnic Parties, 13. Regional Parties, 14. Religious Parties, 15. Inde-
pendent Parties, 16. Other. 
58 It should be noticed that the relationship between the effective threshold and the number of 
parties is not always that clear cut. For example, France has an effective threshold of 37.5 in 
the election of 2002 while the effective number of parties in the same election reaches 4.82. 
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theless, the rather strong positive effect of parliamentarism is well in line 
with our theoretical expectations that parliamentary systems will bring 
greater focus on the parties, which in turn will increase the competition 
among parties. The use of party ballots was also expected to work as a 
proxy for more centralized party organizations with less focus on individ-
ual politicians, which should increase the competition among parties and 
hence lead to greater divergence among them. This seems not to be the case 
in this model where the effect instead is negative (-.119**). However, con-
sidering that party ballots often are used in proportional multiparty sys-
tems this result might resemble the effect of the effective number of parties.  
Considering the second equation in the first model it is clear that all sig-
nificant system related variables have a positive impact on PA. The greatest 
effect is to be found from parliamentarism (.426***) while the second 
strongest effect comes from the degree of party system divergence 
(.296***). Other significant, positive effects emerge from the use of party 
ballots, the effective number of parliamentary parties and the strength of 
the left-right dimension. Except for the effective number of parties, which 
supports the motivational hypothesis, all other significant variables relate 
to the simplicity hypotheses in which facilitative factors have a positive ef-
fect on voters’ PA.  
At this point, the empirical results appear to refute the hypothesis that 
multiparty systems per se should cause centrifugal party competition. 
However, in order to generate a form of party competition that will affect 
the direction of the competition, the parties must compete in the ‘same 
lane’, i.e. over the same issues. Hence, the effective number of parties as 
such may not be a good measure of the degree of competition as it does not 
consider the dimensionality in the party space. Downs (1957) theory of 
party competition originally assumed a one-dimensional left-right oriented 
policy space in which centrifugal competition is most likely to appear in 
multiparty systems. We need thus to include interaction terms between the 
effective number of parties and unidimensionality, the strength of LR-
dimension, the ballot structure and parliamentarism.  
These four variables have in common that they are expected to affect the 
degree of competition among parties. Parliamentary systems are supposed 
to bring a greater focus on the parties while the use of party ballots sup-
posedly will promote more programmatically oriented parties. The degree 
of party competition can also be expected to increase if the parties are con-
centrated/located in the same policy space, which is why the degree of 
unidimensionality and the strength of the left-right dimension can be ex-
                                                                                                                       
In the opposite direction, both Peru and Bulgaria tend to have relatively low thresholds but 
also a low number of effective parliamentary parties.  
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pected to affect the competition among parties. Assuming reasonably that 
Downs is right, the effect of these four variables on party system divergence 
is dependent on the number of parties and vice versa. An increasing 
amount of competition in a two-party system should then bring centripetal 
incentives for the parties while the opposite should be true in multiparty 
systems. The spatial direction of party competition is thus, theoretically, 
contingent on the degree of competition and the number of parties. 
Turning to the second model which includes the interaction terms, we 
find a significant and positive effect on divergence in parties’ policy posi-
tions of the interactions between the effective number of parties and the 
ballot structure (.262***), the strength of the left-right dimension 
(.175***) and parliamentarism (.232***). By itself, this is an interesting 
finding since it a) supports the hypothesis that party ballots and parliamen-
tarism (here assumed to imply centralized party organizations and party 
centered political systems) affects the degree of competition among parties 
and b) it empirically supports Downs' hypothesis that a high degree of 
competition in multiparty systems will promote a centrifugal form of party 
competition. The effects of the ballot structure, the strength of the left-right 
dimension and parliamentarism on the degree of divergence seems to in-
crease with the number of parties.59  
When it comes to the direct effect of the independent system variables on 
PA in model 2, the effects are identical with the results in the first model 
since this is a structural equation and the interactions are relevant only for 
the first dependent variable, which is party system divergence. 
The most interesting results are to be found in the third and final model 
where the control variables for the party related features are included. The 
direct effects of the effective threshold, the use of party ballots, the number 
of parties and parliamentarism on party system divergence are particularly 
robust when compared with the former two models, except that the effect 
of the effective number of parties is no longer significantly different to zero. 
The interaction effects are also highly similar compared to the results in the 
second model. Turning to the direct effect of the system related variables 
on PA, a pattern of robustness similar to that seen in the other models ap-
pears. The effects on PA of the strength of the left-right dimension and 
party system divergence, under control for all other variables in the model, 
 
 
                                                   
59 It could be argued that centrifugal party competition not only results from the number of 
parties but also from the effective threshold. Both an interaction between parliamentarism 
and threshold and a triple interaction between the number of parties, the threshold and par-
liamentarism were included in the model but none of them had a significant effect on diver-
gence. 
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are however decreasing when the control variables are included. The diver-
gence effect decreases from (.296**) in model 2 to (.191***) in model 3, 
while the effect of the strength of the left-right dimension no longer is sig-
nificantly different to zero.60 There is also a slight decrease in the amount of 
explained variance (from .47 to .42) in the third and final model.61 
In an attempt to more easily illustrate the causal relationships between 
the variables in model three, figure 2 presents a path diagram.  
 
 
 
                                                   
60 A logic explanation behind this result is that if the model is run solely on a system level 
with countries as the units of analysis, there is a rather strong, positive and significant effect 
of the strength of the left-right dimension on PA. This effect holds also when the analysis is 
made with single parties as the units of analysis (as is shown in model 2 in the present study). 
However, when conducting the analyses on a system level with parties as the units of analy-
sis, one have to control for the party related factors that might affect PA. One of these con-
trol variables is, as mentioned, the parties’ attachment to the left-right dimension (see Budge 
2001; Snyder and Ting 2002). However, since the strength of the left-right dimension and the 
parties’ attachment to the left-right dimension is highly interrelated, the party related control 
variable captures the strength of the left-right dimension on a system level, which is why the 
effect disappears when the party related variables are included.     
61 This model was also run with the effective threshold replaced by both the district magni-
tude, the degree of proportionality (according to Gallagher’s index (1991)) and a dummy for 
majoritarian vs. proportional electoral systems. There were no substantial differences be-
tween the models and thus it seems empirically that it is of minor importance which variable 
is used.  
Article 1 – Perceptual Agreement in Different Institutional Contexts 
 113  
Figure 2. Causal path model of system related determinants of party system 
divergence and perceptual agreement. Unstandardized LISREL estimates 
for the exogenous and endogenous variables in table 2 together with the 
control variables (maximum likelihood). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comment: * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p <.01. The model has been calculated with LISREL 8.72, coefficients are unstandard-
ized. Chi-Square=22.942, df=5, P-value=.000, Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) =.112. Goodness 
of Fit Index (GFI) = .989. Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) =.771.  
 
 
Considering the effect of the explanatory variables on party divergence, 
(equation 1 in model 3), the effect of the number of parties has decreased 
even further and is now insignificant (-.075). The outcome of the effective 
threshold goes against the expectation that a high threshold should create 
centripetal tendencies for the parties. Admittedly, this result is not that un-
Ballot structure 
Party age 
Ideo. Family 
Party size 
Eff. # of parties 
Effective threshold 
Informal system related factors 
Divergence Perceptual 
agreement 
Unidimensionality 
 .212*** 
  -.017 
.191*** 
 .239*** 
 -.229*** 
   .241*** 
  .213***     
   .166*** 
.177*** 
-.041 
.054 
.135*** 
 -.016 
  .051   .232*** 
Div.-single parties 
Education (mean) 
R2 .47 
R2 .42 
Strength LR-dim 
-.075 
 -.134*** 
Parlamentarism 
 .374*** 
 .651*** 
Formal system related factors 
       -.047 
   .032     
Control variables 
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expected since high thresholds usually mean fewer parties competing in the 
same space. This however, may be a less valid explanation since the effect 
of the number of parties is already controlled by inclusion in the model. 
The constitutive effect of the ballot structure does not have the expected 
impact on divergence but this result could also be related to the number of 
parties, since party ballots mostly are used in proportional multiparty sys-
tems. But the effect of the number of parties in this aspect is already ac-
counted for in the model.62  
Among the more interesting results is the significant and positive effect 
on divergence of the interactions between the effective number of parties 
and the use of party ballots (.241***), the strength of the left-right dimen-
sion (.177***) and parliamentarism (.212***). Most simply, this means 
that for each increase in the effective number of parties, the positive effect 
of these three independent variables on party divergence increased accord-
ingly. In order to assess what these interaction effects mean, four alterna-
tive regressions were made in which the effective number of parties was 
divided into four different groups according to the 25:th percentile values. 
One regression for each group of effective number of parties tests the effect 
of the system related variables on party divergence. The results are dis-
played in table 3. 
 
Table 3. The conditional effect of party ballots, parliamentarism, unidi-
mensionality and the strength of the left-right dimension on divergence in 
party positions for every percentile value of the effective number of parties.  
 Eff#part≈2 Eff#part≈3 Eff#part≈4 Eff#part≈5 
Party ballot -.928*** -.140 .006 .130** 
Parliamentarism -.245** .457*** .621*** -.004 
Unidimensionality -.660** .715** .376 .021 
Strength LR-dim. 1.226*** -.253** -.121 .374** 
N: 133 135 126 126 
Comment: The effective number of parties has here been divided into four different groups according to the percentile 
values such as: (min/2.825317=2) (2.847434/3.527795=3) (3.718421/ 4.176455=4) (4.238373/max=5) 
 
 
Aside of difficulty in interpreting the conditional effect of the strength of 
 
 
                                                   
62 All models have also been run using the robust MM estimation technique. The results were 
fairly similar to those obtained from an OLS regression based on the weighted data matrix 
while the results from an OLS regression based on the unweighted original data differed to 
some extent. 
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the left-right dimension, the results do to some extent bring further empiri-
cal support for the hypothesis that a high degree of party competition in a 
multiparty system increases centrifugal incentives for the parties. Both 
party ballots, parliamentarism and the degree of unidimensionality was 
expected to increase the competition among parties and when the number 
of parties is low, the significant effect of these variables on divergence is 
negative but the opposite result is true when the effective number of parties 
is higher.  
Among the direct effects on PA, (equation 2 in model 3) positive and 
significant effects are to be found from the effective number of parties, par-
liamentarism and party system divergence. The rather strong and signifi-
cant effect of party system divergence (.191***) supports the expectation 
derived from the RPM, which emphasizes the importance of divergent pol-
icy positions among parties in giving voters meaningful electoral choices. 
The greatest initial effect is found in the dummy variable for parliamentary 
systems (.374***). Parliamentary systems with a greater focus on the par-
ties may thus not only increase the competition among the parties (as both 
the direct effect of parliamentarism (.651***) and the interaction between 
the number of parties and parliamentarism (.212***) exert a rather large 
and significant positive effect on party system divergence), but may also 
produce a simpler political structure that helps voters to comprehend the 
parties’ policy positions. The positive direct effect of parliamentarism on 
voters’ PA confirms this hypothesis. Substantively, this means that if the 
USA, or any other presidential system, switched to a parliamentary system 
such as used by Norway, the Netherlands etc, the PA would generally in-
crease by approximately 20 percent. 63  
The degree of unidimensionality does not seem to have any significant 
direct effect on the agreement in voters’ perceptions and this result conflicts 
with Thomassen's (1999) expectation that a simple unidimensional party 
space should facilitate the communication between parties and voters. An-
other expectation that not is supported in the empirical findings is the ex-
pectation that the use of party ballots should simplify the process of voters 
acquiring political information, which would have a positive impact on 
voters’ PA.  
 
 
                                                   
63 It has also been suggested that unicameral systems may have a facilitative effect on voters’ 
knowledge about party positions (Arnold 2007). The models in this study were therefore 
tested with a dummy variable included for bi- and unicameral systems but the effect was 
small and insignificant. This variable was therefore left out of analyses in order to keep the 
models as parsimonious as possible.  
Article 1 – Perceptual Agreement in Different Institutional Contexts 
 116  
The hypothesized direct negative effect of high effective thresholds on 
voters’ PA is not confirmed either. The expectations that voters in more 
proportional systems should be more motivated to seek information about 
the parties and thus should present a higher PA, seems not to be the case 
according to the results in this study.64 However, there is an indirect effect 
of the effective threshold that is positive for voters’ PA since higher thresh-
olds seems to promote greater divergence among the parties, which makes 
the interpretation a bit ambiguous.  
Another interesting result is that the number of parties has a positive ef-
fect on PA (.135***). The theoretical expectations were that an increasing 
number of parties would, a) force parties to profile themselves more clearly 
for the voters in terms of ideology and b) motivate voters to inform them-
selves about the parties’ policy positions due to the greater variety of par-
ties to choose from. An issue of diminishing returns - due to an increasing 
number of parties bringing greater information costs having a negative im-
pact on PA was discussed and so, a dummy-variable was included in all the 
models to test for this. The variable was coded as 0 if the number of parties 
were less than or equal to 3.73, which is the mean effective number of par-
ties among the countries, and 1 if the number of parties exceeded 3.73. 
This variable had only a small and insignificant positive effect on PA, and 
was therefore excluded from the final analysis.  
In conclusion, two of the three variables that have a significant impact 
on PA, namely parliamentary systems and party positional divergence, are 
facilitative in nature while the effective number of parliamentary parties is 
the only motivational factor of significance. It appears that simplicity 
within political systems improves the communication between voters and 
their representatives. This result does not necessarily mean that motiva-
tional factors are of lesser importance than facilitative ones. A significant 
impact on PA was found from two out of four facilitative variables in the 
model, whilst one out of two motivational factors were significant. It 
would seem that both facilitative and motivational factors in some ways 
are equally important. 
In order to test the robustness of the model and strengthen the confi-
dence in the effects caused by the independent variables on divergence and 
 
 
                                                   
64 An argument delivered by Gordon & Segura (1997) is that the effect of electoral systems 
on voters’ motivation to attain information about parties’ policy positions is a result of the 
knowledge of belonging to either a majoritarian- or a proportional system. The analysis has 
for that reason also been conducted with a dummy-variable with 1 for proportional systems 
and 0 for majoritarian systems but there were no significant changes in the estimates.  
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PA, an extreme bound analysis (EBA) was conducted. An EBA tests the 
effect of a given independent variable on the dependent variable for differ-
ent combinations of all other independent variables. It then displays mini-
mum and maximum parameter estimates for each variable together with 
the t-statistics, p-values and z-variables used and it also controls for multi-
collinearity. 
 
Figure 3. Extreme bound analysis (EBA) for the effect on divergence and 
perceptual agreement caused by each significant variable under different 
combinations of all other variables. 
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Comment: EBA Performs an Extreme Bound Analysis on the regressor x, for a given dependent variable y, and a set 
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of regressors z and x. Where z(nxk) and x(nxm) with k<=4. The program runs n!/(k!(n-k)!) OLS regressions by taking 
combinations of k<=4 Z variables among the p-listed. It then displays minimum and maximum parameter estimates for 
x together with their t-statistics, p-value and z-variables used and it also controls for multicollinearity. A total of 8 com-
binations of 1 regressor from the Z(nx8) vector were used for PA and a total of 9 combinations of 1 regressor from the 
Z(nx9) vector for divergence. See appendix II for a full description. When testing the robustness of the interaction 
effects the interaction constituencies has been ‘forced’ to be included in all model combinations. EBA estimates for the 
interaction terms between unidimensionality*eff#parties and the ballot structure*eff#parties is not available at the 
suggested level of confidence (.95). 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the results from the EBA test for the effect of all significant 
independent variables on divergence and PA respectively. Clearly the effect 
of each variable is particularly robust through all different variable combi-
nations of the model and the VIF-values are acceptable as well. However, 
the EBA could not be performed at the suggested level of confidence (.95) 
for the specific effect of the interactions between the effective number of 
parties and the degree of unidimensionality and the ballot structure on 
party system divergence. This was also the case for the specific effect of the 
ballot structure and the degree of unidimensionality on PA. This means 
that the significant effect of ballot structure and the degree of unidimen-
sionality on PA is valid only in the specific model at hand. These effects 
cannot be considered to be fully robust because the results are no longer 
significant when some of the other independent variables in model 3 are 
omitted. Consequently, any theoretical generalizations based on these re-
sults should be made cautiously.  
Aside of the control variables, it seems that parliamentarism, together 
with the degree of divergence among parties, exerts the largest influence on 
PA. However, in order to evaluate the model fully and to observe the total 
effect of the system related variables on PA, some of the path coefficients 
need to be added and multiplied together since the system related variables 
also have an indirect effect on PA through the effect of divergence in the 
parties’ policy positions. Moreover, since the variables are measured at dif-
ferent scales the effects are still not fully comparable, which further compli-
cates the interpretation of the substantial effects of different variables on 
PA. A comparison of the effect on the dependent variable caused by a cer-
tain amount of change in the independent variables is a simple procedure to 
mitigate this problem. The effects can then be interpreted as the average 
effect on PA caused by a variable, under control for all other variables in-
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cluded in the model, when moving from the lowest to the highest value of 
the variable.65 The results are shown in table 4. 
 
Table 4. The total effect of the strength of the left-right dimension, the ef-
fective number of parliamentary parties, the ballot structure together with 
the effective threshold and party divergence on voters’ PA when moving 
from the lowest to the highest value of each independent variable (unstan-
dardized ML-coefficients).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comment: * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p <.01. Variables within parentheses have only significant  indirect ef‐
fects on PA. 
 
  
The total effect of the strength of the left-right dimension on PA with di-
vergence in the party system mediating both the direct and indirect effects 
is (.736). The respective total effect of unidimensionality and the effective 
number of parliamentary parties is (-.338) and (.754), whilst that for the 
use of party ballots is (-.015). The total effect of the effective threshold and 
parliamentarism is (-.023) and (.539) respectively. 
Clearly, the effective number of parties produces the greatest effect on 
 
 
                                                   
65 An alternative and probably more commonly used procedure is to display standardized 
beta coefficients. However, standardizations at best give an approximation of the relative 
weight of the independent variables, all other variables held constant, when explaining the 
variation in the dependent variable (Andrews, Morgan, Klem, and Sonquist 1973). 
Eff. # of parties 
(Unidimensionality) 
(Ballot structure) 
Perceptual agreement      -.015 
      .754 
         -.338 
        .736 
(Strength LR-dim.) 
(Effective threshold) 
         -.023 
Parliamentarism 
        .539 
Divergence 
           .573 
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PA and this effect is positive, just as predicted by the motivational hypothe-
sis. In the second place comes the positive effect of the strength of the left-
right dimension followed by parliamentarism. Except for the negative ef-
fects of unidimensionality and the ballot structure, the results confirm the 
initial hypotheses. It also seems that motivational and facilitative factors 
are equally important determinants of PA among voters on parties left-right 
positions.  
Discussion and conclusions  
The aim of this article was to test some of the founding assumptions about 
constitutional design and voting behavior. By combining contextual system 
related variables with cross-national surveys of voting behavior, the present 
study examined the effects of the electoral context on both parties and vot-
ers simultaneously, thus taking the empirical analysis a step further. 
The theoretical foundations of the study rest on rational choice institu-
tionalism and propose that formal institutions (such as the constitution, the 
ballot structure and the effective threshold in an electoral system) and in-
formal institutions (such as the effective number of parties, the degree of 
unidimensionality in the party systems and the strength of the left-right di-
mension) should generate different incentives for parties and voters.  
It was hypothesized that parliamentary and more proportional electoral 
systems with low thresholds and closed party ballots would create centrifu-
gal incentives for parties to appeal more ideologically or programmatically 
to voters. In contrast, a more unidimensional multiparty system with the 
presence of a strong left-right dimension was hypothesized to result in cen-
trifugal incentives with a high degree of ideological competition among the 
parties.  
With respect to the voters, it was foreseen that an increasing degree of 
centrifugal competition among the parties would generate more divergent 
party systems that would smooth the process of acquiring information 
about the parties’ policies. It was also predicted that the effective threshold, 
the ballot structure, the degree of unidimensionality and strength of the 
left-right dimension together with the number of parties would have an 
independent and direct effect on the voters as well. Lower thresholds would 
suppress the feeling of ‘wasted votes’ and thereby raise incentives to obtain 
information about the policy positions of the parties. Closed party ballots 
together with a strong and unidimensional policy space with not too many 
parties competing for the votes was expected to simplify the process of in-
formation gathering by voters. In contrast to presidential or semi-
presidential systems, parliamentary constitutions were supposed to reduce 
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the information costs among voters due to a less complicated division of 
powers and a greater focus on the political parties. 
The results showed that significant positive and negative effects indeed 
exist on party system divergence that are due to, on the one hand, parlia-
mentary constitutions and the effective threshold and, on the other hand, to 
the use of party-ballots and the degree of unidimensionality present in an 
electoral system. There was also a positive and significant relationship be-
tween the degree of party system divergence and the voters' perceptual 
agreement. Parliamentary systems and the number of parties contributed 
significant direct effects on the PA among voters.  
Consequently, the results confirm the existence of direct effects on vot-
ers’ perceptual agreement produced by the electoral and political context 
and an important indirect effect resulting from party system divergence. 
This study supports the notion that institutions matter and that as defined 
by the responsible party model, effective political representation appears to 
work best in parliamentary multiparty systems within which the contesting 
parties hold divergent policy positions. The RPM proves consequently to be 
a fruitful model to proceed with when seeking insights as to how to obtain 
effective political representation. 
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Appendix I 
Table 1. Institutional characteristics of the countries included in the study. 
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Denmark 1998 List PR* 7.9 2.0 Pref 179 3.7 1.5 1.0 .5 1.9 2.0 .7 
Sweden 1998 List PR* 1.7 4.0 Pref 349 3.9 1.7 1.0 .5 1.0 4.0 .7 
Sweden 2002 List PR* 1.7 4.0 Pref 349 4.2 1.6 .8 .5 1.2 4.0 .7 
Bulgaria 2001 List PR* 7.7 4.0 Party 240 2.4 1.6 .7 .5 6.5 4.0 .7 
Netherlands 2002 List PR* 15.0 .7 Party 150 5.0 1.5 .8 .4 1.3 2.6 .7 
Netherlands 1998 List PR* 15.0 .7 Party 150 4.4 1.4 1.0 .4 1.1 .7 .6 
Denmark 2001 List PR* 7.9 2.0 Pref 179 5.2 1.6 .6 .5 .8 2.0 .6 
Norway 1997 List PR* 8.6 .0 Party 165 4.4 1.6 1.0 .5 3.7 4.0 .6 
Iceland 2003 List PR* 1.5 5.0 Party 63 4.0 2.1 .2 .5 1.9 16.0 .6 
Norway 2001 List PR* 8.3 .0 Party 165 5.6 1.5 1.0 .4 2.3 4.0 .6 
Czech Rep. 2002 List PR* 14.3 5.0 Pref 200 3.9 1.7 1.0 .5 5.1 5.0 .6 
Netherlands 2003 List PR* 15.0 .7 Party 150 6.0 1.3 .8 .4 1.4 2.3 .6 
Portugal 2002 List PR* 1.5 .0 Party 230 3.2 1.9 .8 .5 5.0 6.6 .6 
Great 
Britain 2001 
Majority 
(FPP) * 1.0 - Cand - 2.7 1.7 1.0 .6 16.6 37.5 .6 
Iceland 1999 List PR* 6.2 5.0 Party 63 3.5 2.0 .2 .3 1.2 16.0 .6 
Chile 2003 List PR 7.7 .0 Pref 200 2.3 2.0 1.0 .6 2.4 25.0 .6 
Spain 2004 List PR* 6.7 3.0 Party 350 3.1 2.1 1.0 .6 5.1 9.7 .6 
Czech Rep. 1996 List PR* 25.0 5.0 Pref 200 4.3 1.8 .5 .6 9.0 5.0 .6 
Hungary 2002 
Quasi-Maj. 
Mixed* 1.0 .0 Dual 176 2.7 1.8 .8 .7 25.1 4.0 .6 
Spain 1996 List PR* 7.0 3.0 Party 350 2.8 1.7 .9 .4 5.6 9.7 .5 
Finland 2003 List PR 13.3 .0 Pref 200 4.8 1.3 .2 .3 3.0 5.2 .5 
Germany 2002 
Quasi-Prop.* 
Mixed 1.0 .0 Dual 299 3.4 1.5 .8 .6 3.1 5.0 .5 
Chile 1999 List PR 7.6 - Pref - 2.2 2.1 1.0 .5 5.9 25.0 .5 
Spain 2000 List PR* 7.0 3.0 Party 350 2.5 1.6 .6 .7 5.1 9.7 .5 
Switzerland 1999 List PR*  - Pref - 4.4 1.5 - - 3.1 8.6 .5 
Israel 2003 List PR* 12.0 1.5 Party 120 4.2 1.4 1.0 .6 2.0 1.5 .5 
New 
Zealand 1996 
Quasi-Prop. 
Mixed* 1.0 .0 Dual 69 4.0 1.6 .3 .4 4.5 5.0 .5 
Poland 1997 List PR 7.5 5.0 Pref 460 3.9 1.7 .1 .5 1.7 5.0 .5 
Japan 1996 
Quasi-Maj. 
Mixed* 1.0 16.7 Dual 300 4.0 1.8 1.0 .3 13.2 25.1 .5 
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Israel 1996 List PR* 12.0 1.5 Party 120 3.7 1.4 .9 .7 1.9 1.5 .5 
Germany 1998 
Quasi-Prop. 
Mixed* 1.0 .0 Dual 299 3.4 1.2 1.0 .5 3.1 5.0 .5 
Ireland 2002 STV* 4.0 .0 Pref 166 3.3 1.3 .4 .3 6.4 14.9 .5 
Lithuania 1997 Semi-Prop.* 1.0 - Dual - 2.5 1.3 .3 .5 14.6 5.0 .5 
Hungary 1998 
Quasi-Maj. 
Mixed* 1.0 .0 Dual 176 3.5 1.6 .5 .6 22.4 4.0 .5 
Great 
Britain 1997 
Majority* 
(FPP) 1.0 - Cand - 2.8 1.4 1.0 .5 16.8 37.5 .5 
Poland 2001 List PR* 11.2 5.0 Pref 460 3.7 1.5 .3 .4 5.4 5.0 .5 
Korea Rep. 
of 2000 
Quasi-Maj. 
Mixed 1.0 .0 Dual 243 2.8 1.0 .5 .6 14.5 32.0 .5 
Belgium 
(wall) 1999 List PR* 7.5 - Pref - 3.8 .5 .3 .4 2.6 8.8 .5 
France 2002 
Two-Round 
System 1.0 12.5 Pref 577 4.8 1.0 .5 .4 17.7 37.5 .4 
Austria 1996 
Majority (Alt. 
Vote) * 1.0 - Cand 150 2.9 1.4 .6 .5 11.6 37.5 .4 
New 
Zealand 2002 
Quasi-Prop. 
Mixed* 1.0 .0 Dual 69 3.8 1.4 1.0 .4 1.9 5.0 .4 
Austria 2004 
Majority (Alt. 
Vote)* 1.0 .0 Cand 150 2.8 1.6 .9 .5 7.9 37.5 .4 
USA 2004 Majority 1.0 .0 Cand 435 2.1 2.0 1.0 .4 2.5 37.5 .4 
Korea Rep. 
of 2004 
Quasi-Maj. 
Mixed 1.0 .0 Dual 243 3.4 1.6 .0 .6 12.1 32.0 .4 
Taiwan 1996 
Quasi-Maj. 
Mixed 9.1 .0 Dual 225 2.5 1.8 .5 .2 5.6 11.3 .4 
Belgium 
(flan.) 1999 List PR* 7.5 - Pref - 5.5 .9 1.0 .4 2.6 8.8 .4 
Taiwan 2001 
Quasi-Maj. 
Mixed 5.7 .0 Dual 225 3.5 1.3 1.0 .5 3.6 11.3 .4 
Canada 1997 Majority* 1.0 - Cand - 3.9 1.4 .9 .4 13.2 37.5 .4 
Slovenia 1996 Semi-Prop.* 11.0 - Pref - 4.3 1.3 .6 .6 2.5 3.0 .3 
Ukraine1 1998 Semi-Prop. 1.0 - Dual - 3.2 .9 .7 .4 8.9 4.0 .3 
Romania 1996 List PR 11.0 - Pref  3.3 1.2 .2 .4 5.8 3.0 .3 
Mexico 2003 
Quasi-Maj. 
Mixed 1.0 2.0 Dual 500 3.2 1.4 .9 .5 8.4 22.7 .2 
Brazil 2002 List PR 19.0 .0 Cand 513 5.0 .9 .1 .4 3.3 3.8 .2 
Peru 2000 List PR 12.0 - Pref - 2.2 .5 .7 .5 6.1 .6 .2 
Mexico 2000 
Quasi-Maj. 
Mixed 1.0 2.0 Dual 500 3.0 1.4 .8 .5 8.4 22.7 .2 
Mexico 1997 
Quasi-Maj. 
Mixed 1.0 2.0 Dual 500 3.4 1.3 1.0 .5 8.4 22.7 .2 
Peru 2001 List PR 4.8 - Pref - 4.1 .8 .1 .5 14.6 .6 .1 
Comment: Data on effective threshold and district magnitude is taken from Anckar (2002). Data on ballot structure is 
taken from Norris (2004). The effective number parliamentary of parties was calculated on the vote-shares using the 
index of Laakso and Taagepera, also known as Herfindahl’s index of concentration (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). 
Disproportionality is calculated according to Gallagher’s least square index (Gallagher 1991). Perceptual agreement is 
based on van der Eijk’s measure of agreement van der Eijk (2001). Divergence is calculated as the average distance 
between the parties in a party system, weighted by the size of the parties. Unidimensionality is based on the CSES-
question ‘like-dislike’ and calculated with a multiple unidimensional scaling technique using ‘Mudfold’. Only respon-
dents that assigned a ‘like-dislike’ to all parties are included in the unfolding analyses. Since a dichotomous unfolding 
model (MUDFOLD) was employed (van Schuur and Post 1990), cut-points for ‘picked’ party had to be selected. A 
party was considered ‘picked’ by a respondent if the party scored 6-10 on the eleven-point like-dislike-scale. This 
range of evaluative response had to be adjusted to find better j-scales: a) range 5-10, b) range 4-10. There are a 
number of possible reasons why a stimuli (party) may not be unfoldable, such as if the stimuli is too popular or too 
unpopular, if a stimuli is very close to another stimuli, or if a stimuli does not fit the scale (the responses to the stimuli 
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was guided by a completely other principle, or ideology, than all other stimuli). Strength of left-right dimension is the 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between voters’ ordering of parties in terms of left-right (mean values) and the 
ordering of parties according to the first dimension received by the unidimensional scaling procedure. Information 
about the division of powers (indicated by * for parliamentary systems) is taken from: http://en.wikipedia.org 
/wiki/List_of_countries_ by_system_of_ governmen t#Full_presidential_systems. All other information is taken from 
CSES. 1Ukraine is excluded from the analyses in this article as it is not considered to be free according to the freedom 
house index (www.freedomhouse.org). 
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Appendix II 
Table 1. Correlation matrix for the Lisrel estimation. 
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Perceptual agreement 1               
Divergence .49 1              
Effective threshold -.19 .12 1             
Partyballots .01 -.15 -.19 1            
Strength LR-dim. .18 .17 .13 -.26 1           
Unidimensionality .07 .15 -.05 -.04 .23 1          
Eff. nr. of parties .19 -.18 -.36 .15 -.11 -.26 1         
Strength LR*effnrpart .20 -.04 -.19 -.18 .31 -.01 .15 1        
Unidim*effnrpart -.12 .06 -.02 .19 -.02 -.16 -.17 .06 1       
Partybal.*effnrpart .00 -.02 .12 .18 -.15 .17 .04 -.06 .26 1      
Votideosize .31 .23 .22 .00 .25 -.06 .08 -.08 -.03 .00 1     
Divergence (parties) .46 .40 -.26 .14 .00 .18 .08 .09 -.02 -.04 .04 1    
Education (mean) .03 .02 .13 -.07 .27 -.10 .05 .19 -.03 .01 .13 .03 1   
Parliamentarism .57 .38 -.26 -.14 .20 .13 .23 .41 .03 .09 .10 .31 .04 1  
Parlam*effnrpart .02 .10 -.05 .09 .34 .01 -.06 .40 .16 -.44 .07 .05 .02 -.11 1 
 N: 291                               
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Table 3. Factor analysis on different factors related to the electoral systems. 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 2.016 .858 .632 .632 
Factor2 1.158 1.061 .363 .995 
Factor loadings       
Variable Factor1 Factor2  Uniqueness 
Party threshold -.066 .272 -- .923 
District magnitude .313 -.052 -- .899 
Majoritarian -.240 .968 -- -.004 
Proportional .996 -.078 -- -.002 
Pluralistic -.929 -.371 -- -.001 
Comment: A pearson’s correlation between Gallagher’s index of disproportionality and factor 1 gives a value of -.621. 
 
 
Table 4. Extreme bound analysis (EBA) 
Perceptual agreement Divergence Effective thresh. Strength LR-dim. Eff. # of parties Parliamentarism 
 min max min max min max min max min max 
beta .19 .27 .00 .00 .10 .12 .02 .05 .17 .22 
t 7.12 1.59 -4.88 -2.41 2.96 3.67 2.06 5.49 9.46 11.67 
p-val .00 .00 .00 .02 .00 .00 .04 .00 .00 .00 
.95 .14 .22 -.01 .00 .03 .06 .00 .03 .14 .18 
C.I. .24 .32 .00 .00 .16 .18 .05 .07 .21 .26 
VIF 1.14 1.03 1.05 1.15 1.05 1.02 1.15 1.03 1.12 1.01 
 
Divergence Effective thresh. Ballot structure Strength LR-dim. Eff. # of parties Eff#part.*Str. LR. Parliamentarism 
 min max min max min max min max min max min max 
beta .01 .01 -.15 -.09 .11 .23 -.08 -.04 -.20 -.20 .24 .35 
t 2.80 2.80 -4.00 -2.50 2.02 4.00 -3.74 -2.13 -2.60 -2.60 5.86 8.81 
p-val .01 .01 .00 .01 .04 .00 .00 .03 .01 .01 .00 .00 
.95 .00 .00 -.22 -.17 .00 .12 -.11 -.08 -.36 -.36 .16 .27 
C.I. .01 .01 -.08 -.02 .23 .35 -.04 .00 -.05 -.05 .32 .43 
VIF 1.25 1.25 1.01 1.05 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.13 1.13 1.15 1.33 
Comment: EBA performs an Extreme Bound Analysis on the regressor x for a given dependent variable y and a set of 
regressors z and x. Where z(nxk) and x(nxm) with k<=4. The program runs n!/(k!(n-k)!) OLS regressions by taking 
combinations of k<=4 Z variables among the p-listed. It then displays minimum and maximum parameter estimates for 
x together with their t-statistics. p-value and z-variables used and it also controls for multicollinearity. A total of 8 com-
binations of 1 regressors from the Z(nx8) vector were used for perceptual agreement while a total of 9 combinations of 
1 regressors from the Z(nx9) vector were used for divergence. 
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Appendix III  
Table 1. Political parties included in the study. 
Country/Year Partyname Ide
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Australia 1996 Greens ECO 4 1.75 .42 3.84 1.16 2.66 
Australia 1996 Australian Labour Party SOCDEM 95 38.80 .44 4.33 .67 2.66 
Australia 1996 Australian Democrats L LIB 19 6.80 .61 4.69 .31 2.66 
Australia 1996 Liberal Party R LIB 52 38.70 .39 6.44 1.44 2.66 
Australia 1996 National (Country) Party REGIO 76 8.20 .35 6.5 1.5 2.66 
Australia 2004 Greens ECO 12 7.00 .38 3.21 1.79 3.83 
Australia 2004 Australian Labour Party SOCDEM 103 38.20 .42 4.31 .69 3.83 
Australia 2004 Liberal Party of Aus R LIB 60 40.40 .41 7.04 2.04 3.83 
Australia 2004 One Nation NAT 6 1.20 .51 4.41 .59 3.83 
Australia 2004 National Party of Aus REGIO 84 5.80 .34 6.59 1.59 3.83 
Belgium Fla 1999 Anders Gaan Leven ECO . 7.36 .44 3.6 1.4 3.44 
Belgium Fla 1999 Socialistische partij SOCDEM 21 9.55 .43 3.7 1.3 3.44 
Belgium Fla 1999 Vlaamse liberalen en democraten R LIB 7 14.30 .39 5.75 .75 3.44 
Belgium Fla 1999 Christelijke volkspartij CH DEM 31 14.09 .34 5.84 .84 3.44 
Belgium Fla 1999 Vlaams blok REGIO 23 9.87 .24 7.04 2.04 3.44 
Belgium Wal 1999 Ecologistes confederes pour  ECO 18 7.36 .56 3.8 1.2 3.16 
Belgium Wal 1999 Parti Socialiste SOCDEM 21 10.16 .38 5.72 .72 3.16 
Belgium Wal 1999 Parti social chrettien (socialist  CH DEM . 5.88 .55 6.96 1.96 3.16 
Belgium Wal 1999 Viviant NAT . 0.00 .17 4.92 .08 3.16 
Belgium Wal 1999 Parti reformateur Liberal-front  . . 10.14 .58 3.08 1.92 3.16 
Belgium Wal 1999 National front . . 1.50 . .  3.16 
Brazil 2002 Workers' party COM 27 18.00 .19 3.70 1.3 2.72 
Brazil 2002 Brazil Social Democatic Party SOCDEM 18 14.00 .24 6.42 1.42 2.72 
Brazil 2002 Brazil Labor Party SOCDEM 25 5.00 .14 4.71 .29 2.72 
Brazil 2002 Labor Democratic Party L LIB 27 4.00 .21 6.15 1.15 2.72 
Brazil 2002 Party of Liberal Front LIB 21 16.00 .16 6.00 1 2.72 
Brazil 2002 Party of Brazil Democratic  CH DEM 21 14.00 .16 6.08 1.08 2.72 
Bulgaria 2001 Bulgarian Socialist Party SOCIAL 16 . .78 1.70 3.3 7.1 
Bulgaria 2001 National Movement Simeon the  NAT 5 42.70 .55 6.54 1.54 7.1 
Bulgaria 2001 United democratic forces OTH 17 18.20 .74 8.80 3.8 7.1 
Bulgaria 2001 Coalition; Movmnt f Rights and  OTH 16 7.50 .62 5.12 .12 7.1 
Bulgaria 2001 Movment Georgievden . 9 3.60 .63 5.76 .76 7.1 
Canada 1997 New Democratic Party SOCDEM 45 11.00 .48 3.36 1.64 2.37 
Canada 1997 Liberal Party LIB 139 38.50 .45 5.4 .4 2.37 
Canada 1997 Progressive Conservative R LIB 139 18.80 .42 5.91 .91 2.37 
Canada 1997 Reform Party (Canadian Reform)  CONS 14 19.30 .18 5.96 .96 2.37 
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Canada 1997 Bloc Quebecois REGIO 16 10.20 .23 3.59 1.41 2.37 
Chile 1999 Himanista Verde ECO 94 0.50 .61 6.54 1.54 . 
Chile 1999 Comunista COM 112 3.19 .55 7.19 2.19 . 
Chile 1999 La Democratia SOCDEM 35 48.69 .53 8.70 3.7 . 
Chile 1999 Union Democrata Independiente CONS 118 47.50 .47 4.19 .81 . 
Chile 1999 Union de Centro Centro  . 93 0.40 .52 3.99 1.01 . 
Chile 2003 Himanista Verde ECO 94 0.40 .62 5.48 .48 5.35 
Chile 2003 Comunista COM 112 5.20 .58 6.22 1.22 5.35 
Chile 2003 La Democratia SOCDEM 35 47.90 .62 8.17 3.17 5.35 
Chile 2003 Union Democrata Independiente CONS 118 44.30 .51 2.82 2.18 5.35 
Chile 2003 (Independent candidate) . 23 1.60 .50 2.91 2.09 5.35 
Czech Rep. 1996 Com. Party of Bohemia and Moravia COM 49 10.30 .88 0.6 4.4 8.33 
Czech Rep. 1996 Social Democratic Party SOCDEM 128 26.40 .55 3.38 1.62 8.33 
Czech Rep. 1996 Civic Democratic Alliance R LIB 17 6.40 .54 7.38 2.38 8.33 
Czech Rep. 1996 Christian Democratic Union –  CH DEM 17 8.10 .55 6.19 1.19 8.33 
Czech Rep. 1996 Civic Democratic Party CONS 17 29.60 .78 8.93 3.93 8.33 
Czech Rep. 1996 Republican Party NAT 16 8.00 .07 5.93 .93 8.33 
Czech Rep. 2002 Communist Party of Czech COM 49 18.50 .83 0.77 4.23 7.47 
Czech Rep. 2002 Czech Social democratic Party SOCDEM 128 30.20 .62 2.70 2.3 7.47 
Czech Rep. 2002 Christian Democratic Union CH DEM 17 11.00 .51 5.74 .74 7.47 
Czech Rep. 2002 Civic Democratic Party  CONS 17 24.50 .65 8.24 3.24 7.47 
Czech Rep. 2002 Freedom union - democratic  . 8 4.50 .51 6.92 1.92 7.47 
Denmark 1998 Socialist People SOCIAL 47 7.50 .69 2.52 2.48 6.12 
Denmark 1998 Social Democrat SOCDEM 25 35.65 .72 4.35 .65 6.12 
Denmark 1998 Centre Democrat L LIB . 4.30 .73 5.53 .53 6.12 
Denmark 1998 Liberal LIB 136 23.83 .62 7.55 2.55 6.12 
Denmark 1998 Conservative CONS 36 8.86 .64 7.23 2.23 6.12 
Denmark 1998 Danish People NAT 11 7.35 .73 8.64 3.64 6.12 
Denmark 2001 Socialist People's party SOCIAL 47 6.00 .66 2.78 2.22 6.66 
Denmark 2001 Radical left SOCIAL 101 9.20 .68 4.61 .39 6.66 
Denmark 2001 Social democrats SOCDEM 135 25.90 .67 4.38 .62 6.66 
Denmark 2001 Left Liberal Party LIB 136 29.00 .60 7.32 2.32 6.66 
Denmark 2001 Conservative People's party CONS 136 10.30 .60 6.98 1.98 6.66 
Denmark 2001 Danish Peoples' party NAT 11 13.20 .62 8.13 3.13 6.66 
France 2002 Socialist Party SOCIAL 37 24.10 .39 3.61 1.39 5.43 
France 2002 Workers' Struggle SOCDEM 38 1.20 .52 2.30 2.7 5.43 
France 2002 Republican and civic movement L LIB 14 1.10 .44 4.62 .38 5.43 
France 2002 Union for french democracy LIB 28 4.79 .44 6.37 1.37 5.43 
France 2002 Rally for the republic CONS 30 19.90 .41 6.66 1.66 5.43 
France 2002 National front NAT 34 11.34 .45 7.85 2.85 5.43 
Finland 2003 Green League ECO 19 8.00 .61 4.76 .24 5.12 
Finland 2003 Left Alliance SOCIAL 16 9.90 .57 2.37 2.63 5.12 
Finland 2003 Social democratic Party SOCDEM 107 22.90 .45 4.72 .28 5.12 
Finland 2003 Christian Democrats CH DEM 48 5.30 .51 5.83 .83 5.12 
Finland 2003 National Coalition Party CONS 88 18.50 .52 7.49 2.49 5.12 
Finland 2003 Centre Party  AGRA 100 24.70 .60 6.20 1.2 5.12 
Germany 1998 Greens/Alliance 90 ECO 26 6.70 .53 2.9 2.1 4.23 
Germany 1998 Party of Democratic Socialism SOCIAL 17 5.10 .55 2.07 2.93 4.23 
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Germany 1998 Social Democratic Party SOCDEM 143 40.90 .59 3.36 1.64 4.23 
Germany 1998 Free Democratic Party R LIB 58 6.20 .56 4.96 .04 4.23 
Germany 1998 Christian Democratic Party CH DEM 61 28.40 .42 5.7 .7 4.23 
Germany 1998 Christian Social Union in Bavaria CH DEM 61 6.70 .36 6.3 1.3 4.23 
Germany 2002 Greens/Alliance 90 ECO 26 8.60 .60 2.61 2.39 5.36 
Germany 2002 Party of Democratic Socialism  SOCIAL 17 4.30 .27 2.68 2.32 5.36 
Germany 2002 Social Democratic Party SOCDEM 143 38.50 .62 3.23 1.77 5.36 
Germany 2002 Free Democratic Party R LIB 58 7.40 .64 5.53 .53 5.36 
Germany 2002 Christian Democratic Union CH DEM 61 29.50 .58 6.74 1.74 5.36 
Germany 2002 Christian Social Union in Bavaria CH DEM 61 9.00 .54 7.54 2.54 5.36 
Great Britain 1997 Labour SOCDEM 106 43.20 .40 3.97 1.03 3.2 
Great Britain 1997 Conservative CONS 165 30.60 .42 7.17 2.17 3.2 
Great Britain 1997 Scottish National Party REGIO 72 2.00 .37 4.47 .53 3.2 
Great Britain 1997 Plaid Cymry REGIO 81 0.50 .50 4.53 .47 3.2 
Great Britain 1997 Liberal Democrats OTH 147 16.70 .65 4.71 .29 3.2 
Great Britain 2001 Labour SOCDEM 106 40.67 .54 5.60 .6 .12 
Great Britain 2001 Conservative CONS 165 31.70 .67 5.48 .48 .12 
Great Britain 2001 Liberal Democrats OTH 147 18.25 .63 5.48 .48 .12 
Hungaria 1998 Socialist Party SOCIAL 17 32.90 .40 2.93 2.07 4.98 
Hungaria 1998 Worker’s Party SOCIAL . 3.95 . .  4.98 
Hungaria 1998 Alliance of free Democrats LIB 18 6.90 .46 3.99 1.01 4.98 
Hungaria 1998 Alliance of Young Democrats.  CH DEM 18 29.40 .49 6.48 1.48 4.98 
Hungaria 1998 Justice and Life Party NAT 13 5.50 .57 7.91 2.91 4.98 
Hungaria 1998 Independent Smallholder’s Party AGRA 76 13.20 .44 7.13 2.13 4.98 
Hungaria 2002 Socialist Party SOCIAL 17 42.10 .62 1.87 3.13 6.23 
Hungaria 2002 Worker’s Party SOCIAL 18 2.80 .52 7.68 2.68 6.23 
Hungaria 2002 Alliance of free Democrats LIB 18 5.50 .53 7.87 2.87 6.23 
Hungaria 2002 Alliance of Young Democrats.  CH DEM 18 41.10 .58 8.10 3.1 6.23 
Hungaria 2002 Justice and Life Party NAT 13 4.40 .60 4.16 .84 6.23 
Hungaria 2002 Independent Smallholder’s Party AGRA 6 0.80 .43 2.87 2.13 6.23 
Ireland 2002 Green (Comhaontas Glas)  ECO 25 3.80 .53 4.36 .64 3.38 
Ireland 2002 Labour (Pàiriti Lucht Oibre)  SOCDEM 105 10.80 .52 3.61 1.39 3.38 
Ireland 2002 Fianna Fail ('Solidiers of Destiny') L LIB 80 41.50 .50 6.44 1.44 3.38 
Ireland 2002 Progressive Democrats LIB 21 4.00 .47 6.31 1.31 3.38 
Ireland 2002 Fine Gael ('Family of the Irish')  R LIB 84 22.50 .49 6.06 1.06 3.38 
Ireland 2002 Sinn Fein ('We Ourselves') NAT 101 6.50 .37 3.06 1.94 3.38 
Iceland 1999 Left Greens ECO 8 9.12 .60 2.39 2.61 6.01 
Iceland 1999 Social Alliance Party SOCDEM 7 26.78 .67 3.65 1.35 6.01 
Iceland 1999 Liberal Party LIB 7 4.17 .37 5.54 .54 6.01 
Iceland 1999 Independence Party CONS 77 40.74 .66 8.4 3.4 6.01 
Iceland 1999 Progressive Party AGRA 90 18.35 .69 5.7 .7 6.01 
Iceland 2003 Left Greens ECO 8 8.80 .61 3.25 1.75 6.09 
Iceland 2003 Social Alliance Party SOCDEM 6 31.00 .63 5.10 .1 6.09 
Iceland 2003 Liberal Party LIB 7 7.40 .57 6.50 1.5 6.09 
Iceland 2003 Independence Party CONS 77 33.70 .65 9.34 4.34 6.09 
Iceland 2003 Progressive Party AGRA 90 17.30 .68 7.04 2.04 6.09 
Israel 1996 Avoda (Left Block) SOCDEM 38 27.50 .47 3.12 1.88 5.95 
Israel 1996 Meretz (Left Block) L LIB 32 7.50 .70 1.51 3.49 5.95 
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Israel 1996 Likud NAT 18 25.80 .53 7.46 2.46 5.95 
Israel 1996 Shas (Religious Block) IND 22 8.70 .36 6.21 1.21 5.95 
Israel 1996 Mafdal (Religious Block) IND 50 8.10 .47 7.31 2.31 5.95 
Israel 2003 Labor SOCDEM 38 14.50 .41 2.88 2.12 6.48 
Israel 2003 Meretz (Left Block) L LIB 14 5.20 .64 1.76 3.24 6.48 
Israel 2003 Likud NAT 33 29.40 .55 7.75 2.75 6.48 
Israel 2003 National Union NAT 7 5.50 .63 8.24 3.24 6.48 
Israel 2003 Shinui IND 7 12.30 .44 4.88 .12 6.48 
Israel 2003 Shas (Religious Block) IND 22 8.20 .41 7.00 2 6.48 
Japan 1996 Social Democratic Party COM 10 6.40 .50 2.41 2.59 5.19 
Japan 1996 Communist Party SOCDEM 84 13.10 .63 4.66 .34 5.19 
Japan 1996 Democratic Party of Japan LIB 10 16.10 .50 5.2 .2 5.19 
Japan 1996 New Frontier Party R LIB 12 28.00 .40 5.9 .9 5.19 
Japan 1996 Liberal Democratic Party CONS 51 32.80 .49 7.6 2.6 5.19 
Korea 2000 New Korean Party of Hope SOCDEM 6 0.40 .46 4.21 .79 2.35 
Korea 2000 Grand National Party CONS 9 39.00 .39 5.66 .66 2.35 
Korea 2000 Millenium democratic Party CONS 6 35.90 .44 5.44 .44 2.35 
Korea 2000 United Liberal Democrats CONS 8 9.80 .46 6.56 1.56 2.35 
Korea 2000 Democratic Peoples Party CONS 6 3.70 .49 5.7 .7 2.35 
Korea 2000 Democratic Liberal Party CONS 6 1.20 .48 5.36 .36 2.35 
Korea 2004 Democratic labor party SOCDEM 6 13.00 .36 4.38 .62 3.82 
Korea 2004 Our Party LIB 3 38.30 .40 4.85 .15 3.82 
Korea 2004 Grand National Party CONS 9 35.80 .42 8.20 3.2 3.82 
Korea 2004 Millenium democratic Party CONS 6 7.10 .41 7.24 2.24 3.82 
Korea 2004 United Liberal Democrats CONS 8 2.80 .31 7.91 2.91 3.82 
Korea 2004 National integration . . . .45 6.42 1.42 3.82 
Lithuania 1997 Social Democrat Party SOCDEM 17 7.30 .46 4.35 .65 5.99 
Lithuania 1997 Democratic labor party SOCDEM . 11.10 .57 2.07 2.93 5.99 
Lithuania 1997 Christian Democrat Party CH DEM 16 13.20 .41 6.9 1.9 5.99 
Lithuania 1997 Homeland (Fatherland) Union- CONS 13 28.70 .59 8.06 3.06 5.99 
Lithuania 1997 Nationalist party NAT . 1.70 .26 3.82 1.18 5.99 
Lithuania 1997 Centre Union AGRA . 6.80 .57 3.75 1.25 5.99 
Mexico 1997 Cardenista Party OTH . 1.12 .44 2.65 2.35 3.34 
Mexico 1997 Ecological Party ECO 16 3.82 .16 3.73 1.27 3.34 
Mexico 1997 Democratic Revolution Party SOCDEM 17 25.70 .00 4.73 .27 3.34 
Mexico 1997 Labour Party SOCDEM 16 2.53 .32 3.15 1.85 3.34 
Mexico 1997 National Action Party R LIB 67 26.63 -.06 5.22 .22 3.34 
Mexico 1997 Institutional Revolutionary Party NAT 77 39.11 .06 5.99 .99 3.34 
Mexico 2000 Labour Party ECO 16 1.80 .06 4.34 .66 3.97 
Mexico 2000 Democratic Revolution Party SOCDEM 17 16.60 .17 3.92 1.08 3.97 
Mexico 2000 Ecological Party SOCDEM 16 3.90 .30 3.35 1.65 3.97 
Mexico 2000 Cardenista Party SOCDEM 48 . .39 2.72 2.28 3.97 
Mexico 2000 Institutional Revolutionary Party R LIB 77 36.89 .25 6.69 1.69 3.97 
Mexico 2000 National Action Party NAT 67 38.29 -.10 5.37 .37 3.97 
Mexico 2003 Partido del Trabajo ECO 16 2.40 .45 2.47 2.53 3.73 
Mexico 2003 Partido de la Revoluciòn  SOCDEM 17 17.60 .21 3.75 1.25 3.73 
Mexico 2003 Partido Verde Ecologista de  SOCDEM 16 4.00 .19 3.88 1.12 3.73 
Mexico 2003 Convergencia SOCDEM 7 2.30 .44 2.46 2.54 3.73 
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Mexico 2003 Partido Revolucionario  R LIB 77 48.00 -.20 5.46 .46 3.73 
Mexico 2003 Partido Actiòn Nacional NAT 67 23.10 .03 6.19 1.19 3.73 
Netherlands 1998 Green Left ECO 16 7.30 .68 2.84 2.16 4.38 
Netherlands 1998 Socialist Party SOCIAL 35 3.50 .64 2.8 2.2 4.38 
Netherlands 1998 Labour Party SOCDEM 60 29.00 .61 4.25 .75 4.38 
Netherlands 1998 People’s Party for Freedom and  LIB 58 24.70 .60 7.18 2.18 4.38 
Netherlands 1998 Democrats 66 LIB 40 9.00 .69 5.07 .07 4.38 
Netherlands 1998 Christian Democratic Appeal CH DEM 26 18.30 .61 6.23 1.23 4.38 
Netherlands 2002 Groen Links ECO 16 5.10 .71 2.65 2.35 5.11 
Netherlands 2002 SP SOCIAL 35 6.30 .70 2.48 2.52 5.11 
Netherlands 2002 Labour Party SOCDEM 60 27.30 .64 3.84 1.16 5.11 
Netherlands 2002 People’s Party for Freedom and  LIB 58 17.90 .62 7.59 2.59 5.11 
Netherlands 2002 Democrats 66 LIB 40 4.10 .63 4.82 .18 5.11 
Netherlands 2002 Christian Democratic Appeal CH DEM 26 28.60 .59 6.74 1.74 5.11 
Netherlands 2003 Groen Links ECO 16 7.00 .68 3.31 1.69 5.25 
Netherlands 2003 SP SOCIAL 35 5.90 .60 3.36 1.64 5.25 
Netherlands 2003 Labour Party SOCDEM 60 15.10 .62 4.43 .57 5.25 
Netherlands 2003 People’s Party for Freedom and  LIB 58 15.40 .61 8.03 3.03 5.25 
Netherlands 2003 Democrats 66 LIB 40 5.10 .61 5.44 .44 5.25 
Netherlands 2003 Christian Democratic Appeal CH DEM 26 28.00 .62 7.30 2.3 5.25 
New Zealand 1996 Labour SOCDEM 90 28.19 .57 3.82 1.18 5.35 
New Zealand 1996 Alliance SOCDEM 14 10.10 .51 2.68 2.32 5.35 
New Zealand 1996 Act New Zeeland R LIB 11 6.10 .60 8.03 3.03 5.35 
New Zealand 1996 Christian Coalition CH DEM 11 4.33 .29 6.67 1.67 5.35 
New Zealand 1996 National CONS 70 33.84 .53 7.68 2.68 5.35 
New Zealand 1996 New Zeeland First NAT 13 13.35 .55 5.44 .44 5.35 
New Zealand 2002 Green Party ECO 16 7.00 .44 2.65 2.35 4.64 
New Zealand 2002 Labour SOCDEM 90 41.30 .33 3.96 1.04 4.64 
New Zealand 2002 Act New Zeeland R LIB 11 7.10 .43 7.29 2.29 4.64 
New Zealand 2002 National CONS 70 20.90 .43 6.85 1.85 4.64 
New Zealand 2002 New Zeeland First NAT 13 10.40 .41 6.48 1.48 4.64 
New Zealand 2002 United Future . 5 6.80 .52 5.58 .58 4.64 
Norway 1997 Socialist Left Party SOCIAL 45 6.00 .68 2.41 2.59 5.89 
Norway 1997 Labour Party SOCDEM 112 35.10 .48 4.8 .2 5.89 
Norway 1997 Progress Party R LIB 33 15.30 .66 8.3 3.3 5.89 
Norway 1997 Christian People’s Party CH DEM 73 13.70 .63 5.77 .77 5.89 
Norway 1997 Conservative Party CONS 124 14.30 .66 8.04 3.04 5.89 
Norway 1997 Centre Party AGRA 85 8.00 .67 4.15 .85 5.89 
Norway 2001 Socialist Left Party SOCIAL 45 12.55 .63 2.77 2.23 5.32 
Norway 2001 Labour Party SOCDEM 119 24.29 .55 4.58 .42 5.32 
Norway 2001 Progress Party R LIB 33 14.64 .61 8.09 3.09 5.32 
Norway 2001 Christian People’s Party CH DEM 73 12.40 .64 5.89 .89 5.32 
Norway 2001 Conservative Party CONS 122 21.21 .66 8.04 3.04 5.32 
Norway 2001 Centre Party AGRA 86 5.56 .66 4.46 .54 5.32 
Peru 2000 Partido Aprista RELIG 7 5.84 .00 4.86 .14 3.14 
Peru 2000 Frente ind. Moralizador RELIG 9 7.89 .12 4.83 .17 3.14 
Peru 2000 Peru Possible IND 7 22.84 .24 6.54 1.54 3.14 
Peru 2000 Solucion Popular IND 50 0.00 .31 3.4 1.6 3.14 
Article 1 – Perceptual Agreement in Different Institutional Contexts 
 132  
Peru 2000 Renaciemento Andino IND 7 0.00 .17 4.7 .3 3.14 
Peru 2000 Unitad Nacional OTH 11 0.00 .24 4.08 .92 3.14 
Peru 2001 Partido Aprista SOCDEM 7 19.70 .04 4.9 .1 2.35 
Peru 2001 Peru Possible IND 7 26.30 .08 5.03 .03 2.35 
Peru 2001 Frente ind. Moralizador OTH 9 11.00 .21 5.23 .23 2.35 
Peru 2001 Unitad Nacional . 11 13.80 .21 6.15 1.15 2.35 
Peru 2001 Solucion Popular . 50 3.60 .05 5.19 .19 2.35 
Peru 2001 Renaciemento Andino . 7 1.40 .28 3.8 1.2 2.35 
Poland 1997 Union of Labour SOCIAL 14 4.70 .35 4.1 .9 6.49 
Poland 1997 Democratic left alliance SOCDEM 15 27.10 .66 1.66 3.34 6.49 
Poland 1997 Freedom Union LIB 12 13.40 .45 5.61 .61 6.49 
Poland 1997 Solidarity Election Action CH DEM 10 33.80 .63 8.15 3.15 6.49 
Poland 1997 Movement for the Reconstraction  NAT 11 5.10 .49 7.44 2.44 6.49 
Poland 1997 Peasant Party AGRA 16 6.90 .46 3.74 1.26 6.49 
Poland 2001 Coalition democratic left  SOCDEM 7 41.00 .73 1.32 3.68 6.75 
Poland 2001 League of Polish Families CH DEM 5 7.90 .40 7.21 2.21 6.75 
Poland 2001 ELF Defence of the Polish  AGRA 5 10.20 .36 4.63 .37 6.75 
Poland 2001 Polish People's Party AGRA 16 9.00 .45 4.31 .69 6.75 
Poland 2001 Law and Justice OTH 5 9.50 .40 6.65 1.65 6.75 
Poland 2001 Citizen's Platform (PO) . 5 12.70 .37 6.34 1.34 6.75 
Poland 2001 Coalition Electoral Action  . 5 5.60 .61 8.07 3.07 6.75 
Poland 2001 Freedom Union . 12 3.10 .33 6.12 1.12 6.75 
Portugal 2002 Communist Worker’s (Portuguese  COM 36 6.97 .62 1.95 3.05 6 
Portugal 2002 Socialist Party SOCDEM 33 37.84 .62 4.62 .38 6 
Portugal 2002 Social Democrat Party LIB 32 40.15 .55 7.31 2.31 6 
Portugal 2002 Popular Party CONS 32 8.75 .54 7.72 2.72 6 
Portugal 2002 Unitarian Democratic Coalition . 19 7.00 .66 1.9 3.1 6 
Portugal 2002 Left Block . 7 0.00 .69 1.72 3.28 6 
Romania 1996 Democratic Convention of  SOCDEM 16 30.20 .35 6.78 1.78 2.94 
Romania 1996 Party of Social Dmocracy SOCDEM 16 21.50 .21 3.84 1.16 2.94 
Romania 1996 Democratic Party ETHN 14 12.90 . .  2.94 
Romania 1996 Social Democratic Union ETHN 14 12.93 .38 5.32 .32 2.94 
Romania 1996 Party for National Unity REGIO 16 4.36 .17 4.74 .26 2.94 
Romania 1996 National Peasant and Chritian  . . . . .  2.94 
Romania 1996 Democratic Union of Hungarians  . 16 6.60 .14 5.28 .28 2.94 
Romania 1996 Greater Romania Party . 15 4.50 . .  2.94 
Slovenia 1996 Social Democratic Party of  SOCDEM 17 16.10 .32 6.18 1.18 3.13 
Slovenia 1996 United List of Social Democrats SOCDEM 17 9.00 .34 3.44 1.56 3.13 
Slovenia 1996 Liberal Democratic Party LIB 17 27.00 .36 3.9 1.1 3.13 
Slovenia 1996 Christain Democrats CH DEM 17 9.62 .29 6.57 1.57 3.13 
Slovenia 1996 People’s Party AGRA 18 19.00 .41 5.88 .88 3.13 
Slovenia 1996 Democratic Party of Retired  OTH 13 4.30 . .  3.13 
Spain 1996 Izquierda Unida COM 31 10.60 .62 2.28 2.72 5.56 
Spain 1996 Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol SOCIAL 126 37.50 .62 4.02 .98 5.56 
Spain 1996 Partido Popular CONS 106 38.90 .57 7.84 2.84 5.56 
Spain 1996 Convergencia i Unio de Catalunya REGIO 31 4.60 .49 5.76 .76 5.56 
Spain 1996 Partido Nacionalista Vasco REGIO 31 1.30 .42 5.47 .47 5.56 
Spain 2000 Izquierda Unida COM 31 5.46 .62 2.25 2.75 4.86 
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Spain 2000 Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol SOCIAL 126 34.08 .70 3.7 1.3 4.86 
Spain 2000 Partido Popular CONS 106 44.54 .58 7.11 2.11 4.86 
Spain 2000 Convergencia i Unio REGIO 31 4.20 .47 5.9 .9 4.86 
Spain 2000 Partido Nacionalista Vasco REGIO 31 1.53 .31 5.54 .54 4.86 
Spain 2004 Izquierda Unida COM 31 5.00 .66 2.98 2.02 6.03 
Spain 2004 Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol SOCIAL 126 42.60 .59 4.24 .76 6.03 
Spain 2004 Partido Popular CONS 106 37.70 .60 9.01 4.01 6.03 
Spain 2004 Convergencia i Unio REGIO 31 3.20 .41 5.63 .63 6.03 
Sweden 1998 Left Party SOCIAL 89 11.99 .75 1.24 3.76 7.78 
Sweden 1998 Social Democratic Party SOCDEM 117 36.38 .54 3.48 1.52 7.78 
Sweden 1998 People’s Party Liberals LIB 104 4.71 .65 6.4 1.4 7.78 
Sweden 1998 Moderate Party CH DEM 102 22.90 .80 9.02 4.02 7.78 
Sweden 1998 Christian Democrats CH DEM 42 11.76 .54 6.97 1.97 7.78 
Sweden 1998 Centre Party AGRA 91 5.12 .73 5.43 .43 7.78 
Sweden 2002 Left Party SOCIAL 89 8.39 .71 1.44 3.56 7.25 
Sweden 2002 Social Democratic Party SOCDEM 117 39.85 .57 3.76 1.24 7.25 
Sweden 2002 People’s Party Liberals LIB 104 13.39 .67 6.28 1.28 7.25 
Sweden 2002 Christian Democrats CH DEM 42 9.15 .58 7.08 2.08 7.25 
Sweden 2002 Moderate Party CONS 102 15.26 .74 8.69 3.69 7.25 
Sweden 2002 Centre Party AGRA 91 6.19 .74 5.68 .68 7.25 
Switzerland 1999 Greens Party ECO 23 4.96 .52 3.02 1.98 4.58 
Switzerland 1999 Social Democrats SOCDEM 118 22.56 .48 3.29 1.71 4.58 
Switzerland 1999 Freethinking Democrats LIB 112 19.90 .55 6.16 1.16 4.58 
Switzerland 1999 People’s Party R LIB 69 22.50 .50 7.6 2.6 4.58 
Switzerland 1999 Liberal Party (Parti Suisse de la  R LIB . 2.25 . .  4.58 
Switzerland 1999 Christian Democrats CH DEM 94 15.80 .60 5.54 .54 4.58 
Taiwan 1996 Democratic Progressive Party L LIB 20 29.85 .46 6.58 1.58 2.12 
Taiwan 1996 Nationalist Party R LIB 112 49.68 .33 4.46 .54 2.12 
Taiwan 1996 Chinese New Party NAT 13 13.67 .38 5.66 .66 2.12 
Taiwan 2001 Kuomintang   R LIB 112 31.30 .48 5.79 .79 1.34 
Taiwan 2001 New Party  NAT  13 2.90 .31 5.07 .07 1.34 
Taiwan 2001 Peoples First Party . 6 20.30 .39 5.03 .03 1.34 
Taiwan 2001 Taiwan Solidarity Union . 5 8.50 .30 4.45 .55 1.34 
Taiwan 2001 Democratic Progressive  . 20 36.60 .33 4.99 .01 1.34 
USA 1996 Democratic Party L LIB 178 49.20 . . . . 
USA 1996 Republican Party R LIB 150 40.70 . . . . 
USA 1996 Reform Party IND 14 8.40 . . . . 
USA 2004 Democratic Party L LIB 178 47.40 .29 4.09 .91 2.59 
USA 2004 Republican Party R LIB 150 49.90 .37 6.68 1.68 2.59 
USA 2004 Reform Party IND 14 . .55 4.24 .76 2.59 
Comment: See comment in table 1, appendix I for details. 
 
   
   
 
Article 2 
 
Political Parties and Perceptual 
Agreement  
   
Article 2 – Political Parties and Perceptual Agreement 
 137  
 
Political Parties and Perceptual 
Agreement  
- The influence of party related factors on 
voters’ perceptions in proportional electoral 
systems66 
Abstract 
A normative ideal of political representation is that governmental policy 
should reflect the will of a majority of the voters. The responsible party 
model emphasizes a number of conditions that must be fulfilled in order to 
achieve meaningful representation. The model presumes that parties will 
present stable and divergent policy programs – that is, prospective man-
dates - during election campaigns, thereby giving voters meaningful elec-
toral choices. An underlying assumption that can be deduced from the re-
sponsible party model is that an electorate with clear and shared percep-
tions of the party space is an important prerequisite for successful political 
representation. This article is focused on how the extent of agreement in 
voters’ perceptions of parties’ policy positions is affected by 1) the behavior 
of the parties in terms of the degree of stability and divergence in their pol-
icy positions and 2) by various party characteristics such as the electoral 
size, the age and the labels of the parties. The study is based on data from 
election studies in Norway, Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands with 26 
parties covered in 35 elections. The results show that both the degree of 
stability and divergence in parties left-right positions are of considerable 
importance for the perceptual agreement among voters, while electoral size 
 
 
                                                   
66 This article is published in Electoral Studies 2009: doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2009. 01.007  
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of parties has a negative effect. In contrast to the vast literature on voting 
behavior that emphasizes the role of well-informed and knowledgeable vot-
ers as an important ingredient in effective policy representation, this article 
shows that responsible parties that present stable and divergent policy posi-
tions are needed as well. 
 
Key words: elections, political representation, perceptual agreement, left-
right ideology, political parties 
Introduction 
In the best of worlds, elections constitute a linkage between citizens and 
their representatives, where the latter are seen as delegates for the former in 
order to act on their behalf and according to their will. During elections 
voters have the opportunity to give their mandate to the candidate(s) that 
most closely represents the voters’ views. This step is an intrinsic part of 
representative democracies and also forms the heart of the responsible 
party model (RPM) (APSA 1950; Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; Schmitt 
and Thomassen 1999). Political parties are central in the RPM because of 
their function as mediators between public preferences and policy out-
comes. This ideal of political representation can, however, only be reached 
to the extent that the voters adequately perceive the policy positions of the 
contesting parties. Perceptual agreement (PA) is an important prerequisite 
in this respect. Without agreement among voters as to what the parties 
stand for, the choices made by individuals according to their policy prefer-
ences would altogether be indistinguishable from random noise. Agreement 
about party policies allows the collective outcome of an election to be intel-
ligible and will thereby affect the extent to which voters are meaningfully 
represented in a political system (Granberg and Holmberg 1988; van der 
Brug and van der Eijk 1999b). 
Not much is known about the causes of PA. Previous research has, how-
ever, concluded that voters’ perceptions of party positions are influenced 
generally by different individual qualities such as ideological predisposition 
(Granberg and Holmberg 1988) and cognitive capabilities (van der Brug 
1997) as well as the salience of the issues at hand (Oscarsson 1998; van der 
Brug and van der Eijk 1999b; van der Brug 1997). But what about the role 
of political parties in the formation of voter perceptions? This question is 
significant given that political parties are a central part of European de-
mocratic systems as bearers of continuity, values and ideologies (Dalton 
1985; Granberg and Holmberg 1988; Katz and Mair 1995). From studies 
on voting behavior we know that different aspects related to political par-
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ties are influential on the vote-choices of individual voters. For example, 
the left-right position, the breadth of agenda and the electoral size of the 
parties certainly affect voters’ evaluations (Holmberg and Oscarsson 2004). 
One question is, if party related features are influential on individual vote-
choices, to what extent do they also affect voters’ perceptions of the par-
ties’ policy positions? 
Literature on political parties suggests that behavioral and characteristic 
related features of parties are two kinds of variables that theoretically could 
be relevant in explaining PA among voters. As indicated by the name of the 
RPM, an essential part of the electoral process is that responsible parties 
present voters with a meaningful set of electoral choices by offering stable 
and divergent policy programs/positions (APSA 1950). Party behavior in 
this respect can be expected to affect PA among voters. Turning to the 
characteristic aspect of parties, the first variable derives from Kircheimer’s 
theory of the catch-all parties, which typically are big parties with vague 
ideologies (Kirchheimer 1990). A second characteristic variable of parties is 
the labels that are attached to them, such as socialist, liberal or center etc, 
as it has been suggested that these may work as party policy short-cuts for 
voters (Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, and Tanenbaum 2001; Snyder 
2002). The third variable that can be expected to influence PA is the age of 
a party, since the position of older and more established political parties 
may be readily known to voters due to prolonged exposure to those poli-
cies (van der Brug, Franklin, Popescu, and Toka 2008).  
The purpose with this article is to explore how behavioral and character-
istic features of political parties are affecting the quality of voters’ percep-
tions, i.e. PA among voters on parties’ policy positions. Observations for 
this study consist of time series data from election studies in Norway, Swe-
den, Germany and The Netherlands which have been pooled into one data-
set of 26 parties covered in 8 elections.  
The article continues with a discussion of the importance of PA, fol-
lowed by a theoretical section concerning the background of the explana-
tory variables discussed above. Next is a section covering the data and the 
design together with the operationalizations used in the study, followed by 
a section on the results. The article ends with a discussion of the results and 
a summary. 
The importance of perceptual agreement  
The RPM emphasizes a number of conditions that must be fulfilled in order 
to achieve the normative ideals of political representation, namely the re-
flection of the will of a majority of the voters in public policy. The model 
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presumes that during election campaigns parties will present stable and di-
vergent policy programs – prospective mandates - in order to give the vot-
ers meaningful electoral choices. Voters are supposed to make a compara-
tive evaluation of the competing policy programs and, by voting for the 
party or candidate whose program is most congruent with their prefer-
ences, they will directly influence government policies (APSA 1950; Esaias-
son and Holmberg 1996; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999). An underlying 
assumption that can be deduced from the RPM is that an electorate with 
clear and shared perceptions of the policy space is an important prerequi-
site for successful political representation.  
An important determinant of the quality of the outcome of an election is 
thus the extent to which voters are informed about the policy alternatives, 
since it is more likely that well informed voters will make decisions that 
properly reflect their attitudes toward public policies. A range of studies 
within the field of political representation, this one included, focus on citi-
zens’ abilities to perceive political messages from elites, i.e. how well policy 
alternatives and issue positions are being communicated to citizens. An 
electorate with clear and shared perceptions of the party space has repeat-
edly been identified as one important prerequisite for successful political 
representation (Converse 1975; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999; van der 
Brug 1997).67 
According to Anthony Downs (1957) there are three different factors 
that influence a voters evaluation of a party’s or a candidate’s policy posi-
tion: 1) the position that emerges from the election manifesto, speeches or 
from other kinds of performances; 2) policy positions that were continued 
or introduced in earlier elections; and 3) expected future performance 
based on past and current evidence (see also Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 
1987). When direct information about a candidate or a party’s policy posi-
tion is hard to obtain, voters will use information short-cuts such as ideol-
ogy or past positions in an attempt to estimate the current or future posi-
tion (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981; 
Key 1966; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Popkin 1991).68 Ideology, thus, is 
 
 
                                                   
67 The concept of perception in this context refers to the cognitions or beliefs voters have about 
different political phenomena. An individual’s perceptions may be articulated as: ‘party A is 
opposed to death penalties’ or: ‘party B is a left wing feminist party’. The main difference be-
tween attitudes and perceptions is that while the former builds on evaluative judgements the 
latter does not (Granberg and Holmberg 1988). 
68 The past record may also be an important cue for how reliable a specific party or a candidate 
actually is as a provider of information. A voter can reduce the information costs by separating 
out reliable speakers from those who are not (Lupia and McCubbins 1998)  
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an important cognitive cue that voters can use to substitute for detailed 
information about party policies. In Downs’ theory voters are assumed to 
make implicit use of a spatial image, such as the left-right dimension, when 
perceiving political actors, issues or ideologies (Adams 2001; Downs 
1957).69 The advantage of the left-right spectrum is that it summarizes a 
large number of underlying ideological issues (Downs 1957; Fuchs and 
Klingemann 1990; Holmberg and Oscarsson 2004; van der Brug 1997; 
1999a).70 Furthermore, the left-right dimension is considered as one of the 
most universal and salient issue-dimensions within several political systems 
(Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 1987; Jones 2004; Klingemann, Hofferbert, 
and Budge 1994; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999).  
How can voting decisions based on ideology lead to meaningful repre-
sentation? The answer is that it depends on the extent to which the per-
ceived positions of the parties actually reflect the true policy positions (van 
der Brug 1999a). Earlier studies have shown that when evaluated as a sta-
tistical average, voters’ perceptions of parties largely reflect the positions 
evident in manifestos, as well as surveys among members of the parliament 
and roll-calls (Pennings and Kleinnijenhuis 2001; van der Brug and van der 
Eijk 1999b; van der Brug 1998; 2001). That the overall perception among 
voters tends to reflect some kind of ‘true’ position is encouraging but it 
does not necessarily tell us everything about the distribution of perceptions 
among the voters – that is, whether or not there is PA.  
Persuaded by the findings by the authors above, the present study will 
focus on the issue of agreement among voters about the policy positions of 
parties. If elections are to function as vehicles for meaningful representation 
and aggregation of preferences, a vast majority of the voters must perceive 
a party’s election platform in a similar manner (Downs 1957; Stokes 1963). 
Vague or blurred ideological positions or party profiles could yield dis-
torted perceptions which in turn may obstruct formation of informed and 
cohesive public opinions (Holmberg 1974; Holmberg, Westerståhl, and 
 
 
                                                   
69 An objection can be raised against treating ideology as a valuable information short-cut for 
parties' policies in that not all parties necessarily have an ideology (Bäck and Möller 2003). This 
is especially true for more recently arisen parties that mobilize around certain issues rather than 
ideology (Mair 1997). However, Swedish election studies have shown that the left-right dimen-
sion tends to reproduce itself so that it lasts over time and encompasses parties that usually do 
not fit in the ideological left-right dimension. (Oscarsson 1998). 
70 There is most likely a reciprocal relationship between parties left-right positions and how 
voters perceive them, as voters use their perception of parties left-right positions to assess party 
positions on concrete issues and the other way around; concrete issues affect how they are per-
ceived in terms of left-right (van der Brug 1997). 
Article 2 – Political Parties and Perceptual Agreement 
 142  
Branzén 1977). PA is important in this respect, as it affects the extent to 
which voters are adequately represented in a political system (Granberg 
and Holmberg 1988; van der Brug and van der Eijk 1999b). 
PA among voters on parties’ ideological left-right positions can thus 
work as a guarantor for successful political communication and representa-
tion within a political system. 
Determinants behind perceptual agreement 
The behavior of parties   
As mentioned earlier, the RPM emphasizes the importance of parties that 
hold stable and divergent policy positions so that voters are given meaning-
ful electoral choices. Weakly divergent policy positions should thus impede 
the process of information acquisition by voters since it may be difficult to 
discriminate between parties. This in turn may affect the degree of PA 
among voters. Instability in a party’s policy position may, for the same rea-
son, be another factor that may obstruct the PA among voters, especially 
since voters evaluate a party’s policy position based on information about 
current, past and expected performance (compare Downs 1957). In both 
cases, more stability and divergence are expected to facilitate an increase in 
PA among individual voters. 
Party characteristics  
Whereas the RPM highlights the behavior of political parties, other theories 
are more focused on various characteristics and attributes of the parties. 
According to Kirchheimer’s theory of the catch-all party, this type of party 
has its’ large size and an often a vague ideological position as distinctive 
features (Dittrich 1983; Kirchheimer 1990). Inspired by Kirchheimer’s 
work, it is reasonable to expect that bigger parties will in general be less 
ideologically distinctive compared to smaller parties such as interest based 
or regional ones, everything else being equal. In order to gather a large na-
tional electoral base, a party needs to bring together groups of voters with 
sometimes diverse interests. This is best done by downplaying ideological 
differences and promoting issues that are less likely to meet resistance in 
the electorate. Hence, if bigger parties might be less distinctive in their ideo-
logical positions, a party’s electoral size may have implications for the clar-
ity of voters’ perceptions of the policies. Party size should thus have a nega-
tive effect on the degree PA.  
Secondly, political parties are also more or less attached to different po-
Article 2 – Political Parties and Perceptual Agreement 
 143 
sitions on a political spectrum (Budge 1994; Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 
1987) and PA has been proven to vary considerably between different party 
families (Dahlberg, Berlin, and Oscarsson 2005; Dahlberg and Oscarsson 
2006). An  explanation of this phenomenon might be that parties that are 
closely attached to the left-right dimension often have names such as ‘social 
democrats’, ‘liberals’ or ‘conservatives’ which serve as signals of position 
on the left-right continuum (Budge et al. 2001). It has been suggested that 
these labels sometimes work as cues for voters when acquiring information 
about parties’ policies (Downs 1957; Snyder 2002), which may promote 
higher PA. 
A third characteristic factor that can be expected to influence the percep-
tions of voters is the age of a party. All things being equal, it should be eas-
ier to apprehend or at the very least, to know something about the position 
of an old established party than a younger one. Newer parties are also 
more likely to adjust their policies and ideological profiles, which in turn 
may be confusing for the voters (van der Brug, Franklin, Popescu, and 
Toka 2008). Party age should thus have a positive impact on PA.  
We now have five main factors to model, two factors related to party 
behavior: stability and divergence; and three characteristic associated fac-
tors: party label, size and age of a party. Country dummy variables will 
also be included as control variables for other possible but unspecified 
country specific differences.  
Data and research design  
Studying the effect of stability in party positions on the perceptions among 
voters requires time-series data and it is difficult to obtain such observa-
tions from a single country. In Sweden, for example, electoral studies have 
been carried out since 1956 but questions about parties’ left-right positions 
(for all parties) were only included after 1979. In order to obtain efficient 
estimates, time-series data from four countries – Norway, Sweden, Ger-
many and the Netherlands – have been pooled into one data-set with 26 
parties covered in 35 elections from the mid-seventies onwards. In practice 
this means 26 parties in an average of eight elections in each country which 
gives an effective N of 187 parties.71  
 
 
                                                   
71 The data, which is based on national election studies, was gathered from the European Voter 
Project database and can be obtained from the Central Archive for Empirical Social Research 
(ZA) at the University of Cologne with the study number 3911. In the case of the elections of 
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A frequent problem associated with comparative studies is the variation 
in the questions asked in different national election surveys. When it comes 
to the left-right dimension, this is a minor problem since the question usu-
ally goes: “Where would you place party x on a left-right scale stretching 
from y to z?” The advantage of survey questions like this is that we do not 
need to consider what the left-right dimension actually means in each coun-
try, even if it differs to some extent between countries depending on his-
tory, traditions, culture, etc.  
More problematic, however, is the fact that the rating scales of the an-
swers varied in length between seven and eleven points.72 The difficulty of 
comparing the results from a ten-point scale with those of an eleven-point 
scale may not be severe but this is less obviously the case in comparisons of 
data captured on a seven point and eleven point scales respectively. Gran-
berg and Holmberg (1988) confronted this problem in their study of voters 
in Sweden and USA and argued that comparisons between scales based on 
seven and eleven points respectively can be made. They based this conclu-
sion on an analysis of the results from studies by the Swedish institute SIFO 
(Research International), and by SCB (Statistics Sweden) in which the only 
respective difference was the use of seven-point and eleven-point scales. 
Differences due to the scales proved to be minor and had small variations 
                                                                                                                       
2002 and 2003 in the Netherlands, complementary data for the post-1998 elections not in-
cluded in the European Voter database has been gleaned from Irwin (2005). Data for Norway 
in 2001 and Sweden 2002 comes from the Swedish National Data Service (SND), 
http://www.snd.gu.se. Data for Germany in 2002 has been taken from the CSES-project and 
can be downloaded from http://www.umich.edu/~cses. The data for the 1977 election in the 
Netherlands is extrapolated from the previous and the past parliamentary election studies and is 
taken from the Continuous Survey, wave 11, which can be found in (van der Eijk and 
Niemöller 1983). Data on left-right positions is missing for Germany in the elections of 1980 
and 1994 and, as in the above mentioned Dutch case, an extrapolation was therefore made 
based on the previous and the past parliamentary election studies. The European voter data set 
does include data on left-right positions over time for Great Britain. However, since there are 
rather few cases (3 parties in 6 elections) and the fact that Great Britain is the only country 
having an electoral system using a plurality (FPTP) formula, there is a risk that Great Britain 
would become an ‘outlier’ and affect the results to a disproportionate extent. Great Britain has 
therefore been left out of the analysis. 
72 In Norway a 7-point scale was used for the election studies from 1973 until 1977 when a 9-
point scale was introduced. From 1985 until 1997, 10-point scales were used and again re-
placed by an 11-point scale in 2001. The Netherlands used a 7-point scale from 1971 until 
1981 when it was replaced by a 10-point scale. For the election study of 2002 an 11-point scale 
was temporarily used. Sweden and Germany have used an 11-point scale in all election studies. 
To make sure there are no stronger relationships between the scales used and the degrees of PA 
(i.e. shorter scales means less alternatives which may yield higher PA), a Pearson’s r correlation 
was run and yielded a coefficient of .22. Obviously, there is a weak relationship between the 
variables but interestingly enough in the ‘wrong direction’ in the sense that longer scales tend to 
coincide with higher degrees of PA. 
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(Granberg and Holmberg 1988). Van der Eijk and Niemöller (1983) 
reached a similar conclusion when comparing data from the Dutch parlia-
mentary elections. 
The variation in PA in the present study (Table 3 in appendix II) indi-
cates that the degree of PA in each of the four countries has a fairly similar 
distribution. With this in mind, the comparisons upon which this study 
rests appear as both feasible and reliable. However, the fact that scales of 
different lengths were used for measuring the left-right positions of the par-
ties could imply that the homoscedasticity assumption for ordinary least 
squares (OLS) does not hold. Fortunately, both heteroscedacticity and 
other contemporaneously correlated errors in time-series cross-section 
analyses can be accounted for by using panel corrected standard errors 
(PCSE) (Beck and Katz 1995).73 According to Beck (2001), OLS with PCSE 
is also more efficient than panel weighted least squares when the time-series 
are short.74  
There are a number of important differences between the countries rep-
resented in this study – some of the more obvious being the degree of pro-
portionality in the electoral systems, the effective number of parliamentary 
parties and the issue-dimensionality. These variables are all proven to affect 
PA indirectly among voters (Dahlberg, Berlin, and Oscarsson 2005; Dahl-
berg and Oscarsson 2006) and should ideally be taken into consideration. 
However, due to the tiny variation in these variables in this particular data 
 
 
                                                   
73 In contrast to simple heteroscedasticity, panel heteroscedasticity assumes that the error vari-
ance is constant within a unit, in this case a country. This assumption is thus violated in the 
cases of Norway and the Netherlands where different left-right scales were used over the years. 
However, in these instances the variation between the countries is held to be more severe for the 
Gauss Markov assumptions than the within-country variance (see Beck 2001 for a further dis-
cussion). 
74 Another problem to be dealt with is the fact that both a Durbin Watson test and a Correlo-
gram indicate the presence of a first order autoregressive process. However, since the dependent 
variable in this study is the aggregated agreement among voters, and since the respondents in all 
the election studies are – more or less – recruited independently it does not make any theoretical 
sense to include a lagged dependent variable in the model in order to avoid autocorrelation. The 
commonly used Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV)-model, with a lagged dependent vari-
able as well as a full set of country dummies will also provide biased estimates when used with 
short panels (Lindgren 2006). The autocorrelation has therefore been corrected for by a Prais 
Winsten transformation, where the autoregressive terms have been excluded instead of included 
in the model as with the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable (Beck and Katz 1996). The 
autoregressive correction is based on the assumption that the errors are commonly serially cor-
related instead of unit-specifically serially correlated. According to Beck and Katz (1995), this 
type of correction is more reliable and efficient in TSCS-data. Instead of using the time-series to 
make the model dynamic, it is here partly considered as stationary where the time aspect as 
such is of less interest. 
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set no certain conclusions can be made concerning their effect on PA. The 
variables have therefore been replaced with country dummy-variables in 
order to control for the influence of country specific differences and to 
mitigate the problem of omitted variables.75   
Operationalizations 
As discussed earlier, political representation can only be meaningful if vot-
ers share a clear view of the content or meaning of the proposed mandates. 
One way to estimate the agreement of voter perceptions is to use a measure 
of dispersion. A problem then is that the left-right position of parties is not 
measured on continuous scales but on ordered rating scales. For this rea-
son, this study uses a measurement on PA constructed by Cees van der Eijk 
(2001). This coefficient builds on the distribution of voters’ placements of 
parties on ordered rating scales, such as the left-right scale. The focus in 
this study is, therefore, not on perceptions among individual voters on par-
ties’ policy positions as such but on perceptions for the electorate as a 
whole. The coefficient is bound between -1 and +1 and it reaches its mini-
mum of -1 when half the sample places the party on one extreme and the 
other half of the sample places it on the opposite extreme – which is the 
same as maximum disagreement or a total deviation from a unimodal dis-
tribution. On the other hand, when all respondents place the party in the 
same category, the coefficient attains +1, which is the same as maximum 
agreement or perfect unimodality. A uniform distribution yields an agree-
ment value of 0.  
The first explanatory variable is the degree of stability in the parties’ pol-
icy positions. The most straight forward way to measure the degree of sta-
bility is either to rely on a simple measure of the difference between a 
party’s current and its past policy position or an average measure based on 
 
 
                                                   
75 The main alternative to this so called fixed effect model is the random effects approach, which 
builds on the assumption that the unit effects are uncorrelated with all independent variables in 
the model. In practice however, this assumption is, hard to meet (Wooldrige 2003). As the dif-
ferences within the countries can be expected to be less severe than the differences between the 
countries, the analysis will only include country dummy variables and not time-dummies due to 
the decreasing number of case In contrast to simple heteroscedasticity, panel heteroscedasticity 
assumes that the error variance is constant within a unit, in this case a country. This assumption 
is thus violated in the cases of Norway and the Netherlands where different left-right scales 
were used over the years. However, in these instances the variation between the countries is 
held to be more severe for the Gauss Markov assumptions than the within-country variance (see 
Beck 2001 for a further discussion).  
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earlier policy positions, as perceived by the voters in each election. How-
ever, these kinds of measures are not optimal since they do not take the 
direction of change into consideration.76 For example, if a party from one 
election to the other shifts from position 1 to, say, 2 on the scale and then 
in the third election moves back  to position 1, this is a shift of two scale 
steps in total. However, a party moving from position 1 to 2, and then in 
the third election from position 2 to 3, is also moving two steps in total. At 
least from an ideological point of view, the second party must, without 
doubt, be considered less stable in its policy position than the first party, 
which returns to a position. For this reason a measure based on cumulative 
values for a party’s current position has been chosen.77 The measure for 
stability used in this article is hence constructed as the square root of the 
value of a party’s current minus its previous median policy position and the 
current position minus the median policy position immediately before its 
previous  position, such that: 
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where ∆pjk is stability for party j in country k. The variable has then been 
reversed so that it actually captures stability instead of volatility.  
Turning to the second variable, divergence, this variable has been con-
structed as the weighted average distance for a party to all other parties in 
 
 
                                                   
76 To achieve an acceptable number of cases, the time period cannot be set to more than three 
elections in total. Selecting three time units for the construction of the stability measures is also 
justified by a Fisher’s F-test demonstrating no significant difference between models based on 
three as opposed to four time units. 
77 The most straight forward way to measure stability in a party’s policy position is to rely on 
a party’s earlier policy positions. To obtain a valid measure of change, four different meas-
ures with twelve different variations were constructed and tested on Swedish election data 
from 1979 to 2002, collected by Statistics Sweden (SCB) and administered by Swedish National 
Data Service (SND). The four measures consisted of one cumulative measure, one average 
measure, one measure based on average positions of the party family and one measure based 
on the deviation from a party’s own average position. For practical reasons the two latter 
measures were dropped since a) it is difficult to compare party ideologies between countries 
and b) an average position for older parties does not make sense. Average measures are not 
optimal anyhow since they do not take the direction into consideration. For this reason, two 
measures of a party’s current position based on cumulative values were chosen based. Since 
the two measures had a similar effect on perceptual agreement (-.41 and -.37, Pearson’s r) 
and also were highly correlated (r .92), which one to use was an arbitrary decision. Separate 
analyses were run with each of the measures but results showed there were only small differ-
ences in the effect.  
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each country in an election year. The weights are based on the percentages 
of votes received by the parties in order to avoid small extremist parties 
without any ‘real’ influence on the political arena affecting the average dis-
tance between the main alternatives. The divergence of party i can formally 
be expressed as: 
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where pi is the left-right position of party i, based on the interpolated me-
dian, pj the corresponding measure for party j, and sj the vote-share of 
party j. When weighting the distances in this way, one does not have to 
divide by the number of parties because when weighting them by the pro-
portion of votes, it is already a weighted average. One should, however, 
correct for the fact that the total size of the other parties differs across par-
ties and countries. 
The operationalizations of the remaining three independent variables are 
less complicated. The party label variable is coded as a dummy variable 
where parties classified as belonging to either (former) communistic-, social 
democratic-, liberal- or conservative party families have been coded one 
due to their attachment to the left-right dimension and all other unattached 
parties as zero (Ware 1996). The classification of parties has been taken 
from Budge et.al. (2001) and the categories are as follows: 1. Ecology Par-
ties, 2. (Former) Communist Parties, 3. Social Democratic Parties, 4. Lib-
eral Parties, 5. Christian Democratic (and other religious parties), 6. Con-
servative Parties, 7 National Parties, 8 Agrarian Parties, 9. Ethnic and Re-
gional Parties, 10. Special Interest Parties.78 The size of a party in each 
election is represented by the percentage of votes received, while the age of 
a party is the number of years since it was first represented in the national 
parliament. 
 
 
 
                                                   
78 The number of observations in each group in the European voter data is 71 in category  0 
and 114 in category 1. 
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Analysis 
Table 1 presents five different regression models. The first model represents 
the control variables and the second model contains the variables related to 
the party characteristics. The third model is simply a combined model of 
both control variables and party characteristic related factors. In the fourth 
model the two explanatory variables related to party behavior are intro-
duced and in the fifth model, the effect of the five main variables on per-
ceptual agreement is tested with the control variables included. Starting 
with the control variables, the first model can be used as a benchmark 
against which to judge the amount of explained variance derived from the 
other models.  
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Table 1. Determinants of perceptual agreement. OLS-regression, panel cor-
rected standard errors (PCSE) and PW-corrected autocorrelation (AR1). 
  
Perceptual agreement (e2) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Party behavioral features       
Stability (ln) - - - .017** .014** 
    (.005) (.005) 
Divergence (e2) - - - .049*** .033* 
    (.009) (.015) 
Party characteristic features      
Party label  - -.018 -.002 - .016 
  (.026) (.032)  (.032) 
Party size  - -.003*** -.003*** - -.003** 
  (.001) (.001)  (.001) 
Age of party (ln) - .250*** .173** - .162 
  (.071) (.088)  (.088) 
Country dummy variables79      
Sweden .147*** - .128*** - .106*** 
 (.027)  (.041)  (.027) 
Norway .062 - .044 - .036 
 (.038)  (.052)  (.038) 
Netherlands .017 - .010 - .028 
 (.029)  (.041)  (.036) 
Constant .319*** -.394* -.186 .257*** -.233 
 (.029) (.228) (.279) (.028) (.269) 
Ρ: .524 .544 .602 .523 .549 
N (pairwise): 135/23 135/23 135/23 135/23 135/23 
R2 .495 .449 .544 .482 .577 
Comment: * p<.05, ** p<.01 & *** p<.001 (2-tailed). The N-values indicate the number of parties and number of elec-
tions (observations per election by country: minimum: 3, average: 7,2, maximum: 11). Panel corrected standard errors 
within parentheses. For variable descriptives, see table 4 in appendix II. 
 
 
Even if the control variables not are of primary concern, it is interesting to 
get a glimpse of their effects in the first model. Two out of three control 
variables in the first model are significant and account for 49,5 percent of 
the explained variance in PA among voters; or rather the square of PA to 
be correct since the dependent variable, PA, here has been squared due to 
its skewed distribution.80  
 
 
                                                   
79 The effect of belonging to Germany is captured by the intercept. 
80 As the OLS-regression assumes linearity, the F-tests and t-tools assume a constant error vari-
ance. Hence, these methods work best with symmetric, roughly normal data distributions. 
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According to model 2, two of the party characteristic factors have a sig-
nificant effect on PA, namely the size (-.003***) and the age (.250***) of a 
party. This accords with the expectation that PA will decrease with increas-
ing electoral size of a party whilst it will increase with the age of a party, as 
longer term exposure assists with voters’ comprehension of the party's left-
right positions. Altogether the variables account for approximately 45 per-
cent of the explained variance.  
In the third model, where both the control and the party characteristic 
related variables are included, the amount of explained variance has in-
creased to 54 percent. The effects of both the size and the age of a party are 
still significant but the influence of party age on PA has decreased slightly. 
Party labels have an insignificant impact and this may indicate that for vot-
ers the brand names of the parties do not function as efficient information 
short-cuts after all. Obviously, a party label as a cognitive heuristic cannot 
compensate entirely for an absence of information; in this case substantial 
knowledge about a party’s left-right position. However, the insignificant 
result may arise from the small variation evident in party labels coming 
from just four west European countries. Further research is needed in order 
to say anything certain about this effect.81 
In model 4, which examines the effect on PA caused by the two variables 
related to party behavior, under control for each other, both stability 
                                                                                                                       
Thus, it is often better to analyze transformed data values rather than raw data when variables 
are skewed. Different (log/power) transformations are often useful for correcting problems with 
skewed data, outliers, and unequal variation. There are different tools at hand for transforming 
a variable where the most common procedures are: y=ex, √e ln(e) or lg(e). Which transforma-
tion is used is often of less importance, since this is rather a matter of scale selection. The effect, 
then, is that the log function squeezes the large values in the data together and stretches the 
small values apart, while squaring a variable does the opposite (Hamilton 1992; Sydsaeter 
1995). 
81 If the same model is run on Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data with the 
only difference being that stability not is included in the model since the CSES modules does not 
provide temporal data, the party labels do have a rather strong significant positive effect on PA 
(.039***). One reason behind this result could be that the number of parties in the CSES data-
set is 296 instead of 135 as in the European voter dataset. The insignificant effect of party labels 
should thus be noted with caution. On the other hand, this study shows that stability in party 
positions also is important and, with that variable excluded from the analysis, we are actually 
testing two different models on two different data sets. Nevertheless, this exception aside, the 
results based on the CSES-data are highly similar to those from the European Voter-data used 
in this study, which strengthens the reliability of the findings in this study. (CSES module 1 and 
2, were collected respectively during 1996-2001 and 2001-2004 in post election surveys in 32 
countries. The dataset covers a total of 63 elections with 396 political parties and 56 067 re-
spondents. The data can be retrieved from CSES Secretariat, http://www.cses.org, Centre for 
Political Studies. Institute for Social Research. The University of Michigan. The data can also be 
downloaded from: http://www.umich.edu/~cses.) 
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(.017**) and divergence (.049***) respectively yield a positive and signifi-
cant effect on the squared agreement among voters. These two factors 
alone explain about 48 percent of the variance in PA, which is a difference 
of three percentage points compared to model 2. This do, however, indi-
cates that stability and divergence in policy positions are important factors 
the agreement among voters.  
Turning to the final model 5, where all variables are included, the effect 
of stability (.014**) and divergence (.033*) on PA has decreased slightly 
compared to the fourth model.82 The amount of explained variance has also 
increased by approximately ten percentage points to 58 percent. Among the 
characteristic related variables the effect of party size (-.003**) is similar 
compared to the effect in model 2 whilst the effect of party age now is in-
significant. It is worth mentioning that the effect of the only significant 
context control variable in the fifth model, namely Sweden, has decreased 
by approximately 28 percent compared to its effect in the first model.83 This 
highlights the overall importance of the party related variables for explain-
ing variation in PA: policy divergence and stability have the most explana-
tory power for the degrees of PA among voters followed by the electoral 
size of a party.84 The rather strong effect of stability and divergence on PA 
is illustrated in figure 1.   
 
 
                                                   
82 In order to test for the saliency of the left-right dimension in respective elections, the regres-
sions were conducted including a measure of left-right taken from the Comparative Manifesto 
Project (CMP). The saliency of the left-right dimension did not affect the results to any great 
extent besides that the stability measure in model 4 became insignificant on the .01 level. The 
results in the other models were not affected at all and the effect of saliency by itself was not 
significant in any of the models. The CMP data, which is a thematic content analysis of election 
manifestos, is coded by placing every sentence or quasi-sentence into one of 56 categories. The 
sentences are then summarized and the frequencies counted as the proportion of the total 
amount of coded sentences where the scores are obtained and put into the CMP-dataset. In 
order to create a measure for left-right saliency in each country, all the left-right related catego-
ries were expressed as a proportion of the total amount of sentences for all parties in respective 
election. The left-right classification of the categories is made by the CMP and is stipulated on 
both theoretical grounds and by factor analysis (see Budge et al. 2001). 
83 Variables controlling for the effect of party government position and coalition collabora-
tions have also been tested for. The effects were not significantly different from zero and they 
did not affect the models as such, why they were excluded from the final analysis.  
84 Since the RPM highlights the importance of stable and divergent party policy positions an 
interaction term based on these two variables was included in initial models but this neither had 
any significant impact on PA nor did it influence the effect of the other variables. In terms of 
size, age and label there are no theoretical reason to model any interactions between these vari-
ables. 
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Figure 1. A 3-dimensional scatter plot illustrating the effect of divergence 
and stability on perceptual agreement.  
 
Comment: The graph has been produced with R 2.7.1 (R-Development Core Team 2005) and the Rcmdr package 
made by John Fox (2008). 
 
 
The scatter plot in figure 1 clearly illustrates the positive correlation be-
tween stability and divergence in parties’ left-right positions and voters’ PA. 
A frequent problem in social science is that variables seldom are meas-
ured on similar scales, a fact that makes interpretations more difficult, not 
least when using the square or the natural logarithms of the variables. But 
most of all, it makes it more difficult to compare the substantial effect of 
the different independent variables on PA. A simple procedure to mitigate 
the problem of dissimilar measurement scales between variables and data 
sources is to examine what effect the total change in the independent vari-
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ables has on the dependent variable. These effects can then be interpreted 
as the average effect in the square of PA caused by each independent vari-
able, under control for all other variables included in the model, when 
moving from the lowest to the highest theoretical value of each specific 
variable (see table 2).85   
 
Table 2. The average change in the squared perceptual agreement when the 
explanatory factors undergo a change from their lowest to their highest 
values. 
  
Perceptual agreement (e2) 
Model 1 
∆PA2 
Model 2 
∆PA2 
Model 3 
∆PA2 
Model 4 
∆PA2 
Model 5 
∆PA2 
Party behavioral features       
Stability (ln) - - - .170** .140** 
Divergence (e2) - - - .490*** .330* 
Party characteristic features      
Party label  - -.018 -.002 - .016 
Party size  - -.123*** -.123*** - -.123** 
Age of party (ln) - 5.000*** 3.460** - 3.240 
Country dummy variables      
Sweden .158**  .137***  .106*** 
Norway  .059**  .038  .036 
Netherlands  -.028  -.021  .028 
Comment: * p<.05, ** p<.01 & *** p<.001 (2-tailed). 
 
 
The largest significant effect on the square of PA is caused by the diver-
gence in a party’s left-right position (.330*) followed by stability (.140**). 
This result is in line with the theoretical expectations derived from the 
RPM that the more there is stability and divergence in parties’ policies, the 
greater the degree of agreement among voters. Since stable and divergent 
policy positions among the parties have this rather large influence on vot-
ers’ PA they are important ingredients for effective representation. Given 
that voters can compensate for an information shortage by using the par-
ties’ ideological positions as cognitive cues and shortcuts (Downs 1957; 
 
 
                                                   
85 An alternative, and probably more often used, procedure is to display standardized beta coef-
ficients. However, standardizations give at best an approximation of the relative weight of the 
independent variables, all other variables held constant, when explaining the variation in the 
dependent variable (Andrews, Morgan, Klem, and Sonquist 1973).     
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Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Popkin 1991), a less polarized party system in 
terms of left-right ideology may have severe consequences for the formation 
of public opinion and the aggregation of preference.  
Shifting attention to the remaining variable in Table 2, it becomes clear 
that the total negative effect of party size on PA (-.123**) is not that small 
after all when compared to the total effect of the two behavioral variables. 
It appears that greater electoral support for a party means less agreement 
among voters on its policy position, a result that is concordant with the 
idea of ‘catch-all’ parties appealing to a bigger swathe of the electorate, by 
expressing less ideological commitment (Kirchheimer 1990).86  
Summary and conclusions 
According to the RPM, an important prerequisite for effective political rep-
resentation is that voters have clear and common perceptions of the main 
political alternatives offered during an election campaign. This study has 
aimed to evaluate the role of different features of political parties in the 
creation of shared perceptions among voters of the parties’ policy positions. 
General conclusions in the literature about voters’ perceptions of party po-
sitions include ideological predisposition (Granberg and Holmberg 1988) 
and cognitive capabilities (Granberg and Holmberg 1988; van der Brug 
1997) and the salience of different issues (Oscarsson 1998; van der Brug 
and van der Eijk 1999b; van der Brug 1997). The present study has shown 
that features related to the political parties also significantly affect voters’ 
perceptions and that it is the behavior rather than the characteristics of the 
parties that are most important in the formation of PA within the elector-
ate. 
Both stability and divergence in policy are two behavioral traits of par-
ties that have considerable importance in explaining the variation in voters’ 
PA. In particular, divergence in a party’s ideological position from that of 
others appears to have a decisive impact on PA among voters. An interpre-
tation of these results is that it simply becomes easier to obtain perspective 
on the parties when their positions are more stable and divergent vis-à-vis 
 
 
                                                   
86 Nevertheless, since bigger parties are by definition more electorally successful (given an opera-
tionalization of size in terms of share of votes) it is counter-intuitive that more successful parties 
also may facilitate weaker perceptual agreement, given the likelihood of incumbency and the 
resources, and opportunities to communicate policy agendas. Conclusively, parties may succeed 
due to a perceptual disagreement they are able to construct within their electorates but this 
question is beyond the scope of this article. 
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one another because this reduces the information costs. As outlined by the 
RPM, parties with stable and divergent policy positions are desirable nor-
matively and an important condition for effective representation of the 
electorate. 
Among the characteristic related features of parties, the only significant 
effect on PA was found in the size of a party, where greater electoral size 
correlates  with  lower  PA  among  voters. Set against the theory of the 
‘catch-all’ party, this result demonstrates that bigger parties indeed strategi-
cally downplay their ideological profiles so as to appeal to a broader spec-
trum of the electorate than is the case with more interest based parties. 
From a normative point of view, however, the tendency for big parties to 
become vague regarding policy is less desirable for the ideal of political rep-
resentation.  
In contrast to the vast literature on voting behavior that emphasizes the 
importance of well-informed and knowledgeable voters (Bartels 1996; 
Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Converse 1964), the re-
search presented here shows that the presentation of stable and divergent 
policy positions by responsible political parties is also a crucial ingredient 
for effective and democratic representation. 
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Appendix I 
Dutch Parties Covered 1971-2003: PvdA (Labour Party); D’66. (Democ-
rats‘66); VVD (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy); CDA (Chris-
tian Democratic Appeal); KVP (Catholic People’s Party) 1971-1977; ARP 
(Anti-Revolutionary Party) 1971-1977; CHU (Christian Historical Union) 
1971-1977. Eleven elections in total. 
Swedish Parties Covered 1979-2002: MP (Green Ecology Party) 1988-
2002; V (Left Party); S (Social Democratic Labour Party); FP (Liberal Peo-
ple’s Party); KD (Christian Democratic Party) 1991-2002; M (Moderate 
Coalition Party); C (Agrarian Party). Eight elections in total. 
Norwegian Parties Covered 1973-2001: SV (Socialist Left Party); DNA 
(Norwegian Labour Party); V. (Liberal Party); Krf. (Christian People’s 
Party); H (Conservative Party); SP (Centre Party); FrP. (Progress Party). 
Ten elections in total.  
German Parties Covered 1976-2002: SPD (Social Democratic Party), 
1976-2002; FDP (Free Democratic Party) 1976-2002; CDU/CSU (Christian 
Democratic Union/ Christian Social Union) 1976-2002 (here treated as one 
party); (Green Party) 1983-2002 (Greens/Alliance 90) 1990-2002; PDS 
(Party of Democratic Socialism) 1990-2002. Eight elections in total. 
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Appendix II 
Table 3. Variations in PA by country 
PA Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Germany 34 .56 .07 .27 .68 
Norway 49 .69 .07 .55 .83 
Sweden 56 .60 .12 -.06 .77 
The Netherlands 48 .55 .08 .35 .71 
 
Table 4. Variable description 
Variable         Obs Mean Std, Dev, Min Max 
Stability 153 -.88 1.17 -3.91 1.44 
Divergence 211 2.11 .70 .54 4.47 
Party label 211 .66 .47 .00 1 
Party size 211 .42 .17 .11 .70 
Party age 211 4.23 .59 2.83 5.11 
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Misperceptions and Effective 
Representation 
-The simultaneous effect of electoral systems, political 
parties and individual characteristics on voters’ percep-
tions of party positions - a multilevel approach  
Abstract 
In the terms of the responsible party model, parties are assumed to formu-
late prospective policy programs and voters are assumed to vote for the 
party whose program most closely matches their preferences. In this con-
text, elections are reckoned as a process of mandate giving where once in 
government, parties will strive to realize their policy programs. Voters’ per-
ceptions of party positions are essential in this view since they affect the 
extent to which voters are meaningfully represented in a political system: 
common and accurate perceptions are the prerequisites for effective policy 
representation. However, according to Heider (1946) people strive to main-
tain cognitive balance and as a consequence, individuals tend to conceptu-
ally ‘push and pull’ candidates or parties which they like or dislike (also 
known as 'assimilation and contrast effects' or ‘wishful thinking’). The ten-
dency to ‘push and pull’ candidates or parties has in earlier studies also 
been shown to be affected by a voter's own ideological beliefs (Granberg 
1992; Granberg 1993).  
Past research on perception among voters has, however, mainly focused 
on the impact of internal features among voters on the perceptual process 
with less emphasis on the impact and characteristics of external stimuli. A 
relevant question regarding external factors is if and to what extent the 
electoral and the political context also matters for voters’ perceptions. The 
focal point in this study is how individual characteristics and various con-
textual factors related to the political parties and the political systems 
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might effect voters’ perceptions. Analysis of data from the Comparative 
Study of Electoral Systems, modules 1 and 2, on individual voters and vari-
ous system characteristics from election surveys in 29 countries will shed 
some light on this area of research. 
The results show that individual factors such as the left-right positions of 
individuals, education and gender are important factors behind voters’ per-
ceptual deviation (i.e. the difference between an individual’s placement of 
parties and the median placement position of a party by all voters). How-
ever, the strongest impact on perceptual deviation comes from the degree of 
divergence in a party’s left-right position together with party size, party 
labels and the degree of competition within a system. In general, it seems 
that the ideological affiliation among voters is less important for the ten-
dency to ‘push and pull’ parties than was believed from earlier research. 
‘Wishful thinking’ instead seems to occur when the policy positions of par-
ties are blurred due to either positions being shared by several parties, large 
party sizes, absent brand cues to party positions or a low degree of com-
petitiveness with in a system. 
 
Key words: political perceptions, electoral systems, political representation, 
left-right ideology, party competition. 
Introduction 
In the history of modern representative democracy one of the key elements 
has been government by the consent of the people rather than government 
by the people such as in Athenian direct democracy (Manin 1997; 
Schattschneider 1960). Consent by the governed is a central component in 
the mandate model of representative democracy, also known as the respon-
sible party model (RPM). In this model parties are assumed to present pro-
spective policy programs during elections as the basis of the choices voters 
must make. Voters are assumed to vote for the party whose policy program 
is closest to their own views. From this perspective, elections are seen as a 
process of mandate giving. When in government, parties will then strive for 
realizing these policy mandates. Elections should thus function as a mecha-
nism for generating agreement between the opinions of the voters and their 
elected representatives (APSA 1950; Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; 
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Thomassen 1999).87  
Since the degree of accuracy and agreement in voters’ perceptions af-
fects the extent to which voters are meaningfully represented in a represen-
tative democracy, it is essential that voters’ indeed have accurate and 
shared perceptions of parties’ policy positions. Without such agreement or 
accuracy, the individual choices of voters will be indistinguishable from 
random noise. Agreement and accuracy about parties’ policies makes the 
collective outcome of such choices meaningful and, as such, both affect the 
quality of representation (Granberg and Holmberg 1988; van der Brug and 
van der Eijk 1999b). 
Much research has been undertaken on the impact of individual-level 
characteristics on voting behavior and party choice such as socio-economic 
status, education and party identification (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and 
Stokes 1960; Fiorina 1981; Holmberg and Oscarsson 2004). Factors such 
as political knowledge, left-right self placement and whether a voter likes 
or dislikes a specific party has been proven to be influential when it comes 
to political perceptions (Granberg 1993; Granberg and Holmberg 1988; 
Popkin 1991). Perceptions among voters with higher levels of political 
knowledge often are both more accurate and more in agreement (van der 
Brug 1997). However, according to Heider (1946), people are prone to 
maintain cognitive balance, and when placing parties or candidates on 
various scales, individuals in general will tend to place parties or candidates 
that they like close to them selves while those that are disliked will be 
pushed away. This tendency will give rise to perceptual distortions. The 
tendency to ‘push and pull’ candidates or parties - also known as assimila-
tion and contrast effects or simply ‘wishful thinking’ occur due to ego in-
volvement and one’s affective orientation toward parties or candidates 
(Granberg 1993; Granberg and Holmberg 1988). A relevant question that, 
according to Granberg (1993), remains unanswered is whether the percep-
tual process is determined mainly by external stimulus or by internal fea-
tures. In literature on social psychology in general and on perceptions in 
particular, the focus is divided among subjects (those who perceive), objects 
(what is being perceived) and finally the context that envelopes the subjects 
 
 
                                                   
87 The consent of the governed is, however, also a central part of the accountability model of 
representative democracy. Just as in the mandate model, the voters’ preferences are expected 
to influence how they evaluate the policy programs of the parties and are central in the ac-
countability model of voting. The main difference between the two models is that while the 
mandate model is prospective, the accountability model is retrospective in the sense that vot-
ers are assumed to evaluate the parties on their past record rather than their programs for the 
future (Holmberg 2006). 
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and the objects. The order of focus of prior research on these topics has 
been firstly the characteristics of the subjects, secondly the objects and 
thirdly, and to a far more limited extent, the context.  
The present article aims to take a more comprehensive grip of the issue 
and make a simultaneous analysis of the impact on perceptual deviations 
(i.e. the deviation between individual’s placement of parties and the median 
party position made by all voters) of what prior research informs us are the 
most important characteristics related to the subjects (the individual vot-
ers), the objects (the political parties) and the context (in which the former 
two interact).  
This study has two consequent aims. First, is an investigation of how dif-
ferent factors related to both individuals and the political and institutional 
context are affecting the perceptions among voters, or more specifically, the 
perceptual deviations among voters. For example, it is well known today 
that proportional electoral systems tend to promote stronger and more 
ideologically committed parties while majoritarian systems are more candi-
date centered (Holmberg 2006; Sartori 1997). Given these differences and 
that voters are assumed to orientate themselves in the policy space accord-
ing to the ideological positions occupied by the political parties, the accu-
racy and agreement in voters’ perceptions of parties’ positions could be ex-
pected to be higher for voters within proportional electoral systems. Other 
studies suggest that various party characteristics such as party labels (cen-
tre-left etc.) (Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, and Tanenbaum 2001; 
Snyder 2002), divergence in ideological positions (Dahlberg 2009; Dahl-
berg and Oscarsson 2006) and electoral size (Cox 1997; van der Eijk, 
Franklin, and van der Brug 1999) also affect perceptions among voters and 
thereby, voting behavior. Consequently we know that internal features 
among individuals are important for the clarity in voters’ perceptions, but 
what about the effect of externally related factors? Are different contextual 
factors associated with the political parties and is the political and the elec-
toral system also affecting voters’ perceptions by facilitating or motivate 
voters when apprehending political information? 
Secondly, we know from prior research that we can expect a significant 
negative impact on the quality of voters’ perceptions due to affective vari-
ables, such as party sympathy, i.e. whether a voter likes or dislikes a spe-
cific party, or the ideological distance between a voter and parties. We also 
know that the adoption of proportional or majority formulas creates incen-
tives for rational vote-seeking politicians to use bonding or bridging strate-
gies, by emphasizing either programmatic or particularistic benefits during 
the election campaigns (Farrell 1997; Norris 2004). It can thereby be ex-
pected that the political context will influence the affective attachment to 
ideologies or parties displayed by individual voters which in turn will result 
in decreasing or increasing levels of wishful thinking, i.e. a tendency to 
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‘push and pull’ parties. Hypothetically, different institutional arrangements 
can thus, be expected to exaggerate or mitigate the effect of different affec-
tive factors on individuals (i.e. party sympathy or the ideological distance 
between voters and parties) which in turn may affect voters’ perceptual de-
viations (PD).  
 
In conclusion, this article addresses two research questions:  
 
1. How important are factors related to the political parties and the insti-
tutional context compared to individual characteristics in the genera-
tion of voters’ perceptual deviations?  
2. To what extent are differences between individual voters regarding 
‘wishful thinking’ being exaggerated or mitigated by contextual differ-
ences?  
 
The study will be carried out by combining data on individual characteris-
tics with various contextual explanations that can be expected to influence 
voters’ perceptions of party positions, using data from the Comparative 
Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) modules 1 and 2 on both individual vot-
ers and various system characteristics from election surveys in 29 countries. 
The article first discusses some of the basic requirements in the RPM for 
effective representation and the importance of left-right ideology as a cue 
for voters when acquiring information. Next follows a theoretical discus-
sion and a literature overview and then a discussion of data and methodo-
logical considerations. The empirical part of the article is divided into two 
sections, in which the first focuses on the relative strength of each variable 
on voters’ PD and which group/level of variables exerts the greatest impact 
on PD. In the second part the aim is to investigate whether the effect of the 
affective variables related to individuals on PD are interacting with the po-
litical context.  
Effective representation 
From a normative point of view, the responsible party model has been 
criticized often as a populist theory missing essential democratic values 
such as a division of powers and checks and balances. From an empirical 
perspective the model is often said to be unrealistic. However, the merit of 
the model is that it helps to study the actors and the process of political 
representation in a systematic manner. The founding assumptions of the 
model can then be used as benchmarks to evaluate the effectiveness of par-
ticular aspects of a system of political representation (Thomassen 1999).  
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The model can be summarized as: 
 
1. There must be at least two competing parties with different policy 
programs. 
2. The political parties need to be internally cohesive with sufficient 
party discipline so as to be capable of implementing their policy 
programs. 
3. Voters are expected to vote rationally which implies to vote for the 
party whose program is closest to a voter’s own preferences. 
a) Voters need to have policy preferences. 
b) They are aware of the main differences between the policy 
positions of the different parties. 
c) Their perceptions of the parties’ policy positions are ade-
quate and accurate (APSA 1950; Esaiasson and Holmberg 
1996; Thomassen and Schmitt 1997; Schmitt and Thomas-
sen 1999). 
  
Turning to the first element in the model, two or more parties are repre-
sented in most parliamentary democracies through out the world (Dalton 
1985; Granberg 1985; Granberg and Holmberg 1988; Katz and Mair 
1995). There are signs of a tendency for parties becoming more candidate 
centered in recent years but it nonetheless, still is the political parties 
rather than individual candidates that are the main actors in parliaments, 
especially in a European context (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000).88 
Concerning the second element, the RPM has gained empirical support 
in a study by Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge where they investigated 
the relationship between election manifestos and enacted policies. Based on 
ten western countries on a period of 40 years, the results show a clear posi-
tive relationship between what politicians say that they will do and what 
actually transpires. The authors conclude that to a large extent, parties 
keep their election pledges and that parties are the central actors in repre-
 
 
                                                   
88 Unless stated to the contrary, the analyses in this article will therefore focus on 
the perceptions of party positions rather than of individual candidates. The knowledge about 
party positions is, of course, only one type of political information that voters can base their 
decisions on. However, the theoretical implications of this study are equally applicable for 
candidates.  
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sentative political systems (Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994). 
These results gain support also in research on parties’ specific election 
promises. Parties are found to act on most of their election promises in 
most systems investigated (Mansergh and Thomson 2007; Naurin (forth-
coming 2009); Royed 1996). 
In relation to the third element, earlier studies have indicated that voters 
in the main do have preferences and that they vote according to them. To 
be motivated by policy is, however, not enough by itself. Policy voting ac-
cording to the proximity principle (here understood as the subjective 
agreement between a voter’s self-placement on a left-right scale or on other 
alternative dimensions and the position of the party voted for (see Downs 
1957), will only produce meaningful representation if the voters are accu-
rately informed about the political alternatives and that they correctly per-
ceive the parties’ positions (Converse 1975a; Converse 1975b; van der Eijk, 
Franklin, and van der Brug 1999).  
Many scholars have argued that in general, voters do not display a large 
amount of information on matters of political or societal character (Bartels 
1996; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Carpini and Keeter 
1996; Converse 1964; Gordon and Segura 1997; Holmberg and Oscarsson 
2004; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Page and Shapiro 1992; Petersson et al. 
1998). Some authors have argued that due to cognitive limitations and in 
order to save on information costs, voters tend to orientate them selves in 
the policy space on the basis of ideological predispositions and by using 
different cues as information short-cuts. Political cue theory emphasizes 
cognitive information processing and inference where people develop 
schemas as cognitive short cuts in making sense of a complex reality. A 
schema in turn is a more or less integrated set of beliefs and implicit rules 
concerning stimuli. Political parties work in this context as anchors, serving 
cues to voters who are forming political perceptions. In this situation the 
schemas often are strong and well developed (Granberg 1993; Lupia 1998; 
Popkin 1991). Cognitive cues can be used to infer details that lie beyond 
the actual information that is given. Cues therefore are cost-saving and thus 
it is rational for voters to them to inform themselves about general political 
differences between parties (Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich 1984; Gran-
berg and Holmberg 1988).  
The idea that voters use ideologies in order to inform and orient them-
selves in the party space corresponds well to the spatial theory of voting 
introduced by Anthony Downs (1957). In the western countries, left-right 
ideology of the voter is also the single most important predictor behind 
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party choice (van der Eijk, Franklin and van der Brug 1999; Holmberg and 
Oscarsson 2004). Nevertheless, a prerequisite for obtaining any meaningful 
representation is that voters have adequate and accurate perceptions con-
cerning the parties’ policy positions.89 If there is neither agreement nor ac-
curacy in voters’ perceptions, it does not matter how rational the voters are 
behaving or how many election pledges governing parties fulfill: Effective 
representation in terms of policies will still be beyond our grasp.  
Party positions as cognitive cues  
As mentioned earlier, party positions often serve as anchors and at least 
two kinds of party positions can be distinguished by voters: ideological po-
sitions and positions on concrete issues. Ideological positions on a left-right 
dimension have been shown to effectively summarize party policies in gen-
eral and with respect to specific issues and priorities. Voters who use left-
right ideologies as cues to assess parties’ stand points may thus acquire 
adequate perceptions even when direct information concerning the posi-
tions is missing (Downs 1957; Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Holmberg and 
Oscarsson 2004; Thomassen 1999; van der Brug 1997).  
Research has shown that cues have validity and often are highly accu-
rate. It has been proven in several studies that the aggregated mean or me-
dian position when voters place parties or candidates on various scales 
tends to be reasonably accurate when compared to alternative sources of 
the same measure (Granberg 1993; Page 1978; Pennings and Kleinnijenhuis 
2001; van der Brug and van der Eijk 1999b; van der Brug 1997; 1998; 
2001). In a study made by Wouter van der Brug (2001) the perceptions of 
voters in the Netherlands were evaluated against alternative indicators of 
parties’ policy positions such as manifestos, surveys among the member of 
the parliament and roll-calls. The results showed that across six different 
issues, voters’ perceptions of party positions were accurate in general, even 
for the least informed group of voters. A study made by van der Brug and 
van der Eijk concerning the European parliament election in 1994 also con-
firms these results. The research compared the perceptions of voters with 
the perceptions of the members of the European parliament of the party 
policy positions. The results showed that voters’ perceptions were moder-
 
 
                                                   
89 Political perception refers to the process by which people develop impressions of the char-
acteristics and positions of political candidates, parties, and institutions (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, 
and McPhee 1954; Granberg 1993). 
Article 3 – Misperceptions and Effective Representation 
 
 169  
ately to strongly correlated with the parties’ ‘true’ positions. Furthermore, 
the accuracy was considerably higher for left-right positions compared to 
other policy dimensions (van der Brug and van der Eijk 1999b).  
 Several studies have shown that not just accuracy but also agreement 
among voter perceptions are considerably higher on left-right positions of 
parties compared to other issue positions or priorities. The salience of an 
issue also plays an important role as a promoter of perceptual agreement 
and perceptual accuracy (Converse and Presser 1986; Esaiasson and Holm-
berg 1996; van der Brug and van der Eijk 1999b). Voters widely use and 
similarly comprehend the left-right dimension as a cognitive map to order 
parties, particularly in Western Europe (Brug 1999b). Clearly, the left-right 
dimension is not the only or most salient issue-dimension in many countries 
but it is one of the few comparable measurements for belief systems avail-
able and, as seen, it is also considered as one of the most widespread and 
salient issue-dimensions in several political systems (Budge, Robertson, and 
Hearl 1987; Jones 2004; Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994; Knut-
sen 1995; Knutsen 1999; Thomassen 1999; Warwick 2002; Bobbio 1996; 
Dalton 1984; van der Eijk, Franklin, and al. 1996).90 
Given that the mean and/or the median left-right position to a large ex-
tent correctly describes a party’s ‘true’ position, the distribution of voter’s 
placement of the parties on the same dimension is of interest when examin-
ing the issue of perceptual adequacy or accuracy. Reasonably, we can ex-
pect variation in voter placements of a party on a left-right scale, due to 
perceptual distortions and the fact that ideologies are abstract and may 
variably mean different things for different voters. A vaguely defined or 
blurred ideological position or party profile facilitates perceptive distor-
tions, which in turn may obstruct the emergence and formation of public 
opinions (Holmberg, Westerståhl, and Branzén 1977). Vague or ambiguous 
party positions may also invite much higher degrees of wishful thinking 
among the voters as “it is easier to see what you want to see if what you 
look at is a bit fuzzy and far away” (Holmberg 1999b:236-237). 
 
 
                                                   
90 As an example of the salience of the left-right dimension among the countries included in 
this study, appendix I presents the eta-values between left-right self placement and party 
choice.  
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Perceptual deviations among individual voters - a proxy for 
perceptual agreement  
Perceptual agreement has been considered as a necessary, although not a 
sufficient, condition for the electoral process to function successfully as a 
channel of communication and an aggregation of political preferences be-
tween the citizens and the elite. Results from earlier studies have shown 
that perceptual agreement among voters on parties left-right positions var-
ies between countries, between different party families and for different 
clusters of parties depending on where they group on the left-right dimen-
sion (Dahlberg and Oscarsson 2006). Other studies have shown that per-
ceptual agreement among voters is affected indirectly by the electoral con-
text such as the degree of unidimensionality and proportionality within an 
electoral system and directly by the degree of divergence and polarization 
in a party system (see article 1; see also Dahlberg 2005). It has also been 
proven that the agreement among voters on parties’ policy positions tend to 
be influenced by the behavior of individual parties such as their degree of 
stability and the divergence between the parties’ policy positions. A party’s 
electoral size also seems to have a negative relationship with the amount of 
agreement between voters (Dahlberg 2009). 
A high degree of PA among voters does not necessarily mean the exis-
tence of a high degree of perceptual accuracy. A problem related to estab-
lishing perceptual accuracy is to find valid indicators of a party’s true posi-
tion. This is especially a problem in comparative research. However, if as 
pointed out by earlier research (See Granberg 1993; Page 1978; van der 
Brug 1997; 1998; 1999b) we are convinced that the mean and the median 
position of a party mostly depicts a party’s ‘true’ policy position, then the 
degree of perceptual agreement is of interest as well, because it describes 
the adequacy of the perceptions of the parties’ policy positions of a vast 
number of voters. 
Perceptual agreement is mostly operationalized as a measure of disper-
sion (see Granberg & Holmberg 1988; van der Brug 1997; 1999b) and 
therefore it does not inform on the perceptions of individual voters. This 
limitation can be overcome by focusing on the deviation between the me-
dian position of the parties - based on the results from the placement of the 
parties on a left-right scale for the whole electorate - and the placement of 
parties made by individual voters. By focusing on the deviation among in-
dividual voters, we can investigate how different individual related factors 
might give rise to misperceptions among voters concerning the parties’ left-
right positions. Consequently, the focal point of the present study is not 
perceptual accuracy or perceptual agreement per se but rather on the devia-
tions between the placements of parties on a left-right scale made by indi-
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vidual voters, and the median placement of the same parties. Perceptual 
deviation (PD) is the term used from hereon for this measure The depend-
ent variable will thus work as a proxy for perceptual agreement (and to 
some extent also perceptual accuracy) on an individual level. 
Prior research and theoretical expectations 
Causes of misperceptions among individual voters 
Education and age often are stressed as important factors behind voting 
behavior in general and political knowledge or sophistication in particular 
since “everything which is known is known not according to its own power 
but rather according to the capacity of the knower”(Boethius 2002:100 
(524)). The extent of voter knowledge affects which information is used 
when becoming informed about political matters. It has been suggested that 
highly educated voters rely on a wider range of sources of information than 
do less educated voters. However, more education does not necessarily 
mean more factual knowledge as educated voters also are sampling infor-
mation and using various cues. The main difference between voters with 
different levels of education lies instead in that highly educated voters use 
the cues more efficiently (Popkin 1991).  
Political knowledge is also a factor that has proven to affect the percep-
tions among voters (van der Brug 1997). However, political knowledge is 
not obtained exclusively through the content of education. Empirical re-
sults show that in the main, older people know more about politics than do 
those younger (Milner 2002; Popkin 1991). This could be interpreted as a 
process of socializing where a voter with time spent in a society becomes 
more familiar with election procedures, parties and politicians. A compara-
tive study of the effects of education, age and gender on political informa-
tion made by Sören Holmberg and Henrik Oscarsson (2004), indicates that 
older educated men in general tend to be best informed about political mat-
ters.91 The perceptions of the parties’ left-right positions could thus be ex-
pected to be more accurate among such groups of voters.  
However, political ideologies also have both an affective and a cognitive 
 
 
                                                   
91 In the literature of voting behavior it has often been stressed that political interest is an 
important determinant of the degree of political sophistication among voters (Zaller 1992). 
Unfortunately, there is no question evaluating political interest of voters included in the data-
sets. Therefore, education will serve as a proxy for political knowledge or sophistication.  
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component. Most voters can relate cognitively to parties in terms of left 
and right and many can identify simultaneously their own ideological pre-
disposition on the same dimension, which is the affective part.92 According 
to Heider's (1946) balance theory, people are motivated principally to 
maintain cognitive balance. Cognitive balance is the tendency for individu-
als to impose order and structure on the world in a psychological process-
ing of events. Arising from this, when placing parties or candidates on 
various scales individuals will tend to place parties or candidates that they 
like closer to themselves while those that are disliked will be pushed away. 
This tendency to ‘push and pull’ candidates or parties according to likes or 
dislikes is known in social judgment theory as contrast effects and is a form 
of perceptual distortion. This phenomenon – which also is referred to as 
‘wishful thinking’ - is a less formal way to deal with cognitive imbalances. 
A direct consequence of wishful thinking is a subjective interaction between 
self placement and party or candidate placements, which constitutes the 
perceptual distortions. Displacement theory hence emphasizes assimilation 
and contrast and proposes that perceptual distortions occur due to ego in-
volvement and one’s affective orientation toward parties or candidates 
(Granberg 1993; Granberg and Holmberg 1988; Popkin 1991). Earlier 
 
 
                                                   
92 Prior researchers have asserted that an individuals’ self-placement on the left–right dimen-
sion is constituted by three major components, namely the ideological, the partisan and the 
social. The ideological component refers to the link between an individual’s left–right self-
placement and his/her attitude toward the major value conflicts in western democratic sys-
tems such as socioeconomic, religious, or the new politics (Ingelhart and Klingemann 1976; 
Knutsen 1995; 1997). The partisan component implies that a voter may primarily identify 
him/herself with a specific party instead of an ideological position. In such a case a voter 
might derive an ideological label for themselves from the party with which they identify. 
Strictly speaking, the labelling then is not necessarily related to their own issue orientations 
(Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Ingelhart and Klingemann 1976; Knutsen 1997). Finally, the 
social component refers to the citizens’ social identities and their locations in the social struc-
ture in relation to their left–right orientation (Freire 2006; Ingelhart and Klingemann 1976). 
According to Klingemann’s and Ingelhart’s study (1976), the party component has the 
strongest impact on voters’ left-right self-placement, followed by the ideological component. 
This means that for a large number of voters the left-right terminology has a major compo-
nent based on party identification instead of issues or value orientations. However, Knutsen 
(1997) in a more comprehensive study showed that the impact of the party component on 
voters’ left-right self-placement is not as big as Klingemann and Ingelhart suggested. More-
over, Knutsen also found empirically that if a voter's value orientation is set prior to party 
choice, it is value orientation rather than party choice that has the greatest impact on indi-
viduals left-right self-placement in most countries included in his study. A study by van der 
Eijk and Niemöller also shows that voters’ ideological orientations to a large extent are more 
or less independent of their social positions, at least in the case of the Netherlands (van der 
Eijk and Niemöller 1992). 
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studies of voter perceptions have produced results showing that there also 
is a u-shaped relationship between voter self placement and the perceived 
distance of parties in which voters with more extreme self placements tend 
to perceive greater distances between the parties than do centrally located 
voters (Granberg 1993). Despite the large field of research on perceptions 
and misperceptions among individual voters, there still is not much is 
known about various contextual influences on voters’ perceptions. 
Contextual explanations behind perceptual deviations 
Interest in comparative research on voting behavior has exploded during 
the last ten years and rational choice institutionalism has been breaking 
new ground. The advantage of rational choice theories in general is that 
they focus on motivations among individuals, while the sociologically 
rooted models of voting behavior often concentrate more on contextual 
explanations and group characteristics (Johnson, Shively, and Stein 2002).93 
According to rational choice institutionalism, formal or informal institu-
tions create an incentive based structure for bounded rationality (Downs 
1957; Gordon and Segura 1997; Norris 2004). The outcome is thus de-
pendent on a combination of individual preferences and the rules that gov-
ern the game, where the latter are assumed to be exogenous to individual 
behavior (Johnson 2002). Individuals are hence expected to be interacting 
with the contexts.94  
How can contextual factors related to political parties, party systems 
and electoral systems affect individual behavior? A vast field of research 
focuses on various motivational and facilitative determinants behind voting 
behavior (see Franklin 1996; Franklin, van der Eijk, and Oppenhuis 1996 
for a further discussion).95 Research has shown that voters are motivated or 
 
 
                                                   
93 The word rational is here used in the same manner as Downs where a voter is acting ra-
tionally when s/he is comparing different policy alternatives given the information that is 
available and voting for the party or candidate that most closely resembles the voter’s prefer-
ences (Downs 1957). 
94 To assume exogeneity is not unproblematic. As an example, it can be discussed whether it 
is the proportional formula  itself that tends to create more fragmented party systems or do 
divided societies prefer proportional rather than more majoritarian systems (Johnson 2002; 
Norris 2004). 
95 In this respect Franklin makes a division between instrumental motivation, resources and 
mobilization instead of facilitative and motivational factors. Among the factors behind in-
strumental motivation we have contextual explanations such as the degree of proportionality 
in the electoral system. Resources are referred to as mainly being individual characteristics 
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facilitated by a number of individual characteristics such as party identifi-
cation, education, age and sex (Campbell, et al. 1960; Holmberg and 
Oscarsson 2004). We also know that voters are affected by various party 
characteristics such as party size (van der Eijk, Franklin, and van der Brug 
1999), party age (van der Brug, Franklin, Popescu, and Toka 2008) and 
ideological affiliation (Snyder 2002).  
Other studies have shown that different electoral systems affect both 
parties and the party systems (Duverger 1954; Lijphart 1994b; Rae 1967; 
Sartori 1976) but they may also result in different motivations for voters 
(Gordon and Segura 1997; Granberg and Holmberg 1988; Holmberg 
2006). For example, proportional systems are known for producing multi-
party systems with cohesive ideologically committed parties and tend to 
motivate prospective voting according to the RPM. Majority systems on 
the other hand, are known to produce more stable two-party systems 
where votes tend to be retrospectively based according to the accountability 
model (Granberg and Holmberg 1988). Aside of Granberg and Holmberg's 
pioneering work, studies on how different contextual factors may affect 
individual voters are rare. Studies that have investigated the effect of elec-
toral systems on individual voters have mostly focused on effects on elec-
toral turn out (Bingham Powell 1986; van der Eijk, Franklin, and al. 1996), 
satisfaction with the democratic system (Farrell and McAllister 2006; Nor-
ris 2004) or party choice (van der Eijk, Franklin, and van der Brug 1999). 
Less is known about the effect of different contextual factors on voters’ 
perceptions of party positions.  
Different institutional or contextual factors can be expected to have mo-
tivational or/and facilitative effects on the perceptions of individual voters. 
Motivational factors will thus induce voters to obtain information from 
certain directions about the political parties while a facilitative factor will 
simplify this process. Both motivational and facilitative factors can then be 
expected to affect the voters’ perceptions of the party positions in form of 
decreasing perceptual deviations. 
This section will concentrate on contextual factors that are expected to 
have either motivational or facilitative consequences for perceptual devia-
tion among voters. Hypothetically, we believe that factors derived from 
different organizational levels such as systems, parties and individuals will 
have a direct impact on voters’ perceptual deviation and further, that the 
                                                                                                                       
such as education or age. Mobilization in turn is referred to as factors related to the electoral 
campaign such as saliency of different issues etc. (Franklin 1996).  The data on which the 
present study is based unfortunately does not allow us to include any variables relating to 
mobilization, which is why only facilitative and motivational factors will be used. Facilitative 
factors thus refer to the same category of variables as does the term resources. 
Article 3 – Misperceptions and Effective Representation 
 
 175  
effect of the individually related factors might be interacting with the po-
litical context.  
Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical relationship between these three 
classes of independent variables and their expected impact on PD. 
 
Figure 1. The theoretical relationship between individual, party and system-
related factors and voters’ perceptual deviation. 
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The institutional context - electoral systems and party systems 
A common notion within the literature is that the adoption of either pro-
portional- or more majoritarian formulas creates different sets of incentives 
that structures rational vote-seeking politicians to either emphasize pro-
grammatic or particularistic benefits during the election campaigns (Farrell 
1997; Norris 2004). The idea is that the degree of proportionality or the 
size of voting districts affects the degree of national competitiveness, which 
often has dramatic consequences for how parties organize. Large propor-
tional districts tend to correlate with more centralized party organization, 
which in turn should induce more programmatically orientated parties 
(Bingham Powell 1986; Farrell 1996). In this context, one can talk about 
the deployment of bridging or bonding strategies whereby party leaders 
and candidates respectively appeal to either a majority of the voters by 
downplaying ideological differences or specific groups of voters by empha-
sizing ideological differences and positions (Norris 2004).  
Proportional systems with a strong focus on cohesive parties thus may 
correspond better with representation according to the RPM, where voters 
vote prospectively for parties according to their policy preferences. More 
majoritarian systems on the other hand, may contribute to greater strains 
of government accountability and retrospective voting as these systems tend 
to emphasize single candidates and strong governments (Holmberg 2006; 
Sartori 1997). Chin and Taylor-Robinson (2004) have investigated the ef-
fect of electoral rules on voting behavior and showed that voters indeed are 
sensitive to different incentive structures produced by differences in the 
electoral systems. The results from an experimental study showed that, de-
pending on the electoral rules, respondents sought different kinds of infor-
mation. In single member districts, respondents tended to acquire informa-
tion about candidates rather than parties while the opposite was true for 
proportional systems (Chin and Taylor-Robinson 2004). This leads to the 
expectation that the degree of perceptual deviation among voters when 
placing parties on an ideological left-right scale, will be lower among voters 
in more proportional political systems since there we can expect a greater 
focus on political parties and ideologies (among both voters and politi-
cians). 
According to Jacques Thomassen (1999), the effectiveness of the respon-
sible party model is also dependent on the dimensionality within a political 
system. Unidimensional belief systems are desired characteristics of repre-
sentative democracies since political representation may be difficult to ob-
tain if idiosyncratic sets of policy preferences motivate the decisions of vot-
ers. A simple and unidimensional political system however, is not sufficient 
Article 3 – Misperceptions and Effective Representation 
 
 177  
by itself. According to Thomassen, it also needs to resemble a left-right di-
mension. Ideology here constitutes a channel of communication between 
citizens and their elected representatives, where the left-right positions of 
parties work as efficient cognitive cues for voters in search of information 
(see also Dahlberg and Oscarsson 2006).  
Political parties are among the key carriers of continuity, values and ide-
ologies in a representative system (Dalton 1985; Hoffman 2005; Katz and 
Mair 1995). Political parties, rather than single candidates, are also the 
main actors in most modern representative systems (Dalton 1985; Gran-
berg and Holmberg 1988; Katz and Mair 1995). If voters are to be repre-
sented satisfactorily, a ‘breadth of alternatives’ is also an important aspect. 
It has for example been argued that an increase in the number of parties 
leads to a more diverse representation of values (John M. Carey quoted 
from Hoffman 2005), minority groups (Lijphart 1999) and women (Norris 
2004). Predictably, a situation of increased political options should increase 
the motivation of voters to seek information about political parties. A high 
degree of party system fragmentation should also encourage the parties to 
differentiate themselves as much as possible from the competitors in an at-
tempt to mobilize their electoral support (Downs 1957). The effective 
number of competing parties thus may be an important causal force behind 
the deviations in voters' perceptions and thereby also a prerequisite for ef-
fective representation. A greater diversity of choices, can thus be expected 
to elicit a greater motivation from voters and at the same time, it will place 
pressure on the parties to profile themselves more clearly in terms of ideol-
ogy. However, if the number of parties becomes so high that no single 
party is likely to attain a majority of the votes and if a large number of 
smaller parties make up the legislature, then the voters may feel anyhow 
that they are unrepresented (Hoffman 2005); more alternatives then will 
simply raise the information cost. Circumstantially, less can be more while 
more can be too much (see Downs 1957 for a further discussion). Hypo-
thetically, the number of parties will have an effect on perceptual deviation 
among voters, but empirically it remains a question as to exactly how. One 
theoretical answer is that fewer parties facilitate whilst more of them serve 
to motivate.  
Earlier studies have shown that intense competition by parties for the 
‘same’ voters, will affect voters' desire to participate (Franklin, van der 
Eijk, and Oppenhuis 1996). It is expected that party leaders will face incen-
tives to mobilize their voters in situations where voters are likely to distrib-
ute support among a variety of parties. This in turn can be expected to 
both motivate voters and to facilitate their acquiring political information. 
Looking at leadership, a high degree of competition will influence leading 
politicians to lean towards bonding (‘us from them’) strategies. In this re-
spect ideological undertones and statements might be of great importance 
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in an attempt to motivate voters to go to the polls and support their party. 
The use of bonding strategies thus may imply that voters become more af-
fectively linked to the political parties, which will increase the assimilation 
and contrast effects, and thereby the PD as well. However, from a voter 
perspective a high degree of competition among parties may also work to 
facilitate a decrease in voters’ perceptual deviation. If a high degree of party 
competition means that the parties are trying to position themselves as 
clearly as possible from their competitors, then voters may find it easier to 
perceive accurately the positions of parties within these contexts. 
The party related context  
Another criteria asserted by the RPM is that the parties should maintain 
divergent policy positions in order to give meaningful electoral choices to 
the voters. For example, the directional theory of voting assumes that vot-
ers mostly are unable to perceive slight differences in the positions held by 
the parties on different issues. It is expected that parties with well separated 
views or holding an extreme position in an issue dimension will hold an 
advantage over parties with conformist and/or centrist positions because 
they can convey their messages more persistently and with a high visibility 
(Gilljam 1997; Macdonald, Listhaug, and Rabinowitz 1991; Rabinowitz 
and Macdonald 1989; Westholm 1997). As such, there is a better chance of 
the voters correctly apprehending the party’s policy position. 
Prior research established that the electoral size of a party may be a deci-
sive factor in settling a voter’s choice party (Cox 1997; Holmberg 2004; 
van der Eijk, Franklin, and van der Brug 1999). It has also been suggested 
that larger parties present different affective features, often adopting a 
more “catch-all” or vague ideological posture (Dittrich 1983; Kirchheimer 
1990). If bigger parties tend be less distinctive in their ideological positions, 
a party’s electoral size can be expected to have implications for the clarity 
of voters’ perceptions.  
 We also know that parties are more or less attached to different ideo-
logical dimensions (Budge 1994; Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 1987). Since 
the present article focuses upon the left-right dimension it may be a good 
idea to include a variable for different party families in the analysis, so that 
parties or countries that are less attached to this dimension not are dis-
criminated against. It is reasonable that left-right proximity voting would 
be promoted in systems where many of the parties have ideologies that are 
directly connected to the left-right dimension. Parties of those sort often 
have brand names such as ‘social democrat’, ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ that 
unambiguously signal their position on the continuum (Budge et al. 2001). 
It has been demonstrated that these labels sometimes works as cues for vot-
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ers when acquiring information about policies or left-right positions (Sny-
der 2002; Zechmeister 2006) and ideological affiliation thus may guide the 
voters, thereby promoting a lower PD.  
Considering the role of left-right ideology as a guide, one might object 
that the content of dimension has become more heterogeneous during the 
last decades in, at least, several West European countries (Knutsen 1995).96 
With greater complexity, it cannot be taken for granted that newer parties, 
perhaps less attached to the traditional left-right dimension, are being cor-
rectly characterized by voters in terms of the left-right scale. The survival of 
the left-right dimension over the centuries however, is due to its strength as 
an overarching ‘super issue’, capable of incorporating many dimensions of 
political conflict (Holmberg 2009; Knutsen 1995; Thomassen 1999; van 
der Eijk, Schmitt, and Binder 2005). As noted, knowledge about a party’s 
left-right position can be used as a pointer to the party’s stances on other 
issues as well. Of course, a party’s position on a specific issue could inform 
inversely about the position on the left-right dimension but the left-right 
schema works best as a complexity reducing mechanism for understanding 
and interpreting different political matters.  
The left-right grammar has an important orientation function for indi-
viduals and a communicative function for the political system overall 
(Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Knutsen 1995). Since the substantial content 
of the left-right dimension is set in steadily development, newer parties may 
not be discriminated as such. However, it is still reasonable to expect that 
voters in general, may find it easier to place parties on a left-right scale 
where the brand names reveal their positions on the same scale. 
Another factor that may assist voters’ decision making is the age of a 
party since logically it will be easier to know the position of a long estab-
lished party due to the greater exposure time. Newer parties also are more 
likely to repeatedly adjust or change their policies and ideological profiles 
as they attempt to carve a political niche. Such frequent changes in policies, 
identity and location will likely be somewhat confusing for voters (Brug 
2008). Party age can, hence, be thought of as a proxy for stability of ideo-
logical positions. 
 
 
                                                   
96 Sweden is in this aspect an exception where the content of the left-right dimension in all 
essentials not have changed since the mid 70’s and onwards (Oscarsson 2008).  
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Theoretical summary and hypotheses 
The theoretical considerations allow the derivation of a total of 13 vari-
ables relating to the right hand-side of the equation (summarized in table 
1). As mentioned, these variables - expected to influence the perceptions 
among individual voters - can be divided into the two broad and partially 
overlapping classes of facilitative- and motivational factors, in turn split 
into contextual and individual factors.  
 
Table 1. Motivational and facilitative contextual factors. 
  Motivational factors Facilitative factors Affective factors 
Contextual factors     
      System related factors    
  Degree of proportionality Left-right dimensionality  
  
(Effective number of 
parties) 
(Effective number of 
parties)  
  (Competition) (Competition)  
      Party related factors    
   Ideological party family  
   Party age  
   Divergence  
   Party size  
Individual characsteristics    
    
      Individually related factors    
   Education Party sympathy  
   Age  Ideological distance 
            Control        Gender   
Comment: Variables within parentheses are to some extent overlapping and cannot fully be regarded as being either 
facilitative or motivational. 
 
 
Starting with the system related variables, the degree of proportionality and 
the effective number of parties are two variables that have a motivational 
impact on voters when acquiring information. Hypothetically, proportion-
ality affects which kind of information that is acquired (information about 
parties or candidates) and the sense of ‘wasted votes’ while the number of 
parties affects the sense of ‘inclusiveness’ among voters. Left-right dimen-
sionality and the degree of competition on the other hand, are expected to 
have a facilitative effect on voters. The least common denominator in this 
respect is ‘simplicity’ in the party space. It will be easier for voters to per-
ceive the parties’ policy positions in a highly competitive, strongly unidi-
mensional left-right oriented party system. However, these categories over-
lap to some extent and the degree of competition within a system can also 
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be a motivational factor because, from a voter perspective, it may indicate 
the degree of excitement in an election, which is an aspect that has been 
proven to motivate voters to go to the polls (Holmberg 2004) and it will 
also influence leading politicians towards bonding strategies. 
Considering the variables related to the political parties, it can be ex-
pected that voters will find it easier to perceive the position of an old and 
established party of small or medium electoral size and which present di-
vergent policy positions and have a brand name that signals a position on 
the left-right continuum. All these four variables are thus more facilitative 
rather than motivational in effect on voters’ perceptions. It might be ob-
jected that party size could also be a motivational factor since size has a 
proven role in tactical/instrumental voting (Thomassen 1999). However, 
whilst this may be true when it comes to party choice, it does not necessar-
ily need to have anything to do with perceptions in general and voting for 
‘the winner’ is not the same as adequately perceiving a party’s position.  
The individually related variables of age and education are viewed as 
having a facilitative effect since education often means more political 
knowledge.97  The same can be said about age, since older voters often have 
higher degrees of political knowledge or rather, are more familiar with the 
political system. Whether factors such as party sympathy and the ideologi-
cal distance between a voter’s self-placement and the placement of parties 
on the left-right continuum, should be considered facilitative or motiva-
tional in character however, is not clear-cut. Since these two components 
are best described as cognitive factors that are either clearly motivational or 
facilitative, I prefer to label them as affective factors that may influence a 
voter’s perception of the parties’ policy positions, which in turn may affect 
perceptual deviations. 
To recapitulate, the goals of the study are twofold: 
1) Research has shown that most individually related variables do have 
an effect on voters’ perceptions in general but it is not well understood how 
or to what extent different contextually related variables affect the percep-
tions among individual. The aim here is to investigate the effect of contex-
tually related variables on perceptual deviations and to examine which fac-
tors or groups of factors related to either individuals, parties or the elec-
toral/political systems exert the greatest influence on voters’ perceptual de-
viation. We also want to know which mechanisms are mainly at hand: do 
the greatest effects emerge from the facilitative or from the motivationally 
 
 
                                                   
97 It can be questioned whether education is the actual source of political knowledge, how-
ever, education is one of few voter characteristics that can be measured and used for country 
comparative studies, which is why education often functions as a proxy for different levels of 
political sophistication. 
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related variables?  
2) The effect of party sympathy and the distance between a voter’s ideo-
logical self-placement and the placement of the parties are two factors that 
can be described best as affective, (and normatively  less  attractive), fea-
tures that research has shown to have direct negative effect on voters’ per-
ceptual accuracy and agreement. If the existence of adequate and common 
perceptions of parties’ policy positions by the voters is a part of the norma-
tive ideal of representative democracy, then it might be interesting to pay 
further attention to the variables on the individual level that might exert a 
negative impact on voters’ PD. A question then is to what extent the con-
text, i.e. characteristics related to the parties or the systems and interactions 
with it, actually affect individual behavior? Can different contextually re-
lated factors explain differences among voters regarding the tendency to 
yield into wishful thinking? 
We can frame a number of hypotheses in examining these questions. 
Firstly, according to Norris (2004), politicians tend to use bonding or 
bridging strategies depending on the institutional structure. If use of bond-
ing strategies implies that politicians are more ideologically committed and 
polarized in image, this might also mean that voters will be more motivated 
and in turn, more affectively related to the political parties. The latter may 
then increase the effect of the ideological distance and party sympathy vari-
ables on voters’ PD. Thus, the tendency to wishful thinking can hypotheti-
cally, be intensified as a direct consequence of the institutional settings.  
Secondly, an alternative hypothesis that follows Holmberg’s argument, is 
that wishful thinking appears when voters are looking for objects, i.e. par-
ties that are a bit fuzzy and far away (Holmberg 1999). Accordingly, facili-
tative contextual factors may decrease the effect of the affectively related 
variables ideological distance and party sympathy on voters’ PD. Conse-
quently, a clear and simple party space should decrease the tendency to 
wishful thinking.  
The main difference between these two hypotheses is the direction of the 
interaction terms between ideological distance and party sympathy and any 
of the facilitative or motivational related context variables. An increasing 
effect supports the motivational hypothesis and a decreasing effect supports 
the simplicity/facilitative hypothesis. These hypotheses, thus, are different 
sides of the same coin.  
In conclusion: 
a) Motivational contextual factors will increase the effect of the affec-
tively related variables on PD through bonding and bridging.  
b) Facilitative contextual factors will decrease the effect of the affectively 
related variables on PD by ‘clearing the mist’. 
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Empirical operationalizations 
The central variable in this study, perceptual deviation, (PD) is based on a 
well known question where the respondents were asked to place the parties 
on an eleven-point left-right scale reaching from 0-10. The CSES-question 
read: “In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you 
place party A on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means 
the right?”98 The variable is operationalized as the absolute deviation be-
tween an individual’s placements of the parties and the median position of 
the parties on the left-right scale. In some sense one could consider this 
variable as an individual level measure of the degree of accuracy among 
voters. However, accuracy implies some kind of objective measure of the 
parties’ ‘true’ policy positions, which as mentioned seldom is available in 
comparative research. Even though earlier studies have shown that the me-
dian or the mean position among voters mostly correctly describes the par-
ties ‘true’ positions (Granberg 1993; Page 1978; van der Brug 1997; 1998; 
1999b; 2001), it cannot be asserted that the voters’ collective perceptions 
always are correct. Thus, the dependent variable is defined here as the per-
ceptual deviation between individuals’ placement of the parties and the 
median placement of the parties made by all voters as a collective. Hence, 
large deviations are bad whilst small deviations are good for effective rep-
resentation. 
Operationalizations of individually related variables 
Party sympathy is a variable ranging from 0 to 10 based on a question 
about party evaluation among voters. The question read: “I’d like to know 
what you think about each of our political parties. After I read the name of 
a political party, please rate it on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you 
strongly dislike that party and 10 means that you strongly like that party“. 
Ideological distance is coded as the absolute deviation between an individ-
ual’s placement of parties on an eleven point left-right scale in each country 
and the individual’s self-placement on the same scale. Age is coded as one 
of 7 intervals such as: (-22, 23-30, 31-40, 41-50, 51-60, 61-70, 71-) see 
Holmberg and Oscarsson (2004) for a similar categorization. Gender is 
coded as a dummy where 0 is women and 1 is indicating men. Education is 
based on the original variable in the CSES-modules and contains of eight 
categories which are labeled as: 1 "none", 2 "incomplete primary", 3 
 
 
                                                   
98 In the Netherlands, a ten-point scale 1-10 was used instead of an eleven-point scale for the 
elections of 2002 and 2003.  
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"primary completed", 4 "incomplete secondary", 5 "secondary com-
pleted", 6 "post-secondary", 7 "university undergrad incomplete", 8 "uni-
versity undergrad - completed".    
Operationalizations of party related variables 
Ideological party family enter as a dummy variable in the model where 
communist, socialist, social democratic, left, liberal and right liberal, and 
conservative parties, which all are party families that reasonably belongs to 
the traditional left-right distinction (Ware 1996), have been coded as one 
and all other party families as zero.99 In order to compare the effect of older 
versus newer parties the variable party age is coded as a dummy. The divi-
sion is based on the percentile values where 0 indicates all parties up to the 
25:th percentile, covering parties of 0 to 17 years of age, while all other 
parties are coded as 1.100 The size of a party is simply the vote shares (per-
centages) for each party. Turning to divergence this variable has been 
measured as the distances to all other parties, weighted by the size of each 
of the other parties (in proportions of votes). The divergence measure can 
more formally be expressed as: 
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where pi is the left-right position of party i, based on the interpolated me-
dian, pj the corresponding measure for party j, and sj the vote-share of 
party j. When weighting the distances in this way, one does not have to 
divide by the number of parties because when weighting them by the pro-
portion of votes, it is already a weighted average. One should, however, 
correct for the fact that the total size of the other parties differs across par-
 
 
                                                   
99 The party families, as defined by the collaborators of the CSES project, are: 01 Ecology 
Parties, 02 Communist Parties, 03 Socialist Parties, 04 Social Democratic Parties, 05 Left 
Liberal parties, 06 Liberal Parties, 07 Right Liberal Parties, 08 Christian Democratic Parties, 
09 Conservative Parties, 10 National Parties, 11 Agrarian Parties, 12 Ethnic Parties, 13 Re-
gional Parties, 14 Religious Parties, 15 Independent Parties and 16 Other. 
100 The reason for recoding this variable into a dummy-variable is that we are mainly inter-
ested in comparing the differences between newer versus older parties. At the same time as 
one cannot expect the relationship between party age and PD to be linear, i.e. that PD will be 
decreasing for every step of party age since there, reasonably, not are any major differences 
between a party established in 1917 and a party established in 1882.  
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ties and countries. 
Operationalizations of system related variables 
A multiple unidimensional unfolding procedure has been conducted in or-
der to obtain a measure for the degree of unidimensionality. The unfolding 
procedure tries all possible orderings of the parties and selects the unfold-
ing model that best fits the data.101 The measure of fit for the unfolding 
model, the coefficient of scalability (Loevinger’s H), varies from 0 to 1 and 
tells us to what extent voters’ preference orderings of parties are in agree-
ment with a perfect unfolding model. For any given set of party prefer-
ences, there is often more than one plausible solution to the unidimensional 
unfolding problem. The guiding principle in this iterative search is that 
each unfolding scale should, if possible, include all main parties. The re-
vealed unidimensional scale should hence be common to as a large propor-
tion of voters as possible. Plausible models where all the large parties are 
included have thus been selected over models with better fit where any of 
the relevant parties are left out. For the unfolding analysis an evaluative 
measure has been used where the respondents were asked to rate the parties 
in terms of “like-dislike party a-i” which is an eleven degree scale, varying 
from 0-10. 
However, The unfolding procedure itself does not tell anything about 
the content of the dimension as it only produces an ordering of parties 
along a dimension (a so called qualitative j-scale), i.e. the ordering that fit 
best to the original like-dislike data. One way to solve this problem is to 
validate the ordering of the parties in the unfolded j-scale with external 
data, such as the respondents’ mean placements of the parties along a left-
right scale. The higher correlation between the j-scale ordering of parties 
and an order based on the parties mean left-right positions, the higher is 
the probability that left-right ideology actually is the latent principle that 
produced the structure of political preferences in the first place. For this 
purpose Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient has been used (Spearman’s 
Rho). A simple measure on the degree of left-right unidimensionality within 
a polity has then been created by multiplying Loevingers’s H coefficients 
with the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients.  
In an attempt to limit the empirical model a measure for disproportion-
ality will be used as a summarized measure on the differences between dif-
ferent electoral systems. The district magnitude, the electoral threshold, the 
 
 
                                                   
101 An H coefficient smaller than .30 indicates that the structure in the data is insufficient for 
the justification of using individual items as indicators of a single latent dimension (van 
Schuur and Post 1990). Mudfold is distributed by ProGAMMA, P.O. Box 841, 9700 AV 
Groeningen, The Netherlands.   
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assembly size and the electoral formula do all influences the degree of pro-
portionality within a political system. Proportionality is higher in large dis-
tricts with low thresholds and large assemblies using the Hare formula and 
together, these four factors explain about two thirds of the variance in pro-
portionality (Lijphart 1994a). The degree of proportionality, or rather dis-
proportionality, in a political system is hence calculated according to Gal-
lagher’s least-square index (Gallagher 1991) such as: 
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Where v is the vote-share and s is the seat-share for partyi .
102  
The number of parties is measured as the effective number of parliamen-
tary parties for each country, calculated by the vote-shares using the index 
of Laakso and Taagepera, also known as Herfindahl’s index of concentra-
tion (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) as that: 
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where pi is the population proportion for group i of votes and where 1/H 
then is the effective number of parties.  
Competition is an additive index based on the questions “like-dislike 
party a-i”. If a voter has given a party a score of 6 or higher the variable is 
coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. The variables are then added together into one 
single variable with a maximum value of 9 in the case where a voter prefers 
all parties. The variable is supposed to be a proxy for the degree of com-
petitiveness within a political system, i.e. the degree of how much parties 
must compete for the same votes. If a voter likes several parties it can be 
expected that s/he also may consider voting for some of these parties. 
 
 
                                                   
102 The reason for using this method instead of the index of Rae or Loosemore and Haneby is 
that while the former tend to understate the disproportionality in systems with a large 
amount of small parties the latter tend to exaggerate the disporportionality in such systems. 
Gallagher’s index weights the deviations by their own values, which makes it registering a 
few large deviations more strongly than several small changes. In this sense Gallagher’s index 
takes the middle course between Rae and Loosemore and Haneby (Anckar 2002; Lijphart 
1994b).  
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Data and research design 
The analysis is, as mentioned, based on data from Comparative Study of 
Electoral Systems (CSES) module 1 and 2, which were collected in 1996-
2001 and 2001-2004 respectively, in post election surveys in 32 countries. 
The dataset is covering totally 63 elections with 396 political parties and 
56 067 respondents represented (for more information, see appendix I).103 
Countries where relevant data on left-right positions is missing has, for ob-
vious reasons, been excluded from the analysis. All “don’t know” answers 
have been coded as missing since we do not have enough information to 
treat them as an incorrect answer. Also countries that are not reckoned to 
be free according to the Freedom House index, such as Russia, Ukraine and 
Hong-Kong, have been left out.104 In total 29 unique countries in 48 elec-
tions are included in this study.  
The most straight forward way to study the impact of different contex-
tually related variables on voters’ perceptual deviations is to do single 
country comparisons. However, since we are interested in the effect of 
various contextual features on perceptual deviation the data has to be 
pooled into one single data set. An OLS-regression with individual voters 
as the unit of analysis will thus not make it possible to investigate the effect 
of different party characteristics on voters’ perceptual deviations. Therefore 
a procedure of ‘stacking’ the data set (see Franklin, van der Eijk, and Op-
penhuis 1996) has been performed. The data has thereby been converted 
into a set with a new unit of analyses that is party-voter dyads, where it in 
each polity will be as many party-voter dyads as there are respondents 
times the number of parties.  
However, as we are dealing with variables on different levels (i.e. con-
textual variables related to electoral systems/party systems and characteris-
tics of different parties versus voter characteristics), one needs to regard the 
contextual dependency. In country comparative studies on individual voters 
the voters are clustered within countries and individuals from the same 
country do often share common experiences, which make them more simi-
lar compared to voters from other countries.  
In recent years there has been a growing interest in various multilevel 
methods among political scientists since multilevel models capture this kind 
of country variation by reparameterizing the intercepts and the coefficients 
 
 
                                                   
103 The data can be received from CSES Secretariat, www.cses.org, Centre for Political Studies. 
Institute for Social Research. The University of Michigan. The data can also be downloaded 
from: www.umich.edu/~cses. 
104 ‘Freedom in the world 2006. ‘Selected data from freedom house’s annual global survey of 
political rights and civil liberties’. www.freedomhouse.org. 
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of ordinary regression models into country level equations. Hence, multi-
level models allow us to test how well models explain not only variation 
among individuals as in ordinary regression but also country differences, 
both in the dependent variables and in the effects of individual-level vari-
ables. (Hox 2002; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2005; Snijders 1999).  
Nevertheless, multilevel models are far from the final solution to the 
problems connected to nested data structures. The main problem with most 
statistical multilevel models is that they are based on the assumption that 
data on all levels are drawn from a successive sampling from each level of a 
hierarchical population (Hox 2002; Kreft and De Leeuw 1998). This crite-
rion is seldom met in comparative political science. However, with the kind 
of data used in this study, the ‘pros’ exceeds the ‘cons’ for using a multi-
level regression model instead of the more traditional OLS regression 
model. The main argument is that ordinary regressions tend to give biased 
estimates and underestimated standard errors for clustered data at the indi-
vidual level in situations where the ‘intra-class correlation’ is positive (i.e. 
where cases from a specific context are more similar to each other than to 
cases from other contexts). Ordinary regression assumes that all cases from 
one context are unique and independent, which they in reality seldom are. 
Especially not in the case with ‘stacked’ data matrixes where the observa-
tions not only are ‘similar’ but also ‘duplicates’ of each other. This leads to 
an underestimation of standard errors due to an overestimation of the ex-
tent of independent information contained in the data. Multilevel models, 
on the other hand, incorporates contextual dependencies into its very de-
sign and will therefore provide more accurate coefficients, standard errors 
and significance tests (Hox 2002; Snijders 1999). By controlling for the 
election waves (i.e. repeated cross section observations for some countries) 
we neither need to consider the fact that the design of the CSES study im-
plies that some countries are represented up to three times while other 
countries only are represented once.105  
A common procedure in comparative studies of voters in different coun-
tries is to let the intercept varies between countries, a so called random in-
tercept model with fixed coefficients. Thereby the dependency between 
countries is taken into account. However, a stacked data set such as in this 
study, does imply that there also is a dependency among specific individu-
 
 
                                                   
105 Since the analyses sets out to investigate the impact of contextually related factors on vot-
ers’ perceptual deviations such a design would, without the inclusion of any weights or by 
not controlling for the election waves, in practice implies that the computer treats them as 
individual and unique country observations. This in turn may result in an overestimation of 
the significance of the effects of the system related variables, especially since most countries 
that do appear several times in the data are West European countries with proportional mul-
tiparty systems. 
Article 3 – Misperceptions and Effective Representation 
 
 189  
als since they appear as many times as there are parties in each country. I 
argue that this form of dependency among specific individuals is a more 
severe violation of the statistical assumptions than the contextual depend-
ency. For this reason the intercepts are set to vary both among individuals 
and countries.  
The analyses in this article is hence made as three-level models with 
party-voter dyads at the first level, individual voters at the second level 
while the system related variables are being treated as level three variables. 
An objection against this design could be that the variables theoretically are 
referred to as being located at four different levels (systems, parties, voters 
and voter/party dyads) and that the empirical models therefore should be 
designed accordingly. The system related variables are (practically) con-
stants in each country while the party related variables are varying to some 
extent. However, individuals are nested with countries and in this data also 
with each other due to the stacked data matrix (i.e. each voter appears as 
many times as there are parties in each country). To also assume that they 
are nested with parties is, however, a more doubtful assumption that does 
not resembles the classical example of multilevel data-structures such as 
students nested with classes, nested with schools, nested in regions etc. For 
this reason, only the within individuals and within country similarities are 
taken into consideration. 
Results 
The first column in table 2 shows the bivariate effect of each variable on 
voters’ perceptual deviation (PD) followed by seven different regression 
models. The 1:st regression model reveals the effect of the individually re-
lated variables on voters’ perceptual deviation. The 2:nd model includes the 
party related variables showing the effect of the individually related vari-
ables under control for the party related variables. The 3:rd model shows 
the effect of the individually related and system related variables on PD. 
The 4:th model only contains the effect of the party related variables while 
the 5:th model shows the effect of both party- and system related variables 
on voters’ PD. The 6:th model shows the independent effect of the system 
related variables on PD while the last and 7:th model is the full model 
where all variables from all levels are included.  
By comparing the effects for different groups of variables that also are 
referring to different levels with each other, as in these seven models, we 
will not only have the opportunity to compare the effects of different vari-
ables and sets of variables on PD, but we will also have the opportunity to 
compare the amount of explained variance between the models. Thereby 
we can investigate which of these groups of variables that explains most of 
the variance in PD.  
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The first model shows that the distance between a voter’s self-placement 
and the position of the parties (ideological distance) has a strong positive 
and significant effect on voters’ perceptual deviations (.056***), just as 
expected from Granberg’s (1993) study. Among the significant negative 
effects we find gender (-.076***) and education (-.058***), which means 
that more educated male voters tend to deviate less from the median posi-
tion compared to less educated female voters.106 The results from the 1:st 
model concerning the individually related variables do not change much in 
the 2:nd model that includes the party characteristics. The electoral size of 
a party has the greatest positive impact on PD (.012***) among the party 
related variables, which means greater perceptual deviations in the case of 
bigger parties. A tendency for voters to struggle to apprehend the positions 
of bigger parties is well in line with the expectations from the ‘catch-all’ 
party theory (Kirchheimer 1990). We find divergence in party positions (-
.288***) and ideological family belonging (-.037***) among the factors 
that are negatively related to PD. Divergent policy positions among the par-
ties seems to facilitate impact on voters’ perceptions of the parties’ policy 
positions. The significant impact of a party’s ideological family member-
ship indicates that voters seem to find it easier to perceive the positions of 
parties that belong to party families that are more closely attached to the 
left-right dimension. It was expected theoretically that parties that are 
closely attached to the left-right dimension would have brand names that 
signal their position on the continuum (Budge et al. 2001), and that these 
labels may work as cues for voters when acquiring information about par-
ties’ left-right positions (Snyder 2002; Zechmeister 2006). 
Turning to the 3:rd model where the system related variables also are in-
cluded, the effect of the individually related variables are considerably ro-
bust. Among the system related variables only one yields a significant effect 
on voters’ perceptual deviation, namely the degree of competition within a 
party system, which seems to have a negative effect on voters’ PD (-
.008***). In the 4:th model, where only the party related characteristics are 
included, the effects are highly similar to those in the 2:nd model where the 
individually related variables also were included together with the party 
related variables. The main difference is that the effects of party size and of 
divergence in a party’s left-right position are decreasing (from .012*** to 
.007**) and (from .288*** to .198**) respectively, the effect of ideological 
family is considerably robust. In the 5:th model that investigated the impact 
 
 
                                                   
106 An alternative variable for age (age*age) has also been tested in all the models in case of 
any curve-linear relationships between age and PD but without any significant effect. 
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of the party related variables are under control for the system related vari-
ables and vice versa, the effect of party size, ideological family and diver-
gence is almost identical with that in the former model. The effects are also 
highly similar among the system related factors compared to the effects in 
the 3:rd model. In the 6:th model where only the system related variables 
are included the results resemble the effects that were found in the 3:rd 
model, except for a slight increase in the effect of competition. It would 
seems that it is the degree of competition within a system that has the 
greatest significant impact on voters’ PD (-.013***).  
All variables from all levels are included in the regression in the final 
model. In general, the results from the earlier models are robust and with 
few exceptions, the same variables from all groups and levels still have a 
significant effect on PD. The effect of the individually related variables, un-
der control for party and system related variables, are almost the same 
through all four models. The distance between a voter's self-placement and 
the position of the parties has the strongest positive effect on voters’ PD 
(.061***).107 Among the negative effects on voters’ PD, gender and educa-
tion are still significant with coefficients of (-.075***) and (-.058***), al-
most the same as in the 1:st model.108 Among the party related variables, 
the effects are effectively the same when comparing the 4:th where only the 
party related variables were included, and preceding models. In the final 
and full model, the effect of party size and divergence in a party’s left-right 
position is (.012***) and (-.288***) respectively and ideological family is 
 
 
                                                   
107 In table 2, the variable of ideological distance is operationalized as the perceived distance 
between a voter and each party. The 7:th model was, however, also run with a different op-
erationalization of ideological distance such as the actual distance, which is the distance be-
tween a voter and the parties’ median positions. In the model the effect of the actual distance 
(-.013***) was somewhat lower than the perceived distance (-.066***), which is an interest-
ing result in it self which supports Granbergs findings on assimilation and contrast effects 
(Granberg 1993).  
108 It has in earlier research been suggested that people who are strong partisans tend to 
spread the parties more widely than non-partisans in their placements of the parties (Gran-
berg 1993). A variable for party identification has therefore been included in all models but it 
did not have a significant impact on PD and it did not affect the other variables included in 
the models as well, why it was excluded from the analysis. The main theoretical reason for 
not including it from the very beginning is that I find the concept of party identification to be 
a bit dubious. What is it in identification that affects a voter’s placement of parties? Most 
likely a party identified voter likes the party he/she identify with more than other parties and 
he/she is probably ideologically more close to that party as well. The fact that party identifi-
cation not has any impact on the models does also support this argument. It should also be 
mentioned that sector employment also has been included in the models but with similar 
results as party identification. 
Article 3 – Misperceptions and Effective Representation 
 
 194  
(-.038***). Regarding the system related variables the results are also con-
siderably robust. The degree of competition within a system still has a sig-
nificant impact on voters’ PD (-.006*), but is somewhat lower compared to 
the effect of competition in the other three models where the system related 
variables were included.109  
In conclusion, the effect of the significant individually related variables 
(ideological distance, gender and education) is robust in all four models. 
The effect of the party related variables (party size, ideological family and 
divergence) is also relatively stable in all the models as is the effect of the 
system related variables, where the degree of competition also yields a 
highly similar result in all four models.110 Clearly, the distance between a 
voter’s self-placement and the position of the parties together with the par-
ties’ electoral size tends to generate greater perceptual deviations among 
voters. On the other hand, the perceptual deviations tend to be lower 
among highly educated men and for parties belonging to left-right related 
party families as well as for divergent policy positions in competitive party 
systems. 
Which factors have the greatest impact on voters’ perceptual devia-
tions? 
The effects cannot yet be compared with each other since the variables are 
measured at different scales, something that makes the interpretation of the 
substantial effects of different variables on PD more difficult. A simple pro-
cedure to mitigate this problem is to compare the effect in the dependent 
variable caused by a certain amount of change in the independent variables. 
 
 
                                                   
109 In order to control for whether the effect of too many effective number of parties may have 
a negative impact on PD, a dummy-variable was included in all the models. The variable was 
coded as 0 if the number of parties goes from < 3.73 and 1 if the number of parties goes from 
3.73 <. The number 3.73 is the mean effective number of parties among the countries. How-
ever, the variable only had a small insignificant effect and it did not improve the model as 
such, why it was excluded from the analysis. 
110 According to Franklin et al. different compositions of the electorates may also affect the 
behavior among voters. The idea is that people tend to interact with their social context, i.e. 
the character of the society they live in, so that individuals in certain contexts are more alike 
than individuals from other contexts. These factors are mainly aggregated versions of differ-
ent individual level variables such as education and age (Franklin, van der Eijk, and Oppen-
huis 1996). All models were therefore run with compositional individual level variables, age 
and education, included but none of the variables did have significant impact on PD in any of 
the models and they did not affect the other variables included in the model either and was 
therefore excluded. 
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The effects can then be interpreted as the average effect in PD caused by 
each variable when moving from its lowest to highest value, under control 
for all other variables included in the model.111 However, in this study the 
dependent variable PD was transformed by the natural logarithm due to its 
skewed distribution, which also makes it more difficult to grasp the sub-
stantial effect of each variable on PD.112 An advantage of the natural loga-
rithm is that it is the inverse of the exponential function. By transforming 
the effects from the full model by the exponential, the effects can almost be 
directly translated into the substantial changes in voters’ PD, in terms of 
the average change in PD caused by a certain variable. The reason for this 
is that the anti-logs of the means from the logged data are the geometric 
means, which when data is positively skewed, are invariably less than the 
arithmetic mean. However, the geometric mean is often a good estimate of 
the median in the original data and if the log-transformation makes the 
original data symmetric, which approximately is the case in this study (see 
appendix II), then the population mean and median are the same as in the 
logarithmized-scale, and vice versa. Nevertheless, the difference between 
logs is the log of the ratio. This implies that the effects should not be 
thought of as an increase or a decrease in the dependent variable caused by 
an independent variable, such as in ordinary regression. Instead the anti-
logarithms indicates how much the geometric mean in PD is changed by a 
certain change in an independent variable in terms of ‘times as much’. For 
example, the geometric mean or the median of PD is approximately chang-
ing x-times as much when moving from the lowest to the highest value of a 
certain variable (see Dallal 2000).  
 
 
 
                                                   
111 An alternative, and probably more often used, procedure is to display standardized beta 
coefficients. However, standardizations gives at best an approximation of the relative weight 
of the independent variables, all other variables held constant, when explaining the variation 
in the dependent variable (Andrews, Morgan, Klem, and Sonquist 1973).  
112 As the OLS-regression assumes linearity, the f-tests and t-tools assume a constant error 
variance. Hence, these methods work best with symmetric, roughly normal data distribu-
tions. Thus, it is often better to analyze transformed data values rather than raw data when 
variables are skewed. Different (log/power) transformations are often useful for correcting 
problems with skewed data, outliers, and unequal variation. There are different tools at hand 
for transforming a variable where the most common procedures are: y=ex, √e ln(e) or lg(e). 
Which transformation that is being used is often of less importance since this rather is a mat-
ter of scale selection. The effect then is that the log function squeezes the large values in the 
data together and stretches the small values apart, while squaring a variable does the oppo-
site. As the dependent variable, PD, has a rather skewed distribution (see appendix II), it has 
been transformed by the natural logarithm (Hamilton 1992; Sydsaeter 1995).  
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Table 3. The average effect caused of each variable on PD, under control 
for all other variables, in the seventh model, when moving from the lowest 
to the highest theoretical value of each variable.  
Variabel Min Max Length of scale b Total change Total change exp() 
Individually related factors       
Like-dislike (0-1) 0 1 1 .001 .001 1.001 
Left-right distance 0 10 10 .061 .549 1.732*** 
Age 1 7 6 -.001 -.006 -1.006 
Gender 0 1 1 -.075 -.075 -1.078*** 
Education 1 8 7 -.058 -.406 -1.501*** 
Party related factors       
Party age (0-1) 0 1 1 .007 .007 1.007 
Ideological family (0-1) 0 1 1 -.038 -.038 -1.039*** 
Vote share 0 50 49 .012 .588 1.800*** 
Divergency 0 3 3 -.288 -.864 -2.373*** 
System related factors       
Left-right rho 0 10 9 -.009 -.090 -1.094 
Disproportionality 0 25 24 .010 .240 1.271 
Effective # of parties 1 9 8 .021 .168 1.183 
Competition 0 9 9 -.006 -.048 -1.049* 
Intercept - - - .185 - 1.203 
Comment: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  The coefficients are taken from the full model in the eight column in table 2. 
 
 
Turning to the effect of the individually related variables in table 3, it is 
clearly the perceived ideological distance between a voter’s own position 
and the position of the parties that has the largest influence on voters’ PD 
(1.732***). Translated into real changes in PD, this effect implies that 
when moving from the lowest to the highest theoretical value of this vari-
able, the predicted geometric mean or median change (in the distance be-
tween a voter's placement of a party and the median position for a specific 
party) is increasing 1.732 times as much compared to the effect of a party 
with shortest distance; that is almost one unit on the scale stretching from 
zero to eleven. This result strengthens the belief that ‘push and pull’ effects 
grow stronger with an increase in perceived distance between a voter and a 
specific party, no matter the kind of party or political system. Among the 
negative effects on PD, education exerts the greatest impact (-1.501***), 
which means that geometric mean distance value decreases -1.501 times 
when moving the lowest to the highest value of this variable. This trans-
lates to approximately .3 steps on the scale compared to the base model, 
where the geometric mean and median in PD is 1.203. Just as expected, the 
predicted levels of PD decrease when education increases or when moving 
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from women to men (-1.078***). Besides that the effect of age is not being 
significant, the results resemble those of Holmberg and Oscarsson (2004) 
to the effect that the degrees of political knowledge or sophistication in 
general is higher among educated men, which in turn should generate lower 
degrees of PD. The most interesting result is thus the effect of ideological 
distance between voters and parties. As earlier discussed, ideologies have 
both a cognitive and an affective part. A consequence of the latter is that 
voters tend to strive for cognitive balance, placing parties they like closer to 
their own position and ‘pushing’ parties they don’t like further away than 
they are in reality. These results reported here thus support earlier findings 
in this field.  
Among the party related factors it is divergence in a party’s left-right po-
sition that has the greatest significant negative influence on voters PD (-
2.373***), while the electoral size of a party has the strongest positive im-
pact (1.800***). This means that the distance on average is decreasing ap-
proximately 2.4 times as much when moving from the lowest to the highest 
value of the variable divergence and increasing approximately 1.8 times as 
much when moving from the smallest to the biggest party. Compared to 
the base model, where the geometric mean and median in PD is 1.203, 
these effects can then be thought of as a decrease in the distance between a 
voter’s party placement and the median placement by approximately 1.4 
steps on the scale due to divergence and an increase of approximately .8 
due to party size.  
Obviously, Kircheimer’s idea of vague ideologies as characteristic of big 
‘catch all’ parties gains empirical support since the predicted values in PD 
tend to covary with the size of a party. It is reasonable that bigger parties 
have more diverse interests and interest groups to consider and this is why 
they downplay the role of ideologies and promote broader issues that ap-
peal to wider spectrum of voters. The most important aspect among parties 
is thus the degree of divergence in their positions. The more divergent a 
party is in its left-right position the lower is the predicted value of PD 
among voters. It appears that voters find it easier to perceive the positions 
of parties that have some positional distance to their competition.  
Turning to the system related variables it is only the degree of competi-
tion that has a significant effect on voters’ PD, (-1.049*). Briefly, the dis-
tance between voters’ placement of the parties and the median positions on 
average decreases 1.049 times when moving from the least to the most 
competitive system, which in turn means just a very slight decrease by ap-
proximately .05 scale step. Even though the effect is rather small, more 
competitive party systems do seem to encourage party representatives to 
profile a party’s position more clearly in terms of ideology. It will reasona-
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bly also become more important to emphasize the differences between the 
parties in competitive systems where voters are more likely to find several 
parties attractive.  
Table 3 shows clearly that the system related variables had the lowest ef-
fect on voters’ PD while the party, and the individually related variables 
exerted the greatest impact. Three out of four of the party- related variables 
were significantly different from zero, while three out of five of the indi-
vidually related variables had a significant impact. Therefore the party re-
lated variables – specifically the degrees of divergence in a party’s position 
followed by party size and then the individually related variables – seem to 
be of greatest importance for voters’ PD.  
The amount of explained variance and the intercept variation can be 
particularly useful in an attempt to more formally compare the models. The 
estimates in table 2, showing the random part of the equations, reveal a 
significant intercept variation in all seven models at all three levels of 
analysis. Approximately 63 percent of the variation through all models is 
related to factors at the voter-party dyad level followed by individual level 
factors at 23 percent of the variation. However, there is also a significant 
intercept variation across countries of around 14 percent that should not be 
ignored. Since all three levels contribute significantly to the variation in PD, 
a three level multilevel model is necessary in order to avoid biased coeffi-
cients and standard errors that are too small (Hox 2002; Snijders 1999).113 
A comparison between model 1, where the individually related variables 
are included, and the empty base model (indicated by a + in the first col-
umn in table 2) indicates a drop in intercept standard deviation from 
(.392***) to (.361***) between voters at level 2. The explained level 2 
variation is, however, relatively low in all models (which often is the case in 
comparative studies on individual voting behavior (see fc Eijk 1996; Holm-
berg 2004; Norris 2004) and reaches its highest value - on average about 
15 percent - in the models where the individually related factors are in-
cluded. This result is not surprising since the individually related variables 
are the only variables that really should add something to the within-
country variance. This effect does, however, indicate that the individually 
 
 
                                                   
113 The fact that the estimated random intercept standard deviation in general are considera-
bly higher for the random intercept within and among individuals compared to the random 
intercept between the countries, strengthens our concerns about that the dependency among 
specific individuals are more sever for the violation of the regression assumptions than the 
dependency between individuals in each country. 
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related variables are important in explaining variation across individuals.114 
Considering the rather modest amount of between-country variance ex-
plained at level 3, the results indicate that the intercept standard deviation 
decreases somewhat when the party and the system related variables are 
included in the 4:th and the 6:th models (.244*** and .236*** respec-
tively) compared to the results in the base model (.249***). These values 
translate to an R2 of 4 and 10 percent respectively. The intercept standard 
deviation decreases even further when the party related variables are in-
cluded together with the system related variables in model 5 (.232***). The 
lowest significant intercept standard deviation is, however, to be found in 
the 7:th model (.228***), which equals an R2 of 16 percent.  
A comparison between the 7:th and the 3:rd models indicate that the 
party related variables account for an increase in the amount of explained 
variance in the average PD between the countries of approximately 10 per-
centage points, while a comparison between the 7:th and the 2:nd models 
indicate that the system related variables contribute to an increase in the 
amount of explained variance of approximately 7 percentage points.  
The contextually related variables connected to the parties thereby seem 
to be of somewhat greater importance, compared to the system related fac-
tors, when it comes to explaining the between country differences in the 
average PD among voters. In model 6 the system related variables do how-
ever, contribute to the amount of explained between country variance with 
an R2 of around 10 percent. Nevertheless, a significant residual country 
variation is evident in the intercepts through all models, in spite of the in-
clusion of the contextually related variables, which indicates that more re-
search is needed concerning the impact of system related factors on voters’ 
PD.115 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
114 The amount of explained variance is an approximation and is calculated as (unrestricted 
error – restricted error) / unrestricted error), where the unrestricted errors refers to the base-
model where no independent variables are included (see Kreft and De Leeuw 1998). 
115 On the other hand, a more skeptical interpretation of the results could hold that the system 
related factors suffer in terms of operationalizations compared to the other two classes of 
variables included in the study. 
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Potential differences in the effects of the individual variables of af-
fective character on voters’ perceptual deviation 
The second research question of this article aims to investigate to what ex-
tent the context, i.e. characteristics related to the parties or the systems, 
affect or interact with individual behavior in shaping PD by introducing a 
set of interaction terms. Previous research pointed out that we can expect a 
significant relationship between party sympathy and ideological distance on 
PD. The results so far have, however, not given any empirical support for 
an effect of voter sympathy on a voter’s PD but we have found an impor-
tant and significant effect of the ideological distance between voters and the 
parties on voters’ PD.116 The remaining question then is whether there are 
any substantial and significant differences in the effect of this variable 
among voters in different countries due to differences in the political sys-
tems. This is especially relevant since at least three of the contextually re-
lated factors had a decreasing direct and significant impact on the percep-
tual deviations, both among individuals and between countries. Can the 
contextually related factors such as the degree of competition within a sys-
tem, regarded mostly as facilitative but to some extent also motivational, 
increase or decrease the effect on voters’ PD of the affectively related vari-
able ideological distance? 
A first and prerequisite step to an answer, is to start by looking at the 
country variation in the effect of ideological distance on voters’ PD. Is there 
any variation between the countries included in the study and can any po-
tential differences possibly be explained by the contextually related factors 
within the respective political systems? 
 
 
 
                                                   
116 A possible explanation behind the insignificant effect of whether a voter likes or dislikes a 
specific party on PD might be that the variables like-dislike and ideological distance are 
highly related to each other in the sense that voters also tend to like parties that are closer to 
themselves and vice versa. 
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Figure 2. The predicted effect of ideological distance on PD (random inter-
cepts and random intercepts and slopes (empirical bayes)) 
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Comment: The graphs are based on the bivariate predicted effects of ideological distance on voter’ PD. 
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the country specific variation in both intercepts and 
slopes in the effect on voters’ PD of the distance between a voter’s self-
placement and placement of the parties along a left-right scale (figure 2 is 
based on the first model in table 4 and illustrates the relationship between 
ideological distance and PD). Both the regression coefficient and the slope 
and intercept variation is significantly different from zero). Clearly, there 
are not only great variations in the intercepts between the countries, but 
also in the effect of ideological distance on PD. This is especially true for 
higher values of ideological distance, where the direction and magnitude of 
the effects differ between countries. Whether these differences can be ex-
plained by a cross-level interaction between ideological distance and the 
degree of competition or any of the other contextually party related vari-
ables, such as divergence, labels or size is a remaining empirical question.  
According to the hypotheses presented in the earlier theoretical section, 
proportional electoral systems tend to promote more centralized party or-
ganizations that are more programmatically and ideologically oriented. In 
more disproportional or majority systems, on the other hand, the parties 
are expected to be more ‘all embracing’ and downplay ideological conflicts 
and focus more on particularistic policies or issues that are less likely to 
meet resistance in the electorate, since they need to appeal to the ‘whole’ 
electorate (Norris 2004). A similar logic applies to more vs. less competi-
tive party systems. The more a system is competitive, the more the party 
leaders will be motivated to profile their party by emphasizing the differ-
ences with competing parties  in  an  attempt  to mobilize voters (Franklin, 
van der Eijk, and Oppenhuis 1996). In this way, ideological undertones 
and statements might be of great importance when distinguishing ‘us from 
them’. Reasonably, if ideologically committed and centralized party organi-
zation, where party representatives are using bonding rather than bridging 
strategies, is an important attribute of more competitive political systems. 
Then the voters could be expected to develop stronger and more affective 
attachments to the parties in terms of ideology, which in turn should in-
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crease the affective effect of the ideological distance between voters and 
parties.  
On the other hand, following Holmberg’s argument, wishful thinking 
appears when voters are looking at parties that are a bit fuzzy and unclear 
(Holmberg 1999). If party representatives in more competitive systems are 
eager to demarcate their party as clearly as possible from others, then the 
levels of wishful thinking, due to an affective impact of ideological distance 
between parties and voters, should decrease among voters. The degree of 
competition thus could work alternatively as a facilitative contextual factor 
that might have a decreasing impact on the effect of the affectively related 
variable ideological distance on voters’ PD. For the same reason we could 
expect the remaining contextually party related variables to have a similar 
impact on the effect of ideological distance on PD. If parties holds diver-
gent policy positions, have labels that signals theirs positions on the left-
right continuum or are of small or medium electoral size, this should facili-
tate voters when absorbing information about the parties and hence, bring 
clarity in their perceptions of the parties’ policy positions. 
Table 4 reports an extended multilevel model where not only the inter-
cepts (as in table 2) but also the effects of the individually related variable 
ideological distance are set to vary. The 1:st model (which equals the last 
model in table 2 excepting that the slopes, also are set to vary for the vari-
able ideological distance) serves as a baseline model.  
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The 2:nd model reveals a significant and additional effect of ideological 
distance that seems to depend on the degree of competition. This interac-
tion effect indicates that the effect of ideological distance decreases with (-
.010***) for every additional unit in the degree of competition. When 
looking at the constitutive effect of the interaction term, we also find that 
the effect of ideological distance increases to (.090***) when the degree of 
competition is held at zero. This is an interesting finding, even though the 
effect is rather small. According to the motivational hypothesis, parties 
should be more likely to employ ‘bonding-strategies’ in more competitive 
systems, which is why the affective attachment between parties and voters 
should increase. This in turn was expected to increase the effect of ideo-
logical distance on voters’ PD. It seems instead that the effect of ideological 
distance on voters’ PD is weaker in more competitive political systems and 
this supports the simplicity hypothesis. Hence, a higher degree of competi-
tion translates to clearer party positions which facilitate comprehension 
and thus decrease wishful thinking among voters.  
In the 3:rd model a second interaction term is included between ideo-
logical distance and divergence in a party’s left-right position. The result 
shows that there is a rather strong additional effect of divergence on PD (-
.043***), which means that the effect of ideological distance on PD is de-
creasing with -.043 for every unit-increase of divergence. This effect is par-
ticularly robust even in the 4:th model where the first interaction between 
ideological distance and competition is included. The results so far point to 
the fact that the effect of ideological distance on PD seems to be dependent 
on clarity or salience in the parties’ policy positions. Wishful thinking de-
clines when it is easier for voters to apprehend or perceive the positions of 
the parties. Factors that may mitigate assimilation and contrast effects 
among voters are from a normative point of view desirable, since less per-
ceptual distortion amongst voters implies a more effective and meaningful 
representation.  
An interaction term between divergence and competition appears to be 
necessary to attempt to further examine whether or not the mitigating ef-
fect of competition on the impact of ideological distance on voters’ PD de-
pends on an increasing clarity in the parties’ left-right positions. According 
to the Downsian theorem (Downs 1957) the degree of competition should 
influence parties to take more divergent policy positions, at least in multi-
party systems, which in turn has been shown to have the strongest positive 
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impact on voters’ PD.117 Especially since the effect of divergence, theoreti-
cally, may depend on the degree of competition and since competition 
alone, under control for this effect, seems to have a negative effect on PD. 
The 5:th model includes an interaction term between divergence and the 
degree of competition. The result confirms the suspicions regarding the in-
teractive effect between competition and divergence since the effect of di-
vergence on PD is decreases with (-.018***) for every unit increase of 
competition. Even in this model the fixed effect of competition on voters’ 
PD is negative. 
In the 6:th model, all three interactions between divergence and competi-
tion and ideological distance vs. divergence and competition are included. 
The interaction between ideological distance and divergence and the effect 
of ideological distance and competition thus is considerably robust in all 
the models. Obviously the effect of ideological distance on PD decreases 
with more divergent party positions and in more competitive systems, at 
the same time as the effect of divergence, under control for all other vari-
ables, has an additional impact on PD for every unit-increase of competi-
tion.118  
Interactions between ideological distance and party size and ideological 
family membership are included in the next three models. The effects are 
small but significant throughout, and the effect of ideological distance and 
ideological family in the ninth model, under control for all other variables, 
have a significant effect on PD (.007**). This result indicates that there is a 
slight increase in the effect of ideological distance on PD when moving 
from a party that is not directly attached to or associated with the left-right 
dimension. This finding somewhat weakens the support for the hypothesis 
that party labels sometimes can serve as cues for the voters, and make the 
party positions more easily apprehensible and, hence, reducing the inclina-
tion to wishful thinking. An alternative interpretation in this respect is in-
stead that more ideologically related labels, may exaggerate the inclination 
to wishful thinking among voters. 
In the final model, both the fixed effects of ideological distance 
(.137***) and competition (.037***) have an increasing positive impact on 
 
 
                                                   
117 For this reason different combinations and triple interactions of competition, divergence 
and the effective number of parties has also been tested for but without any substantial ef-
fects. An interaction between competition and the effective number of parties were also re-
gressed on the degree of divergence among parties but there were no effects of this model that 
supported the Downsian theorem.   
118 A triple interaction term based on LR-distance*divergence*competition was also tested for 
but it did only yield a small and insignificant effect on PD.  
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voters’ PD. However, we also find a small but significant additional inter-
action effect of ideological distance and competition (-.009***) under con-
trol for all other variables included in the model. Obviously, competition 
and ideological distance exerts an independent influence on PD as such, but 
for every increase in competition, the positive effect of ideological distance 
decreases. This strengthens our view that the affective part of ideological 
distance increases in less competitive systems as under such circumstances 
the parties are expected to downplay the differences between themselves 
and the competing parties. This in turn makes it harder for voters to dis-
cern the parties policy positions which heightens the elements of ‘wishful 
thinking’ i.e. the tendency to ‘push and pull’ parties depending on the dis-
tance between a voter’s self-placement and the placement of parties. In 
more competitive systems, on the other hand, the parties are more inclined 
to profile themselves more clearly in terms of ideology and other policy 
positions. Moreover we find that the effect of ideological distance on PD 
decreases with (-.149***)119 for every unit increase in divergence and that it 
increases with (.005***) for every unit decrease in party size (since this 
variable is measured as the percentages of votes, an effect of .005 is rather 
big).  
Recalling that the random intercepts and slopes capture the variation in 
the individually related variable ideological distance across countries, the 
estimated standard deviation of the intercepts for each country successively 
decreases from (.232***) in the first model to (.219***) in the last model. 
This indicates that there is some contextual variation in the effect of ideo-
logical distance on voters’ PD and that the magnitude of the intercept 
variation decreases when all variables are taken into account. When it 
comes to the estimated variation in the impact of ideological distance, the 
standard deviation of the ideological distance coefficient has decreased 
from (.069***) in the first model to (.053***) in the last model. The dif-
ferences are small but significantly different from zero. The fact that the 
country specific intercept variation and the estimated variation in the im-
pact of ideological distance on PD are both change to some extent across 
the models indicates that the macro variables in fact, are able to explain 
some of the differences between the countries included in the analysis.  
A particularly large indirect impact of divergence on PD is of great inter-
est. But what does this interaction effect really mean? Figure 3 illustrates 
the interaction effect of ideological distance and divergence by plotting the 
 
 
                                                   
119 The interpretation of this effect should be made cautiously since the estimated variance 
inflation factor reaches 15.54 for this variable in the full model (see appendix II). 
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predicted effects of ideological distance on PD for different values of diver-
gence when all other variables are held at their mean. Clearly, the effect of 
ideological distance on PD decreases for higher values of divergence. 
 
Figure 3. Effect-plot of the effect of ideological distance on voters’ percep-
tual deviation for different values of divergence in the parties’ left-right po-
sitions (mle) 
 
Comment: The effect-plot of the effect of ideological distance on voters’ perceptual deviation for different values of 
divergence in the parties’ left-right positions has been made with R version 2.7.2 using the “lattice” and “grid” pack-
ages (R-Development Core Team 2005).  
 
 
In a theoretical circumstance of no divergence among parties’ ideological 
positions, the predicted effect of ideological distance on PD increased dra-
matically (which can be seen in the diagram to the lower left), while the 
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opposite holds when there is maximum divergence in the party positions 
(which can be seen in the box in the upper right corner). It is debatable 
whether assimilation or contrast effects or simply selective exposure (you 
collect information about parties you like) produce the effect of the ideo-
logical distance on voters’ PD. Nevertheless, the results in this study show 
that facilitative factors and characteristics related mainly to parties, can 
mitigate the effect of wishful thinking on voters’ PD 
Summary and conclusion 
This study took the responsible party model, a normative theory of repre-
sentative democracy with focus on political parties and voting behavior, as 
its theoretical point of departure. The ultimate goal of the research was to 
investigate the circumstances under which efficient policy representation, in 
terms of low levels of perceptual deviation among voters, can exist. The 
immediate aims of the study were twofold: firstly, to explore which vari-
ables drawn from the theoretical literature on voters, parties and political 
systems that had the greatest impact on voters’ PD; secondly, to try to ex-
plain the country specific differences in PD caused by different affectively 
related, and normatively obscure, features among voters and to examine if 
these individually related variables were interacting with the context and 
how. 
Analytical results reported above clearly show that the system related 
variables had the smallest effect on voters’ PD while the party and the indi-
vidually related variables exerted the greatest impact. Only degree of com-
petition out of four variables among the system related variables was sig-
nificantly different from zero, whilst ideological distance, education and 
age among the five individually related variables had a significant impact. 
Among the party related factors, ideological party family/party labels, di-
vergence and electoral size of the four variables were significantly divided 
from zero. Overall, the party related variables followed by the individually 
related variables seem to be of the greatest importance for voters’ PD, and 
the degrees of divergence in a party’s position had the greatest total effect.  
The results only give empirical support to just one of the solely motiva-
tional factors, namely the ideological distance between a voter’s self-
placement and the placement of parties. It appears that perceptions of the 
parties’ positions seems to be more blurred the greater the distance. A row 
of facilitative factors however, mitigate this effect. Education and gender 
correlated with higher degrees of PD among the individually related fac-
tors. Among the party related factors, an increase in electoral size tended to 
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render more distorted perceptions of parties, a result that is well in line 
with our expectations about big ‘catch-all’ parties.  
Divergence had, as mentioned, the greatest effect in promoting PD and 
the relationship of party labels to the left-right dimension was, to some ex-
tent, another. On the system level, the degree of competition tended to 
yield higher degrees of PD among voters. These factors have a facilitative 
rather than motivational character in common. An objection could be that 
there is a reciprocal relationship between the degree of competition and PD 
which qualifies competition as a motivational factor as well. This is true in 
the sense that voters may be more motivated through an increasing mobili-
zation due to greater party competition. On the other hand, parties are ex-
pected to profile themselves most clearly when the competition is high and 
they are competing for the same votes. The results also showed that the 
degree of divergence among parties tends to increase along with the 
amount of competition. Divergence was in turn the factor that had the 
greatest independent impact on voters’ PD. For this reason, competition 
seems to be more of a facilitative than a motivational factor behind voters’ 
PD.  
As mentioned, the perceived ideological distance between a voter and a 
party had a negative impact on PD among the individually related vari-
ables. It is noteworthy that the effect of ideological distance on PD de-
creased as system competitiveness rose. A sensible explanation of this result 
is that the parties are expected to clarify the differences between themselves 
when the competition is high.  
Voters in general do not seem to maintain the affective relationships 
with political parties as was believed from earlier research. It seems instead, 
as if ‘push and pull’ effects occur when the policy positions of the parties 
are blurred because either a policy position is shared by several parties, a 
party is big, the party does not provide a cue to its expected position by its 
brand name or a low degree of competitiveness within a system. Misper-
ceptions it would seem, are to a large extent the product of a complex and 
indistinct party space. According to Heider (1946), voters wish to maintain 
cognitive balance and so desire structure and clarity in the party space; 
something that in turn inclines them to wishful thinking when the party 
positions are unclear.  
In conclusion, all contexts related factors having a significant impact on 
PD were connected mainly to the political parties. These variables were 
also facilitative rather than motivational in character and appeared to miti-
gate the degrees of wishful thinking exhibited among voters. It is not too 
far fetched to conclude that the responsibility for establishing an effective 
system of representation in terms of policy to a large extent lies with the 
political parties. Misperceptions among voters seem to occur when princi-
pally when party positions are blurred and unclear.  
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Appendix I 
Figure 1 shows the unlogaritimized mean value of perceptual deviation 
among voters in each of the countries included in the study (the unlogari-
timized mean value of PD for all countries together is 1.635). 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean perceptual deviation among all specific countries included 
in the study. 
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Table 1: Type of election system, Effective threshold, Disproportionality, 
Effective number of parties, Wing party ideological distance (WPD), 
Weighted perceptual agreement (WPA)120 and correlation between Left-
right self-placements and Party choice (Eta, Cramer’s V). 
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Country 
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2001 Bulgaria  List PR 4 6.5 2.40 .38 7.10 .61 1.90 .82 
1998 Sweden  List PR 4 1 4.29 .59 7.78 .65 2.15 .77 
1996 Czech Republic  List PR 5 9 4.15 .56 8.33 .62 2.03 .76 
2003 Israel  List PR 1.5 2.0 4.18 .68 6.48 .50 2.05 .76 
2003 The Netherlands List PR 2.6 2.5d 3.19 .55e 3.75 .63 . .74 
2002 Sweden  List PR 4 1.2 4.24 .52a 7.25 .64 2.50 .73 
2000 Hong Kong  Prop . . . .45 2.34 .58 . .72 
2002 The Netherlands List PR 2.3 2.7c 3.17 .47e 3.60 .61 3.84 .72 
2001 Norway  List PR 4 2.3 5.55 .39 5.32 .61 2.64 .71 
1999 Iceland  List PR 16 1.2 3.45 . 6.01 .65 1.89 .70 
2000 Spain  List PR 9.7 5.1 2.48 .43 4.86 .59 1.09 .70 
1996 Israel  List PR 1.5 1.9 5.61 .68 5.95 .50 1.83 .69 
1998 Denmark  List PR 2 1.9 4.54 .39 6.12 .68 2.14 .69 
2003 Iceland  List PR 16 1.9 . . . . . .68 
2002 Hungary  Qvasi-Maj Mixed 26h 25.1 2.66 .82 6.23 .59 2.23 .67 
2003 Chile  List PR 25 2.4 5.00f . 5.26 .27 2.00 .67 
1997 Lithuania  Semi-Prop 5 14.6g 3.32 .57 3.71 .52 . .66 
1999 Switzerland  List PR 8.6 3.1 5.16 . 4.58 .53 . .66 
2001 Poland  List PR 5 5.4 3.73 .38 6.75 .59 1.87 .66 
1997 Norway  List PR 4 3.7 4.36 .39 5.89 .59 2.28 .65 
1998 Ukraine  Semi-Prop 4 8.9g 6.07 .39 5.52 .42 .93 .65 
1996 New Zealand  Quasi-Prop Mixed 5 4.5 3.76 .44 5.35 .53 2.14 .64 
2001 Denmark  List PR 2 .8 5.19 .55b 6.66 .63 2.66 .63 
2003 Finland  List PR 5.23 3.0 4.78 .38 5.12 .54 2.72 .63 
1998 The Netherlands List PR .7 1.1 4.82 .4 4.38 .62 3.10 .59 
1999 Russia  Semi-Prop 5h 5.8g 5.51f .52 6.21 .41 . .57 
2002 New Zealand  Quasi-Prop Mixed 5 1.9 3.83 .47 4.64 .39 2.24 .57 
1996 Spain  List PR 9.7 5.6 2.72 .43 5.56 .62 1.16 .52 
1997 Great Britain  Majority 37.5 16.8 2.12 .54 3.20 .45 1.34 .52 
1998 Hungary  Qvasi-Maj Mixed 26h 22.4 3.45 .82 4.98 .45 1.98 .51 
 
 
                                                   
120 The parties, for which the perceptual agreement has been calculated, have been weighted 
according to the election results (percentages).  
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2004 Australia  Majority (Alt Vote) 37.5 7.9 2.31 . 2.63 .26 1.10 .50 
1996 Slovenia  Semi-Prop 3 2.5g 5.53 .43 3.13 .35 1.63 .49 
1998 Germany  Qvasi-Prop Mixed 5 3.1 3.31 .51 4.23 .51 2.00 .49 
2004 Korea  Qvasi-Maj Mixed 32 12.1 . .39 . . . .48 
2001 Belarus  Majority . . 3.76 .6 2.63 .26 . .44 
1997 Canada  Majority 37.5 13.2 2.98 .37 2.60 .37 1.32 .41 
1996 Australia  Majority (Alt Vote) 37.5 11.6 2.62 .45 2.66 .42 1.85 .40 
1996 Japan  Qvasi-Maj Mixed 25.1 13.2 2.94 .54 5.19 .49 . .40 
2002 Portugal  List PR 6.6 5.0 2.62 .52 6.00 .59 1.39 .40 
2004 USA  Majority 37.5 2.5 2.11f . 2.59 .34 1.07 .40 
1999 Belgium Flanders List PR 8.8 2.6 9.05 .44 3.44 .37 2.16 .39 
2001 Great Britain  Majority 37.5 16.8 2.74 .44 .12 .60 . .36 
1997 Poland  List PR 5 1.7 13.56 .51 6.49 .58 1.97 .32 
2002 Ireland  STV 14.9 6.4 3.30 .34 3.38 .49 2.36 .32 
1996 USA  Majority 37.5 3.2 2.00 . . . . .31 
2002 Czech Republic  List PR 5 5.1 3.92 .64e 7.47 .65 1.92 .30 
1997 Mexico  Quasi-Maj Mixed 22.7 8.4 2.86f .50 3.34 .03 1.65 .29 
2000 Peru  List PR . 6.08c 13.97c .44 3.14 .17  .27 
1998 Hong Kong  Prop . . . .45 1.93 .44 . .26 
2001 Taiwan  Qvasi-Maj Mixed 11.3 3.6 3.53 . 1.34 .39 1.45 .17 
1996 Romania  List PR 3 5.81g 4.30f .36 2.94 .29 2.53 .16 
2004 Hong Kong  Prop . 3.1 2.73 . 3.56 .36 1.25 .13 
2000 Korea  Qvasi-Maj Mixed 32 14.5g 3.32f .41 2.35 .42 1.14 .11 
1996 Taiwan  Qvasi-Maj Mixed 11.3 5.6 2.54 .49 2.12 .38 .74 .09 
1999 Belgium Wallonia List PR 8.8 2.6 9.05 .39 3.88 .51 1.35 .08 
2001 Peru  List PR . 14.57c 6.64c .44 2.35 .11  .07 
2000 Mexico  Quasi-Maj Mixed 22.7 8.4 2.55f .50 3.97 .09 1.99 .01 
1998 Czech Republic  List PR 5 7.1 3.49 . 7.47 .64 . . 
1999 Chile  List PR 25 5.9 2.33f . 5.35 .56 2.01 . 
2001 Thailand  Majority 37.5 3.3 4.32 .38 . . . . 
2002 Brazil  List PR 3.75 3.3 4.97 . 2.72 .18 2.11 . 
2002 France  
Two-Round 
System 37.5 17.7 4.82 .50 5.43 .42 . . 
2002 Germany  Qvasi-Prop Mixed 5 3.1 3.42 .52e 5.36 .61 2.14 . 
Comment: Data on Electoral Systems are from the CSES macro dataset module 1 and 2 and can be found at: 
www.cses.org. Data for Netherlands in 2002 and 2003 is from G.A. Irwin, J.J.M. van Holsteyn and J.M. den Ridder 
(2005), Dutch Parliamentary Election study 2002-2003, Amsterdam: Rozenberg Publishers/NIWI-Steinmetz Ar-
chive/SKON. Only respondents that assigned a ‘like-dislike’ to all parties are included in the unfolding analyses. Since 
a dichotomous unfolding model (MUDFOLD) was employed, cut-points for ‘picked’ party had to be selected. A party 
was considered ‘picked’ by a respondent if the party scored 6-10 on the eleven-point like-dislike-scale. This range of 
evaluative response had to be adjusted to find better j-scales: a) range 5-10, b) range 4-1. There are a number of 
possible reasons why a stimuli (party) may not be unfoldable, such as if the stimuli is too popular or too unpopular, if a 
stimuli is very close to another stimuli, or if a stimuli does not fit the scale (the responses to the stimuli was guided by 
a completely other principle, or ideology, than all other stimuli). *Unweighted PA-measures. 1) Left-right self place-
ment is here measured on a 10-point scale instead of a 11-point scale as normally used in the CSES dataset.c: Data 
comes from www.electionguide.org. d: Data comes from www.electionworld.org. e: data is taken from Dahlberg and 
Oscarsson (2006) f: data is taken from Golder, M. 2004. Democratic Electoral Systems around the World, 1946-200. 
New York University (Forth coming in Electoral Systems) g: Data comes from www.aceproject.org. h: Data is taken 
from Dawisha, K. and Deets, S. (2006) "Political Learning in Postcommunist Elections," East European Politics and 
Society, 20:3, forthcoming. 
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Appendix II 
Figure 6. The distribution of the dependent variable perceptual deviation, 
the original and the logarithmized versions. 
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Table 6. Variance inflation test of model 10 in table 5. 
 Individually related factors  Party related factors  
Party sympathy 1.64 Party age 1.08 
Ideological distance 10.80 Ideological family 2.42 
Age 1.05 Vote share 7.91 
Gender 1.00 Divergence 10.23 
Education 1.07   - 
System related factors   Interactions  
Left-right unidimensionality 1.25 Ideological distance*competition 5.26 
Disproportionality 1.43 Divergence*competition 5.32 
Effective # of parties 1.55 Ideological distance*divergence 15.54 
Competition 4.85 Ideological distance*Ideological family 6.41 
  - Ideological distance*Vote share 11.03 
Mean VIF 4.99   4.99 
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